9router/open-sse/utils/proxyFetch.js
@aaronjmars 52c38cf94c
fix(security): scope OAuth callback postMessage targets and re-enable TLS verification on DNS-bypass fetch (#998)
Two findings, neither blocked by anything else:

1. src/app/callback/page.js — the OAuth callback page posted the
   { code, state } payload to window.opener with targetOrigin "*", so any
   page that opened the popup against the well-known redirect_uri received
   the live OAuth code. The expectedOrigins list was already computed but
   never used. Iterate over it and pass the origin per send.

2. open-sse/utils/proxyFetch.js — createBypassRequest() set
   rejectUnauthorized: false on the HTTPS request that runs after the
   Google-DNS-resolved real-IP fallback (used for cloudcode-pa.googleapis,
   GitHub Copilot, Cursor, AWS LLM endpoints). Combined with servername:
   parsedUrl.hostname this gave SNI-correct connections that nonetheless
   ignored cert validation, so an on-path attacker could swap in their
   own cert and read the user's API tokens / prompts. Drop the flag.

Detected by Aeon + semgrep (javascript.browser.security.wildcard-postmessage-configuration
+ problem-based-packs.insecure-transport.js-node.bypass-tls-verification).
Severity: HIGH (#1) / MEDIUM (#2).
CWEs: CWE-1385 (#1), CWE-295 (#2).

Co-authored-by: aeonframework <aeon@aeonframework.dev>
2026-05-10 21:10:48 +07:00

