feat(security): add security hardening guide and hooks v3.6.0
- Add guide/security-hardening.md (~10K) covering: - MCP vetting workflow with CVE-2025-53109/53110, 54135, 54136 - Prompt injection evasion techniques (Unicode, ANSI, null bytes) - Secret detection tool comparison (Gitleaks, TruffleHog, GitGuardian) - Incident response procedures - Add 3 new security hooks: - unicode-injection-scanner.sh: zero-width, RTL, ANSI escape detection - repo-integrity-scanner.sh: scan README/package.json for injection - mcp-config-integrity.sh: verify MCP config hash - Update existing hooks: - prompt-injection-detector.sh: +ANSI, +null bytes, +nested cmd - output-secrets-scanner.sh: +env leakage, +generic tokens - Update cross-references in ultimate-guide.md (§7.4, §8.6) - Move MCP Security Hardening to Done in IDEAS.md Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@ -393,4 +393,4 @@ where.exe claude; claude doctor; claude mcp list
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**Author**: Florian BRUNIAUX | [@Méthode Aristote](https://methode-aristote.fr) | Written with Claude
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*Last updated: January 2026 | Version 3.5.0*
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*Last updated: January 2026 | Version 3.6.0*
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434
guide/security-hardening.md
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guide/security-hardening.md
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# Security Hardening Guide
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> **Confidence**: Tier 2 — Based on CVE disclosures, security research (2024-2025), and community validation
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>
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> **Scope**: Active threats (attacks, injection, CVE). For data retention and privacy, see [data-privacy.md](./data-privacy.md)
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---
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## TL;DR - Decision Matrix
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| Your Situation | Immediate Action | Time |
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|----------------|------------------|------|
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| **Solo dev, public repos** | Install output scanner hook | 5 min |
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| **Team, sensitive codebase** | + MCP vetting + injection hooks | 30 min |
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| **Enterprise, production** | + ZDR + integrity verification | 2 hours |
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**Right now**: Check your MCPs against the [Safe List](#mcp-safe-list-community-vetted) below.
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> **NEVER**: Approve MCPs from unknown sources without version pinning.
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> **NEVER**: Run database MCPs on production without read-only credentials.
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---
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## Part 1: Prevention (Before You Start)
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### 1.1 MCP Vetting Workflow
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Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers extend Claude Code's capabilities but introduce significant attack surface. Understanding the threat model is essential.
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#### Attack: MCP Rug Pull
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```
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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
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│ 1. Attacker publishes benign MCP "code-formatter" │
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│ ↓ │
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│ 2. User adds to ~/.claude/mcp.json, approves once │
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│ ↓ │
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│ 3. MCP works normally for 2 weeks (builds trust) │
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│ ↓ │
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│ 4. Attacker pushes malicious update (no re-approval!) │
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│ ↓ │
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│ 5. MCP exfiltrates ~/.ssh/*, .env, credentials │
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└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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MITIGATION: Version pinning + hash verification + monitoring
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```
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This attack exploits the one-time approval model: once you approve an MCP, updates execute automatically without re-consent.
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#### CVE Summary (2025)
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| CVE | Severity | Impact | Mitigation |
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|-----|----------|--------|------------|
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| **CVE-2025-53109/53110** | High | Filesystem MCP sandbox escape via prefix bypass + symlinks | Avoid Filesystem MCP or apply patch |
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| **CVE-2025-54135** | High (8.6) | RCE in Cursor via prompt injection rewriting mcp.json | File integrity monitoring hook |
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| **CVE-2025-54136** | High | Persistent team backdoor via post-approval config tampering | Git hooks + hash verification |
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| **CVE-2025-49596** | Critical (9.4) | RCE in MCP Inspector tool | Update to patched version |
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**Source**: [Cymulate EscapeRoute](https://cymulate.com/blog/cve-2025-53109-53110-escaperoute-anthropic/), [Checkpoint MCPoison](https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/cursor-vulnerability-mcpoison/), [Cato CurXecute](https://www.catonetworks.com/blog/curxecute-rce/)
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#### Attack Patterns
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| Pattern | Description | Detection |
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|---------|-------------|-----------|
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| **Tool Poisoning** | Malicious instructions in tool metadata (descriptions, schemas) influence LLM before execution | Schema diff monitoring |
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| **Rug Pull** | Benign server turns malicious after gaining trust | Version pinning + hash verify |
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| **Confused Deputy** | Attacker registers tool with trusted name on untrusted server | Namespace verification |
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#### 5-Minute MCP Audit
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Before adding any MCP server, complete this checklist:
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| Step | Command/Action | Pass Criteria |
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|------|----------------|---------------|
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| **1. Source** | `gh repo view <mcp-repo>` | Stars >50, commits <30 days |
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| **2. Permissions** | Review `mcp.json` config | No `--dangerous-*` flags |
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| **3. Version** | Check version string | Pinned (not "latest" or "main") |
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| **4. Hash** | `sha256sum <mcp-binary>` | Matches release checksum |
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| **5. Audit** | Review recent commits | No suspicious changes |
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#### MCP Safe List (Community Vetted)
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| MCP Server | Status | Notes |
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|------------|--------|-------|
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| `@anthropic/mcp-server-*` | Safe | Official Anthropic servers |
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| `context7` | Safe | Read-only documentation lookup |
