feat(security): add threat intelligence DB, security commands, and cheatsheet audit fixes (v3.26.0)
- Add threat-db.yaml v2.0.0 with 63 malicious skills, 22 CVEs, 4 campaigns - Add /security-check, /security-audit, /update-threat-db slash commands - Add Snyk ToxicSkills evaluation (58th resource evaluation) - Fix cheatsheet: add Alt+T to keyboard shortcuts table, add /fast and /debug commands - Update Features Meconnues table with Agent Teams and Auto-Memories - Clean up cheatsheet.md.bak - Bump version to 3.26.0 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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243
examples/commands/security-audit.md
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examples/commands/security-audit.md
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# Security Audit
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Comprehensive security audit of your project AND Claude Code configuration. Analyzes secrets exposure, injection surfaces, dependencies, hook security, and produces a scored security posture assessment.
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**Time**: 2-5 minutes | **Scope**: Full project + Claude Code config
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> For a quick config-only check, use `/security-check` instead.
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## Instructions
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You are a senior application security engineer. Perform a 6-phase security audit and produce a scored report with prioritized remediation plan.
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---
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### Phase 1: Configuration Security (via /security-check)
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Execute all checks from `/security-check` (the `examples/commands/security-check.md` command). This covers:
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- MCP server audit against CVE database
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- Skills & agents against known malicious entries
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- Hook exfiltration patterns
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- Memory poisoning detection
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- Permissions & settings review
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- Exposed secrets in Claude Code config
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Record findings — they contribute to the final score.
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---
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### Phase 2: Project Secrets Scan
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Scan the entire project for exposed secrets and credentials:
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```bash
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# API keys and tokens
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grep -rn --include="*.{js,ts,py,go,java,rb,php,yaml,yml,json,toml,env,cfg,ini,conf}" \
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-E '(?i)(api[_-]?key|apikey|secret|password|passwd|token|bearer|auth)\s*[=:]\s*["'\''"][^"'\'']{8,}["'\''"]\s' \
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--exclude-dir={node_modules,vendor,.git,dist,build,target,__pycache__,.venv} . 2>/dev/null | head -30
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# Known provider key patterns
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grep -rn -E 'sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}|sk-ant-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}|ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}|AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}|xox[bps]-[a-zA-Z0-9\-]{20,}' \
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--exclude-dir={node_modules,vendor,.git,dist,build,target} . 2>/dev/null | head -20
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# Private keys
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grep -rn 'BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY' --exclude-dir={node_modules,vendor,.git} . 2>/dev/null
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# .env files that might be committed
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find . -name ".env*" -not -path "*/node_modules/*" -not -path "*/.git/*" -type f 2>/dev/null
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# Check .gitignore coverage
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[ -f ".gitignore" ] && {
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grep -q "\.env" .gitignore && echo "✅ .env in .gitignore" || echo "⚠️ .env NOT in .gitignore"
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grep -q "\.pem" .gitignore && echo "✅ .pem in .gitignore" || echo "⚠️ .pem NOT in .gitignore"
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grep -q "\.key" .gitignore && echo "✅ .key in .gitignore" || echo "⚠️ .key NOT in .gitignore"
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}
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```
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**Scoring:**
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- 0 secrets found → +20 points
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- 1-3 secrets → +10 points
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- 4+ secrets → 0 points
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- Private key committed → -10 points
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---
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### Phase 3: Prompt Injection Surface
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Analyze markdown and config files for injection vectors:
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```bash
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# Zero-width characters (invisible instructions)
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grep -rPn '[\x{200B}-\x{200D}\x{FEFF}]' --include="*.md" --include="*.yaml" --include="*.json" . 2>/dev/null