273 lines
9.2 KiB
JavaScript

import { Readable } from "stream";
import { MEMORY_CONFIG } from "../config/runtimeConfig.js";
const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch;
const proxyDispatchers = new Map();
// DNS cache — use Map to avoid prototype pollution via malformed hostnames
const DNS_CACHE = new Map();
const MITM_BYPASS_HOSTS = [
"cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com",
"daily-cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com",
"api.individual.githubcopilot.com",
"q.us-east-1.amazonaws.com",
"codewhisperer.us-east-1.amazonaws.com",
"api2.cursor.sh",
];
const GOOGLE_DNS_SERVERS = ["8.8.8.8", "8.8.4.4"];
const HTTPS_PORT = 443;
const HTTP_SUCCESS_MIN = 200;
const HTTP_SUCCESS_MAX = 300;
function normalizeString(value) {
if (value === undefined || value === null) return "";
return String(value).trim();
}
/**
* Resolve real IP using Google DNS (bypass system DNS)
*/
async function resolveRealIP(hostname) {
const cached = DNS_CACHE.get(hostname);
if (cached && Date.now() < cached.expiry) return cached.ip;
try {
const dns = await import("dns");
const { promisify } = await import("util");
const resolver = new dns.Resolver();
resolver.setServers(GOOGLE_DNS_SERVERS);
const resolve4 = promisify(resolver.resolve4.bind(resolver));
const addresses = await resolve4(hostname);
DNS_CACHE.set(hostname, { ip: addresses[0], expiry: Date.now() + MEMORY_CONFIG.dnsCacheTtlMs });
return addresses[0];
} catch (error) {
console.warn(`[ProxyFetch] DNS resolve failed for ${hostname}:`, error.message);
return null;
}
}
/**
* Check if request should bypass MITM DNS redirect
*/
function shouldBypassMitmDns(url) {
try {
const hostname = new URL(url).hostname;
return MITM_BYPASS_HOSTS.some(host => hostname.includes(host));
} catch { return false; }
}
function shouldBypassByNoProxy(targetUrl, noProxyValue) {
const noProxy = normalizeString(noProxyValue);
if (!noProxy) return false;
let hostname;
try { hostname = new URL(targetUrl).hostname.toLowerCase(); } catch { return false; }
const patterns = noProxy.split(",").map((p) => p.trim().toLowerCase()).filter(Boolean);
return patterns.some((pattern) => {
if (pattern === "*") return true;
if (pattern.startsWith(".")) return hostname.endsWith(pattern) || hostname === pattern.slice(1);
return hostname === pattern || hostname.endsWith(`.${pattern}`);
});
}
/**
* Get proxy URL from environment
*/
function getEnvProxyUrl(targetUrl) {
const noProxy = process.env.NO_PROXY || process.env.no_proxy;
if (shouldBypassByNoProxy(targetUrl, noProxy)) return null;
let protocol;
try { protocol = new URL(targetUrl).protocol; } catch { return null; }
if (protocol === "https:") {
return process.env.HTTPS_PROXY || process.env.https_proxy ||
process.env.ALL_PROXY || process.env.all_proxy;
}
return process.env.HTTP_PROXY || process.env.http_proxy ||
process.env.ALL_PROXY || process.env.all_proxy;
}
/**
* Normalize proxy URL (allow host:port)
*/
function normalizeProxyUrl(proxyUrl) {
const normalizedInput = normalizeString(proxyUrl);
if (!normalizedInput) return null;
try {
new URL(normalizedInput);
return normalizedInput;
} catch {
// Allow "127.0.0.1:7890" style values
return `http://${normalizedInput}`;
}
}
function resolveConnectionProxyUrl(targetUrl, proxyOptions) {
const enabled = proxyOptions?.enabled === true || proxyOptions?.connectionProxyEnabled === true;
if (!enabled) return null;
const proxyUrlRaw = normalizeString(proxyOptions?.url ?? proxyOptions?.connectionProxyUrl);
if (!proxyUrlRaw) return null;
const noProxy = normalizeString(proxyOptions?.noProxy ?? proxyOptions?.connectionNoProxy);
if (noProxy && shouldBypassByNoProxy(targetUrl, noProxy)) return null;
return normalizeProxyUrl(proxyUrlRaw);
}
/**
* Create proxy dispatcher lazily (undici-compatible)
*/
async function getDispatcher(proxyUrl) {
const normalized = normalizeProxyUrl(proxyUrl);
if (!normalized) return null;
if (!proxyDispatchers.has(normalized)) {
// Evict oldest entry if max size reached
if (proxyDispatchers.size >= MEMORY_CONFIG.proxyDispatchersMaxSize) {
proxyDispatchers.delete(proxyDispatchers.keys().next().value);
}
const { ProxyAgent } = await import("undici");
proxyDispatchers.set(normalized, new ProxyAgent({ uri: normalized }));
}
return proxyDispatchers.get(normalized);
}
/**
* Create HTTPS request with manual socket connection (bypass DNS)
*/
async function createBypassRequest(parsedUrl, realIP, options) {
const httpsModule = await import("https");
const netModule = await import("net");
// CJS modules expose exports via .default in ESM dynamic import context
const https = httpsModule.default ?? httpsModule;
const net = netModule.default ?? netModule;
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const socket = new net.Socket();
socket.connect(HTTPS_PORT, realIP, () => {
const reqOptions = {
socket,
// SNI + cert hostname are validated against the hostname the caller
// asked for, not the IP we connected to. This keeps the DNS-bypass
// (avoiding /etc/hosts MITM) while still rejecting on-path attackers
// that present a different cert. The MITM_BYPASS_HOSTS targets are
// all public-CA-issued (Google / GitHub / AWS / Cursor) so default
// verification works without any extra trust store.
servername: parsedUrl.hostname,
path: parsedUrl.pathname + parsedUrl.search,
method: options.method || "POST",
headers: {
...options.headers,
Host: parsedUrl.hostname,
},
};
const req = https.request(reqOptions, (res) => {
const response = {
ok: res.statusCode >= HTTP_SUCCESS_MIN && res.statusCode < HTTP_SUCCESS_MAX,
status: res.statusCode,
statusText: res.statusMessage,
headers: new Map(Object.entries(res.headers)),
body: Readable.toWeb(res),
text: async () => {
const chunks = [];
for await (const chunk of res) chunks.push(chunk);
return Buffer.concat(chunks).toString();
},
json: async () => JSON.parse(await response.text()),
};
resolve(response);
});
req.on("error", reject);
if (options.body) {
req.write(typeof options.body === "string" ? options.body : JSON.stringify(options.body));
}
req.end();
});
socket.on("error", reject);
});
}
export async function proxyAwareFetch(url, options = {}, proxyOptions = null) {
const targetUrl = typeof url === "string" ? url : url.toString();
// Vercel relay: forward request via relay headers
const vercelRelayUrl = normalizeString(proxyOptions?.vercelRelayUrl);
if (vercelRelayUrl) {
const parsed = new URL(targetUrl);
const relayHeaders = {
...options.headers,
"x-relay-target": `${parsed.protocol}//${parsed.host}`,
"x-relay-path": `${parsed.pathname}${parsed.search}`,
};
return originalFetch(vercelRelayUrl, { ...options, headers: relayHeaders });
}
const connectionProxyUrl = resolveConnectionProxyUrl(targetUrl, proxyOptions);
const envProxyUrl = connectionProxyUrl ? null : normalizeProxyUrl(getEnvProxyUrl(targetUrl));
const proxyUrl = connectionProxyUrl || envProxyUrl;
// MITM DNS bypass: for known MITM-intercepted hosts, resolve real IP to avoid DNS spoof
if (shouldBypassMitmDns(targetUrl)) {
if (proxyUrl) {
// Proxy resolves DNS externally (not affected by /etc/hosts) — use proxy directly
try {
const dispatcher = await getDispatcher(proxyUrl);
return await originalFetch(url, { ...options, dispatcher });
} catch (proxyError) {
if (proxyOptions?.strictProxy === true) {
throw new Error(`[ProxyFetch] Proxy required but failed (strictProxy=true): ${proxyError.message}`);
}
console.warn(`[ProxyFetch] Proxy failed, falling back to direct bypass: ${proxyError.message}`);
}
}
// No proxy — manually resolve real IP to bypass DNS spoof
try {
const parsedUrl = new URL(targetUrl);
const realIP = await resolveRealIP(parsedUrl.hostname);
if (realIP) return await createBypassRequest(parsedUrl, realIP, options);
} catch (error) {
console.warn(`[ProxyFetch] MITM bypass failed: ${error.message}`);
}
}
if (proxyUrl) {
try {
const dispatcher = await getDispatcher(proxyUrl);
return await originalFetch(url, { ...options, dispatcher });
} catch (proxyError) {
// If strictProxy is enabled, fail hard instead of falling back to direct
if (proxyOptions?.strictProxy === true) {
throw new Error(`[ProxyFetch] Proxy required but failed (strictProxy=true): ${proxyError.message}`);
}
console.warn(`[ProxyFetch] Proxy failed, falling back to direct: ${proxyError.message}`);
return originalFetch(url, options);
}
}
return originalFetch(url, options);
}
/**
* Patched global fetch with env-proxy support and MITM DNS bypass
*/
async function patchedFetch(url, options = {}) {
return proxyAwareFetch(url, options, null);
}
// Idempotency guard — only patch once to avoid wrapping multiple times
if (globalThis.fetch !== patchedFetch) {
globalThis.fetch = patchedFetch;
}
export default patchedFetch;