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| `sequential-thinking` | Safe | No external access, local reasoning |
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| `memory` | Safe | Local file-based persistence |
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| `filesystem` (unrestricted) | Risk | CVE-2025-53109/53110 - use with caution |
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| `database` (prod credentials) | Unsafe | Exfiltration risk - use read-only |
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| `browser` (full access) | Risk | Can navigate to malicious sites |
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*Last updated: 2026-01-15. [Report new assessments](../../issues)*
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#### Secure MCP Configuration Example
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```json
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{
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"mcpServers": {
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"context7": {
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"command": "npx",
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"args": ["-y", "@context7/mcp-server@1.2.3"],
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"env": {}
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},
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"database": {
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"command": "npx",
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"args": ["-y", "@company/db-mcp@2.0.1"],
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"env": {
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"DB_HOST": "readonly-replica.internal",
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"DB_USER": "readonly_user"
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}
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}
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}
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}
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```
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**Key practices**:
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- Pin exact versions (`@1.2.3`, not `@latest`)
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- Use read-only database credentials
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- Minimize environment variables exposed
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### 1.2 Repository Pre-Scan
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Before opening untrusted repositories, scan for injection vectors:
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**High-risk files to inspect**:
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- `README.md`, `SECURITY.md` — Hidden HTML comments with instructions
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- `package.json`, `pyproject.toml` — Malicious scripts in hooks
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- `.cursor/`, `.claude/` — Tampered configuration files
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- `CONTRIBUTING.md` — Social engineering instructions
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**Quick scan command**:
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```bash
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# Check for hidden instructions in markdown
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grep -r "<!--" . --include="*.md" | head -20
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# Check for suspicious npm scripts
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jq '.scripts' package.json 2>/dev/null
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# Check for base64 in comments
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grep -rE "#.*[A-Za-z0-9+/]{20,}={0,2}" . --include="*.py" --include="*.js"
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```
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Use the [repo-integrity-scanner.sh](../examples/hooks/bash/repo-integrity-scanner.sh) hook for automated scanning.
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---
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## Part 2: Detection (While You Work)
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### 2.1 Prompt Injection Detection
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Coding assistants are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through code context. Attackers embed instructions in files that Claude reads automatically.
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#### Evasion Techniques
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| Technique | Example | Risk | Detection |
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|-----------|---------|------|-----------|
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| **Zero-width chars** | `U+200B`, `U+200C`, `U+200D` | Instructions invisible to humans | Unicode regex |
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| **RTL override** | `U+202E` reverses text display | Hidden command appears normal | Bidirectional scan |
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| **ANSI escape** | `\x1b[` terminal sequences | Terminal manipulation | Escape filter |
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| **Null byte** | `\x00` truncation attacks | Bypass string checks | Null detection |
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| **Base64 comments** | `# SGlkZGVuOiBpZ25vcmU=` | LLM decodes automatically | Entropy check |
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| **Nested commands** | `$(evil_command)` | Bypass denylist via substitution | Pattern block |
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| **Homoglyphs** | Cyrillic `а` vs Latin `a` | Keyword filter bypass | Normalization |
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#### Detection Patterns
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```bash
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# Zero-width + RTL + Bidirectional
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[\x{200B}-\x{200D}\x{FEFF}\x{202A}-\x{202E}\x{2066}-\x{2069}]
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# ANSI escape sequences (terminal injection)
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\x1b\[|\x1b\]|\x1b\(
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# Null bytes (truncation attacks)
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\x00
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# Tag characters (invisible Unicode block)
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[\x{E0000}-\x{E007F}]
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# Base64 in comments (high entropy)
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[#;].*[A-Za-z0-9+/]{20,}={0,2}
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# Nested command execution
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\$\([^)]+\)|\`[^\`]+\`
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```
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#### Existing vs New Patterns
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The [prompt-injection-detector.sh](../examples/hooks/bash/prompt-injection-detector.sh) hook includes:
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| Pattern | Status | Location |
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|---------|--------|----------|
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| Role override (`ignore previous`) | Exists | Lines 50-72 |
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| Jailbreak attempts | Exists | Lines 74-95 |
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| Authority impersonation | Exists | Lines 120-145 |
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| Base64 payload detection | Exists | Lines 148-160 |
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| Zero-width characters | **New** | Added in v3.6.0 |
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| ANSI escape sequences | **New** | Added in v3.6.0 |
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| Null byte injection | **New** | Added in v3.6.0 |
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| Nested command `$()` | **New** | Added in v3.6.0 |
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### 2.2 Secret & Output Monitoring