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# Hidden HTML comments with instructions
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grep -rn '<!--' --include="*.md" . 2>/dev/null | grep -i 'ignore\|system\|admin\|instruction\|override\|forget'
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# Base64 in comments (potential hidden payloads)
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grep -rn -E '[#;].*[A-Za-z0-9+/]{20,}={0,2}' --include="*.py" --include="*.js" --include="*.ts" --include="*.md" \
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--exclude-dir={node_modules,vendor,.git} . 2>/dev/null | head -10
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# ANSI escape sequences
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grep -rPn '\x1b\[|\x1b\]|\x1b\(' --exclude-dir={node_modules,vendor,.git} . 2>/dev/null | head -10
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# Null bytes
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grep -rPn '\x00' --exclude-dir={node_modules,vendor,.git,dist} . 2>/dev/null | head -5
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# Nested command execution in markdown/config
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grep -rn -E '\$\([^)]+\)|`[^`]+`' --include="*.md" --include="*.yaml" --include="*.json" \
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--exclude-dir={node_modules,vendor,.git} . 2>/dev/null | head -10
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```
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**Scoring:**
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- 0 injection vectors → +15 points
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- 1-2 vectors (likely false positives) → +10 points
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- 3+ vectors → +5 points
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- Confirmed injection in CLAUDE.md → 0 points
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---
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### Phase 4: Dependency Audit
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Run the appropriate package audit for the project:
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```bash
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# Node.js
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[ -f "package-lock.json" ] && npm audit --json 2>/dev/null | jq '{total: .metadata.vulnerabilities.total, critical: .metadata.vulnerabilities.critical, high: .metadata.vulnerabilities.high}' 2>/dev/null
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# Python
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[ -f "requirements.txt" ] && pip-audit -r requirements.txt 2>/dev/null || [ -f "pyproject.toml" ] && pip-audit 2>/dev/null
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# Rust
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[ -f "Cargo.toml" ] && cargo audit 2>/dev/null
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# Go
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[ -f "go.mod" ] && govulncheck ./... 2>/dev/null
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```
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If no package manager detected, note it and skip (no penalty).
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**Scoring:**
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- 0 vulnerabilities → +20 points
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- 0 critical + 0 high → +15 points
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- 1-3 high → +10 points
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- Any critical → +5 points
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- 10+ high or 3+ critical → 0 points
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---
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### Phase 5: Hook Security Assessment
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Verify security hooks from `guide/security-hardening.md` are properly installed:
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```bash
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# Check for recommended security hooks
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echo "=== Checking security hooks ==="
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# PreToolUse hooks (should block dangerous patterns)
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ls .claude/hooks/PreToolUse* 2>/dev/null || echo "⚠️ No PreToolUse hooks found"
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# PostToolUse hooks (should monitor output)
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ls .claude/hooks/PostToolUse* 2>/dev/null || echo "⚠️ No PostToolUse hooks found"
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# Check if prompt injection detector exists
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find . -path "*/hooks/*injection*" -o -path "*/hooks/*security*" -o -path "*/hooks/*scanner*" 2>/dev/null
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# Check settings for hook configuration
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grep -c "hooks" .claude/settings.json 2>/dev/null || echo "No hooks in settings.json"
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```
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**Scoring:**
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- PreToolUse security hooks installed → +10 points
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- PostToolUse output scanner installed → +5 points
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- Prompt injection detector hook → +5 points
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- No hooks at all → 0 points
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---
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### Phase 6: Posture Score & Report
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Calculate total score and generate report.
