docs: add git-worktree suite, security kill switch, update reference.yaml + CC releases
- Git worktree commands: overhauled main + 3 new (status, remove, clean) - Security hardening: AI Kill Switch & Containment Architecture (§3.5) - DevOps SRE: cross-reference to security-hardening for AI incidents - CC releases: v2.1.43-v2.1.44 tracking - reference.yaml: 12 new entries, evaluations count 67 → 74 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Florian BRUNIAUX
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@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ tags: [reference, release]
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> **Full details**: [github.com/anthropics/claude-code/CHANGELOG.md](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
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> **Machine-readable**: [claude-code-releases.yaml](../machine-readable/claude-code-releases.yaml)
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**Latest**: v2.1.42 | **Updated**: 2026-02-16
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**Latest**: v2.1.44 | **Updated**: 2026-02-17
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---
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@ -25,6 +25,16 @@ tags: [reference, release]
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## 2.1.x Series (January-February 2026)
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### v2.1.44 (2026-02-17)
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- Fixed: Auth refresh errors
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### v2.1.43 (2026-02-17)
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- Fixed: AWS auth refresh hanging indefinitely (added 3-minute timeout)
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- Fixed: Structured-outputs beta header being sent unconditionally on Vertex/Bedrock
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- Fixed: Spurious warnings for non-agent markdown files in `.claude/agents/` directory
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### v2.1.42 (2026-02-14)
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- **Improved**: Startup performance via deferred Zod schema construction (faster on large projects)
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@ -314,6 +314,7 @@ Understanding limitations prevents frustration and unsafe reliance.
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- **Highly confidential incidents**: Data breach investigation (legal implications)
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- **Simple, obvious fixes**: If you know the answer, just do it
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- **Compliance-restricted environments**: Check if AI tools are allowed
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- **AI-specific security incidents**: Prompt injection detected, MCP compromised, agent exfiltrating data → See [Security Hardening — Response](./security-hardening.md#part-3-response-when-things-go-wrong) for dedicated procedures (kill switch architecture, containment levels, incident timelines)
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### When Claude Excels
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@ -623,6 +623,56 @@ fi
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> **Full docs**: [AI Traceability Guide](./ai-traceability.md#51-entire-cli), [Third-Party Tools](./third-party-tools.md)
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### 3.5 AI Kill Switch & Containment Architecture
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> **Context**: Agentic coding tools operate at the developer's privilege level — anything you can do, the agent can do ([Fortune, Dec 2025](https://fortune.com/2025/12/15/ai-coding-tools-security-exploit-software/)). No model provider has fully solved prompt injection. Plan your containment accordingly.
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**Three-level kill switch mapped to Claude Code:**
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| Level | Concept | Claude Code Mechanism | When to Use |
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|-------|---------|----------------------|-------------|
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| **1. Scoped Revocation** | Disable specific capabilities | [`dangerous-actions-blocker.sh`](../examples/hooks/bash/dangerous-actions-blocker.sh) hook, `permissions.deny` in settings | Suspicious behavior, restrict scope |
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| **2. Velocity Governor** | Rate-limit or threshold triggers | Custom hook tracking command frequency, `--allowedTools` flag to restrict tool set | Agent acting erratically, too many changes |
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| **3. Global Hard Stop** | Kill everything immediately | `Ctrl+C` / `Esc`, `claude config set --disable`, uninstall | Confirmed compromise, emergency |
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**Practical example — Level 2 velocity governor hook:**
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```bash
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#!/bin/bash
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# .claude/hooks/velocity-governor.sh
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# Event: PreToolUse
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# Blocks if >20 Bash commands in 5 minutes (adjust thresholds)
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COUNTER_FILE="/tmp/claude-cmd-counter-$$"
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WINDOW=300 # 5 minutes
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THRESHOLD=20
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# Count recent invocations
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NOW=$(date +%s)
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echo "$NOW" >> "$COUNTER_FILE"
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# Clean entries older than window
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if [[ -f "$COUNTER_FILE" ]]; then
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CUTOFF=$((NOW - WINDOW))
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awk -v cutoff="$CUTOFF" '$1 >= cutoff' "$COUNTER_FILE" > "${COUNTER_FILE}.tmp"
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mv "${COUNTER_FILE}.tmp" "$COUNTER_FILE"
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COUNT=$(wc -l < "$COUNTER_FILE")
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if (( COUNT > THRESHOLD )); then
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echo '{"decision": "block", "reason": "Rate limit: >'"$THRESHOLD"' commands in '"$((WINDOW/60))"'min. Possible runaway agent."}'
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exit 0
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fi
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fi
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exit 0
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```
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**Regulatory context:**
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- **EU AI Act** (Aug 2025): Kill switches mandatory for high-risk AI systems. Non-compliance = fines up to 7% global turnover. If your org deploys Claude Code in regulated workflows, document your containment architecture.
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- **CoSAI AI Incident Response Framework V1.0** (Nov 2025): First framework addressing AI-specific incidents (data poisoning, prompt injection, model theft). Reference for teams building incident response procedures. ([OASIS](https://www.oasis-open.org/2025/11/18/coalition-for-secure-ai-releases-two-actionable-frameworks-for-ai-model-signing-and-incident-response/))
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- **Governance-containment gap**: Industry data shows ~59% of orgs monitor AI agents, but only ~38% have actual kill-switch capability ([CDOTrends, Jan 2026](https://www.cdotrends.com/story/4854/your-fsi-ai-needs-kill-switch-should-terrify-you)). Monitoring without intervention = awareness without safety.
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---
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## Appendix: Quick Reference
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