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#### Tool Comparison
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| Tool | Recall | Precision | Speed | Best For |
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|------|--------|-----------|-------|----------|
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| **Gitleaks** | 88% | 46% | Fast (~2 min/100K commits) | Pre-commit hooks |
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| **TruffleHog** | 52% | 85% | Slow (~15 min) | CI verification |
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| **GitGuardian** | 80% | 95% | Cloud | Enterprise monitoring |
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| **detect-secrets** | 60% | 98% | Fast | Baseline approach |
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**Recommended stack**:
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```
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Pre-commit → Gitleaks (catch early, accept some FP)
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CI/CD → TruffleHog (verify with API validation)
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Monitoring → GitGuardian (if budget allows)
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```
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#### Environment Variable Leakage
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58% of leaked credentials are "generic secrets" (passwords, tokens without recognizable format). Watch for:
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| Vector | Example | Mitigation |
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|--------|---------|------------|
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| `env` / `printenv` output | Dumps all environment | Block in output scanner |
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| `/proc/self/environ` access | Linux env read | Block file access pattern |
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| Error messages with creds | Stack trace with DB password | Redact before display |
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| Bash history exposure | Commands with inline secrets | History sanitization |
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#### MCP Secret Scanner (Conceptual)
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```bash
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# Add Gitleaks as MCP tool for on-demand scanning
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claude mcp add gitleaks-scanner -- gitleaks detect --source . --report-format json
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# Usage in conversation
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"Scan this repo for secrets before I commit"
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```
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### 2.3 Hook Stack Setup
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Recommended security hook configuration for `~/.claude/settings.json`:
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```json
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{
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"hooks": {
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"PreToolUse": [
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{
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"matcher": "Bash",
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"hooks": [
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"~/.claude/hooks/dangerous-actions-blocker.sh"
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]
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},
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{
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"matcher": "Edit|Write",
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"hooks": [
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"~/.claude/hooks/prompt-injection-detector.sh",
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"~/.claude/hooks/unicode-injection-scanner.sh"
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]
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}
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],
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"PostToolUse": [
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{
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"matcher": "Bash",
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"hooks": [
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"~/.claude/hooks/output-secrets-scanner.sh"
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]
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}
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],
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"SessionStart": [
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"~/.claude/hooks/mcp-config-integrity.sh"
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]
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}
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}
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```
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**Hook installation**:
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```bash
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# Copy hooks to Claude directory
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cp examples/hooks/bash/*.sh ~/.claude/hooks/
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chmod +x ~/.claude/hooks/*.sh
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```
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---
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## Part 3: Response (When Things Go Wrong)
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### 3.1 Secret Exposed
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**First 15 minutes** (stop the bleeding):
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1. **Revoke immediately**
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```bash
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# AWS
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aws iam delete-access-key --access-key-id AKIA... --user-name <user>
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# GitHub
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# Settings → Developer settings → Personal access tokens → Revoke
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# Stripe
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# Dashboard → Developers → API keys → Roll key
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```
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2. **Confirm exposure scope**
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```bash
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# Check if pushed to remote
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git log --oneline origin/main..HEAD
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# Search for the secret pattern
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git log -p | grep -E "(AKIA|sk_live_|ghp_|xoxb-)"
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# Full repo scan
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gitleaks detect --source . --report-format json > exposure-report.json
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```
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**First hour** (assess damage):
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3. **Audit git history**
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```bash
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# If pushed, you may need to rewrite history
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git filter-repo --invert-paths --path <file-with-secret>
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# WARNING: This rewrites history - coordinate with team
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```
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4. **Scan dependencies** for leaked keys in logs or configs
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5. **Check CI/CD logs** for secret exposure in build outputs
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**First 24 hours** (remediate):
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6. **Rotate ALL related credentials** (assume lateral movement)