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**Scoring Breakdown:**
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| Category | Max Points | Source |
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|----------|-----------|--------|
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| Config Security (Phase 1) | 30 | /security-check results |
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| Secrets Scan (Phase 2) | 20 | Secrets found in project |
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| Injection Surface (Phase 3) | 15 | Injection vectors found |
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| Dependencies (Phase 4) | 20 | Vulnerability audit |
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| Hook Security (Phase 5) | 15 | Security hooks installed |
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| **Total** | **100** | |
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**Phase 1 scoring detail:**
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- 0 CRITICAL findings → +15 points
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- 0 HIGH findings → +10 points
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- 0 MEDIUM findings → +5 points
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- Any CRITICAL → 0 for that sub-score
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**Grade Scale:**
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| Score | Grade | Meaning |
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|-------|-------|---------|
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| 90-100 | A | Excellent — production-ready security posture |
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| 75-89 | B | Good — minor improvements recommended |
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| 60-74 | C | Acceptable — address HIGH issues before production |
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| 40-59 | D | Poor — significant security gaps |
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| 0-39 | F | Critical — do not deploy, address CRITICAL issues immediately |
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## Output Format
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```
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## 🛡️ Security Audit Report
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**Date**: [timestamp]
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**Project**: [directory name]
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**Scope**: Full project + Claude Code configuration
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### Security Posture Score: [XX]/100 (Grade [X])
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[1-sentence assessment]
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### Phase Results
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| Phase | Score | Max | Key Finding |
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|-------|-------|-----|-------------|
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| 1. Config Security | XX | 30 | [summary] |
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| 2. Secrets Scan | XX | 20 | [summary] |
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| 3. Injection Surface | XX | 15 | [summary] |
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| 4. Dependencies | XX | 20 | [summary] |
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| 5. Hook Security | XX | 15 | [summary] |
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| **Total** | **XX** | **100** | |
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### 🔴 Critical Findings
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[Each finding with location, description, and exact fix]
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### 🟠 High Findings
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[Each finding with location, description, and fix]
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### 🟡 Medium Findings
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[Each finding with location, description, and fix]
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### 🔧 Remediation Plan (Priority Order)
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| # | Action | Severity | Effort | Command/Steps |
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|---|--------|----------|--------|---------------|
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| 1 | [action] | CRITICAL | [time] | [how] |
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| 2 | [action] | HIGH | [time] | [how] |
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| ... | | | | |
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### 📊 Benchmark
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Your score vs security-hardening.md recommendations:
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- [X] items from the guide are implemented
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- [X] items are missing
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- Top 3 missing items to implement next: [...]
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### 📚 References
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- Security hardening guide: guide/security-hardening.md
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- Threat database: examples/commands/resources/threat-db.yaml
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- Quick check: `/security-check`
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- MCP scan tool: `npx mcp-scan` (Snyk)
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```
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$ARGUMENTS
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172
examples/commands/security-check.md
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examples/commands/security-check.md
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# Security Check
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Quick configuration security check against known threats database. Verifies your Claude Code setup for known malicious skills, vulnerable MCPs, dangerous patterns, and exposed secrets.
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**Time**: ~30 seconds | **Scope**: Claude Code configuration only
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## Instructions
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You are a security analyst. Check the user's Claude Code configuration against the threat intelligence database bundled at `examples/commands/resources/threat-db.yaml`. Produce a concise, actionable report.