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7. **Notify team/compliance** if required (GDPR, SOC2, HIPAA)
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8. **Document incident timeline** for post-mortem
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### 3.2 MCP Compromised
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If you suspect an MCP server has been compromised:
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1. **Disable immediately**
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```bash
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# Remove from config
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jq 'del(.mcpServers.<suspect>)' ~/.claude/mcp.json > tmp && mv tmp ~/.claude/mcp.json
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# Or edit manually and restart Claude
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```
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2. **Verify config integrity**
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```bash
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# Check for unauthorized changes
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sha256sum ~/.claude/mcp.json
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diff ~/.claude/mcp.json ~/.claude/mcp.json.backup
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# Check project-level config too
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cat .mcp.json 2>/dev/null
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```
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3. **Audit recent actions**
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- Review session logs in `~/.claude/logs/`
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- Check for unexpected file modifications
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- Scan for new files in sensitive directories
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4. **Restore from known-good backup**
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```bash
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cp ~/.claude/mcp.json.backup ~/.claude/mcp.json
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```
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### 3.3 Automated Security Audit
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For comprehensive security scanning, use the [security-auditor agent](../examples/agents/security-auditor.md):
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```bash
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# Run OWASP-based security audit
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claude -a security-auditor "Audit this project for security vulnerabilities"
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```
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The agent checks:
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- Dependency vulnerabilities (npm audit, pip-audit)
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- Code security patterns (OWASP Top 10)
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- Configuration security (exposed secrets, weak permissions)
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- MCP server risk assessment
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---
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## Appendix: Quick Reference
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### Security Posture Levels
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| Level | Measures | Time | For |
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|-------|----------|------|-----|
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| **Basic** | Output scanner + dangerous blocker | 5 min | Solo dev, experiments |
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| **Standard** | + Injection hooks + MCP vetting | 30 min | Teams, sensitive code |
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| **Hardened** | + Integrity verification + ZDR | 2 hours | Enterprise, production |
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### Command Quick Reference
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```bash
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# Scan for secrets
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gitleaks detect --source . --verbose
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# Check MCP config
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cat ~/.claude/mcp.json | jq '.mcpServers | keys'
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# Verify hook installation
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ls -la ~/.claude/hooks/
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# Test Unicode detection
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echo -e "test\u200Bhidden" | grep -P '[\x{200B}-\x{200D}]'
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```
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---
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## See Also
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- [Data Privacy Guide](./data-privacy.md) — Retention policies, compliance, what data leaves your machine
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- [Security Checklist Skill](../examples/skills/security-checklist.md) — OWASP Top 10 patterns for code review
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- [Security Auditor Agent](../examples/agents/security-auditor.md) — Automated vulnerability scanning
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- [Ultimate Guide §7.4](./ultimate-guide.md#74-security-hooks) — Hook system basics
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- [Ultimate Guide §8.6](./ultimate-guide.md#86-mcp-security) — MCP security overview
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## References
|
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|
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- **CVE-2025-53109/53110** (EscapeRoute): [Cymulate Blog](https://cymulate.com/blog/cve-2025-53109-53110-escaperoute-anthropic/)
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- **CVE-2025-54135** (CurXecute): [Cato Networks](https://www.catonetworks.com/blog/curxecute-rce/)
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- **CVE-2025-54136** (MCPoison): [Checkpoint Research](https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/cursor-vulnerability-mcpoison/)
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- **GitGuardian State of Secrets 2025**: [gitguardian.com](https://www.gitguardian.com/state-of-secrets-sprawl-report-2025)
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- **Prompt Injection Research**: [Arxiv 2509.22040](https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.22040)
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- **MCP Security Best Practices**: [modelcontextprotocol.io](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/draft/basic/security_best_practices)
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---
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*Version 1.0.0 | January 2026 | Part of [Claude Code Ultimate Guide](../README.md)*
|
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|
|
@ -4786,6 +4786,8 @@ exit 0
|
|||
|
||||
Security hooks are critical for protecting your system.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Advanced patterns**: For comprehensive security including Unicode injection detection, MCP config integrity verification, and CVE-specific mitigations, see [Security Hardening Guide](./security-hardening.md).
|
||||
|
||||
### Recommended Security Rules
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
|
|
@ -5480,6 +5482,8 @@ claude plugin uninstall <conflicting-plugin>
|
|||
|
||||
MCP servers extend Claude Code's capabilities, but they also expand its attack surface. Before installing any MCP server, especially community-created ones, apply the same security scrutiny you'd use for any third-party code dependency.
|
||||
|
||||
> **CVE details & advanced vetting**: For documented CVEs (2025-53109/53110, 54135, 54136), MCP Safe List, and incident response procedures, see [Security Hardening Guide](./security-hardening.md).
|
||||
|
||||
### Pre-Installation Checklist
|
||||
|
||||
Before adding an MCP server to your configuration:
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
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