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### Phase 1: Load Threat Database
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Read `examples/commands/resources/threat-db.yaml` from this repository to load:
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- Known malicious authors and skills
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- CVE database for MCP servers
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- Suspicious patterns for hooks, agents, and config
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### Phase 2: MCP Server Audit
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Read the user's MCP configuration:
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```bash
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# Global MCP config
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cat ~/.claude/mcp.json 2>/dev/null
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# Project MCP config
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cat .claude/mcp.json 2>/dev/null
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```
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**Check against threat-db.yaml:**
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- [ ] Any MCP server matching a CVE entry? → CRITICAL
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- [ ] Version pinning: are all MCP servers pinned to exact versions (not `@latest`)? → HIGH if unpinned
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- [ ] Any `--dangerous-*` flags in MCP args? → CRITICAL
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- [ ] Any MCP servers not on the Safe List (see `guide/security-hardening.md` §1.1)? → MEDIUM (flag for manual review)
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### Phase 3: Skills & Agents Audit
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```bash
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# List installed skills
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ls -la .claude/skills/ 2>/dev/null
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ls -la ~/.claude/skills/ 2>/dev/null
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# List agents
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ls -la .claude/agents/ 2>/dev/null
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ls -la ~/.claude/agents/ 2>/dev/null
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# Check agent allowed-tools
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grep -r "allowed-tools" .claude/agents/ 2>/dev/null
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grep -r "allowed-tools" ~/.claude/agents/ 2>/dev/null
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```
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**Check against threat-db.yaml:**
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- [ ] Any skill/agent name matching `malicious_skills` entries? → CRITICAL
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- [ ] Any skill/agent author matching `malicious_authors` entries? → CRITICAL
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- [ ] Any agent with `allowed-tools: ["Bash"]` only? → HIGH
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- [ ] Any agent with overly broad tool access + vague description? → MEDIUM
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### Phase 4: Hook Security
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```bash
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# List all hooks
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find .claude/hooks/ -type f 2>/dev/null
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find ~/.claude/hooks/ -type f 2>/dev/null
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# Scan hooks for suspicious patterns
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grep -rn "curl\|wget\|nc \|ncat\|netcat\|base64\|eval\|exec\|/dev/tcp\|/dev/udp" .claude/hooks/ 2>/dev/null
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grep -rn "curl\|wget\|nc \|ncat\|netcat\|base64\|eval\|exec\|/dev/tcp\|/dev/udp" ~/.claude/hooks/ 2>/dev/null
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# Check for credential access in hooks
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grep -rn "ssh\|id_rsa\|id_ed25519\|\.env\|credentials\|secret\|password\|token\|api.key" .claude/hooks/ 2>/dev/null
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grep -rn "ssh\|id_rsa\|id_ed25519\|\.env\|credentials\|secret\|password\|token\|api.key" ~/.claude/hooks/ 2>/dev/null
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```
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**Check against threat-db.yaml `suspicious_patterns.hooks`:**
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- [ ] Network calls (`curl`, `wget`) → HIGH
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- [ ] Reverse shell indicators (`nc`, `/dev/tcp`) → CRITICAL
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- [ ] Credential access (`ssh`, `.env`, `password`) → CRITICAL
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- [ ] Base64 encoding → MEDIUM (review context)
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### Phase 5: Memory Poisoning Check
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```bash
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# Check for suspicious instructions in memory/config files
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grep -in "ignore\|forget\|override\|disregard\|you are now\|new role\|system prompt" \
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CLAUDE.md .claude/CLAUDE.md SOUL.md .claude/SOUL.md MEMORY.md .claude/MEMORY.md \
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~/.claude/CLAUDE.md ~/.claude/MEMORY.md 2>/dev/null
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```
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- [ ] Prompt injection patterns in CLAUDE.md / SOUL.md / MEMORY.md? → HIGH
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- [ ] Instructions to disable security, skip reviews, or grant broad permissions? → CRITICAL
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### Phase 6: Permissions & Settings
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```bash
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# Check settings
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cat .claude/settings.json 2>/dev/null
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cat ~/.claude/settings.json 2>/dev/null
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```
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- [ ] `permissions.deny` exists and covers `.env*`, `*.pem`, `*.key`, secrets? → MEDIUM if missing
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- [ ] No wildcard `permissions.allow` for Bash or Write? → HIGH if present
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- [ ] No `dangerouslySkipPermissions` or similar flags? → CRITICAL if present
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### Phase 7: Exposed Secrets in Config
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```bash
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# Check for secrets in .claude/ directory
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grep -rn "sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]\{20,\}\|sk-ant-[a-zA-Z0-9]\{20,\}\|ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]\{36\}\|AKIA[A-Z0-9]\{16\}" \
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.claude/ ~/.claude/ 2>/dev/null
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# Check for private keys
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grep -rn "BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY" .claude/ ~/.claude/ 2>/dev/null
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```
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- [ ] API keys or tokens in config files? → CRITICAL
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- [ ] Private keys in config? → CRITICAL
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## Output Format
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```
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## 🛡️ Security Check Report
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**Date**: [timestamp]
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**Scope**: Claude Code configuration
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### Results Summary
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| Severity | Count | Status |
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|----------|-------|--------|
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| 🔴 CRITICAL | X | [PASS/FAIL] |
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| 🟠 HIGH | X | [PASS/FAIL] |
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| 🟡 MEDIUM | X | [PASS/FAIL] |
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| 🟢 LOW | X | [PASS/FAIL] |
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### 🔴 Critical Issues
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[List each critical finding with location and fix]
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### 🟠 High Issues
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[List each high finding with location and fix]
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### 🟡 Medium Issues
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[List each medium finding with location and fix]
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### ✅ Passed Checks
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[List what passed — important for confidence]
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### 🔧 Recommended Actions (Priority Order)
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1. [Most urgent fix with exact command]
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2. [Second priority]
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3. [...]
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### 📚 References
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- Full security guide: guide/security-hardening.md
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- Threat database: examples/commands/resources/threat-db.yaml
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- MCP scan: `npx mcp-scan` (Snyk)
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```
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If ALL checks pass, output:
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```
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## 🛡️ Security Check Report — ALL CLEAR ✅
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**Date**: [timestamp]
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No known threats detected in your Claude Code configuration.
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**Recommendations for continued security:**
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- Re-run `/security-check` after installing new skills or MCP servers
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- Run `/security-audit` for a comprehensive project + config audit
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- Keep Claude Code updated (current security fixes in v2.1.34+)
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```
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$ARGUMENTS
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164
examples/commands/update-threat-db.md
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164
examples/commands/update-threat-db.md
Normal file
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# Update Threat Database
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Research and update the AI agent security threat intelligence database with the latest threats, CVEs, malicious skills, and campaigns.
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**Time**: 3-8 minutes | **Scope**: `examples/commands/resources/threat-db.yaml`
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> Requires Perplexity MCP (or manual web search). Run monthly or after major security advisories.
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## Instructions
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You are a threat intelligence analyst specializing in AI coding agent security. Research the latest threats and update the threat database.
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---
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### Phase 1: Current State Assessment
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Read the current threat database:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Read examples/commands/resources/threat-db.yaml
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Note:
|
||||
- Current `version` and `updated` date
|
||||
- Number of malicious authors, skills, CVEs, campaigns
|
||||
- Most recent entries to avoid duplicates
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### Phase 2: Research New Threats
|
||||
|
||||
Run **4 targeted Perplexity searches** (parallel when possible):
|
||||
|
||||
**Search 1: New malicious skills & campaigns**
|
||||
```
|
||||
Query: "malicious AI agent skills ClawHub OpenClaw skills.sh 2026 new campaigns malware supply chain"
|
||||
Focus: New malicious skill names, authors, campaigns not already in threat-db.yaml
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Search 2: New MCP server CVEs**
|
||||
```
|
||||
Query: "MCP server CVE vulnerability 2025 2026 model context protocol security advisory"
|
||||
Focus: New CVEs for MCP servers, SDK vulnerabilities, transport-level flaws
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Search 3: New attack techniques**
|
||||
```
|
||||
Query: "AI coding agent attack prompt injection Claude Code Cursor supply chain security research 2026"
|
||||
Focus: New attack vectors, techniques, research papers
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Search 4: New defensive tools & blocklists**
|
||||
```
|
||||
Query: "MCP security scanner tool mcp-scan alternative AI agent skills security scanning 2026"
|
||||
Focus: New scanning tools, blocklists, defensive frameworks
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
If Perplexity MCP is unavailable, use WebSearch for each query.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### Phase 3: Analyze & Deduplicate
|
||||
|
||||
For each finding from Phase 2:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Check if already in threat-db.yaml** — skip duplicates
|
||||
2. **Verify source credibility** — prefer: CVE databases, security vendor blogs, peer-reviewed research
|
||||
3. **Categorize** — which section does it belong to?
|
||||
- `malicious_authors` — new confirmed malicious publishers
|
||||
- `malicious_skills` — new confirmed malicious skill/package names
|
||||
- `malicious_skill_patterns` — new prefix patterns for wildcard matching
|
||||
- `cve_database` — new CVEs with component, severity, fixed_in
|
||||
- `minimum_safe_versions` — update if new patches available
|
||||
- `iocs` — new C2 IPs, exfil URLs, malware hashes
|
||||
- `campaigns` — new coordinated campaigns
|
||||
- `attack_techniques` — new documented attack vectors
|
||||
- `scanning_tools` — new tools or major updates
|
||||
- `defensive_resources` — new frameworks, blocklists
|
||||
|
||||
4. **Assess risk level**:
|
||||
- `critical` — confirmed malicious, active exploitation
|
||||
- `high` — confirmed vulnerable, exploit available
|
||||
- `medium` — theoretical risk, no known exploitation
|
||||
- `low` — informational
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### Phase 4: Update threat-db.yaml
|
||||
|
||||
Apply changes following these rules:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Bump version** — increment minor (e.g. 2.0.0 → 2.1.0) for new entries, major for schema changes
|
||||
2. **Update `updated` date** — set to today
|
||||
3. **Add new sources** — add any new research sources to the `sources` list
|
||||
4. **Maintain YAML validity** — use single quotes for patterns containing backslashes
|
||||
5. **Preserve existing entries** — never remove entries unless confirmed false positive
|
||||
6. **Follow existing format** — match the structure of existing entries exactly
|
||||
|
||||
**Important**: After editing, validate YAML:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
python3 -c "import yaml; yaml.safe_load(open('examples/commands/resources/threat-db.yaml')); print('YAML valid')"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### Phase 5: Update Dependent Files (if needed)
|
||||
|
||||
Check if new CVEs should also be added to the security hardening guide:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Count current CVEs in threat-db vs security-hardening
|
||||
grep -c "id:" examples/commands/resources/threat-db.yaml
|
||||
grep -c "CVE-" guide/security-hardening.md
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
If major new CVEs found (severity critical/high):
|
||||
- Consider adding to `guide/security-hardening.md` CVE table
|
||||
- Update `minimum_safe_versions` if new patches released
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### Phase 6: Summary Report
|
||||
|
||||
## Output Format
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
## Threat Database Update Report
|
||||
|
||||
**Date**: [timestamp]
|
||||
**Previous version**: [old version]
|
||||
**New version**: [new version]
|
||||
|
||||
### Changes Summary
|
||||
|
||||
| Category | Added | Updated | Total |
|
||||
|----------|-------|---------|-------|
|
||||
| Malicious authors | +X | ~X | XX |
|
||||
| Malicious skills | +X | ~X | XX |
|
||||
| CVEs | +X | ~X | XX |
|
||||
| Campaigns | +X | ~X | XX |
|
||||
| IOCs | +X | ~X | XX |
|
||||
| Attack techniques | +X | ~X | XX |
|
||||
| Scanning tools | +X | ~X | XX |
|
||||
|
||||
### New Entries
|
||||
|
||||
[List each new entry with source and risk level]
|
||||
|
||||
### Notable Findings
|
||||
|
||||
[Highlight anything particularly important or urgent]
|
||||
|
||||
### No Changes Needed
|
||||
|
||||
[If nothing new found, explain what was searched and confirmed up-to-date]
|
||||
|
||||
### Next Steps
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Run `/security-check` to test against updated database
|
||||
- [ ] Update `guide/security-hardening.md` if new critical CVEs
|
||||
- [ ] Commit: `docs(security): update threat-db vX.Y.Z — [summary]`
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
$ARGUMENTS
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue