feat(security): add threat intelligence DB, security commands, and cheatsheet audit fixes (v3.26.0)
- Add threat-db.yaml v2.0.0 with 63 malicious skills, 22 CVEs, 4 campaigns - Add /security-check, /security-audit, /update-threat-db slash commands - Add Snyk ToxicSkills evaluation (58th resource evaluation) - Fix cheatsheet: add Alt+T to keyboard shortcuts table, add /fast and /debug commands - Update Features Meconnues table with Agent Teams and Auto-Memories - Clean up cheatsheet.md.bak - Bump version to 3.26.0 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Florian BRUNIAUX
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examples/commands/security-check.md
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examples/commands/security-check.md
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# Security Check
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Quick configuration security check against known threats database. Verifies your Claude Code setup for known malicious skills, vulnerable MCPs, dangerous patterns, and exposed secrets.
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**Time**: ~30 seconds | **Scope**: Claude Code configuration only
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## Instructions
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You are a security analyst. Check the user's Claude Code configuration against the threat intelligence database bundled at `examples/commands/resources/threat-db.yaml`. Produce a concise, actionable report.
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### Phase 1: Load Threat Database
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Read `examples/commands/resources/threat-db.yaml` from this repository to load:
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- Known malicious authors and skills
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- CVE database for MCP servers
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- Suspicious patterns for hooks, agents, and config
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### Phase 2: MCP Server Audit
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Read the user's MCP configuration:
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```bash
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# Global MCP config
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cat ~/.claude/mcp.json 2>/dev/null
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# Project MCP config
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cat .claude/mcp.json 2>/dev/null
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```
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**Check against threat-db.yaml:**
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- [ ] Any MCP server matching a CVE entry? → CRITICAL
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- [ ] Version pinning: are all MCP servers pinned to exact versions (not `@latest`)? → HIGH if unpinned
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- [ ] Any `--dangerous-*` flags in MCP args? → CRITICAL
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- [ ] Any MCP servers not on the Safe List (see `guide/security-hardening.md` §1.1)? → MEDIUM (flag for manual review)
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### Phase 3: Skills & Agents Audit
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```bash
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# List installed skills
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ls -la .claude/skills/ 2>/dev/null
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ls -la ~/.claude/skills/ 2>/dev/null
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# List agents
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ls -la .claude/agents/ 2>/dev/null
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ls -la ~/.claude/agents/ 2>/dev/null
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# Check agent allowed-tools
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grep -r "allowed-tools" .claude/agents/ 2>/dev/null
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grep -r "allowed-tools" ~/.claude/agents/ 2>/dev/null
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```
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**Check against threat-db.yaml:**
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- [ ] Any skill/agent name matching `malicious_skills` entries? → CRITICAL
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- [ ] Any skill/agent author matching `malicious_authors` entries? → CRITICAL
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- [ ] Any agent with `allowed-tools: ["Bash"]` only? → HIGH
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- [ ] Any agent with overly broad tool access + vague description? → MEDIUM
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### Phase 4: Hook Security
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```bash
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# List all hooks
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find .claude/hooks/ -type f 2>/dev/null
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find ~/.claude/hooks/ -type f 2>/dev/null
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# Scan hooks for suspicious patterns
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grep -rn "curl\|wget\|nc \|ncat\|netcat\|base64\|eval\|exec\|/dev/tcp\|/dev/udp" .claude/hooks/ 2>/dev/null
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grep -rn "curl\|wget\|nc \|ncat\|netcat\|base64\|eval\|exec\|/dev/tcp\|/dev/udp" ~/.claude/hooks/ 2>/dev/null
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# Check for credential access in hooks
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grep -rn "ssh\|id_rsa\|id_ed25519\|\.env\|credentials\|secret\|password\|token\|api.key" .claude/hooks/ 2>/dev/null
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grep -rn "ssh\|id_rsa\|id_ed25519\|\.env\|credentials\|secret\|password\|token\|api.key" ~/.claude/hooks/ 2>/dev/null
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```
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**Check against threat-db.yaml `suspicious_patterns.hooks`:**
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- [ ] Network calls (`curl`, `wget`) → HIGH
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- [ ] Reverse shell indicators (`nc`, `/dev/tcp`) → CRITICAL
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- [ ] Credential access (`ssh`, `.env`, `password`) → CRITICAL
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- [ ] Base64 encoding → MEDIUM (review context)
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### Phase 5: Memory Poisoning Check
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```bash
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# Check for suspicious instructions in memory/config files
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grep -in "ignore\|forget\|override\|disregard\|you are now\|new role\|system prompt" \
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CLAUDE.md .claude/CLAUDE.md SOUL.md .claude/SOUL.md MEMORY.md .claude/MEMORY.md \
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~/.claude/CLAUDE.md ~/.claude/MEMORY.md 2>/dev/null
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```
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- [ ] Prompt injection patterns in CLAUDE.md / SOUL.md / MEMORY.md? → HIGH
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- [ ] Instructions to disable security, skip reviews, or grant broad permissions? → CRITICAL
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### Phase 6: Permissions & Settings
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```bash
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# Check settings
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cat .claude/settings.json 2>/dev/null
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cat ~/.claude/settings.json 2>/dev/null
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```
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- [ ] `permissions.deny` exists and covers `.env*`, `*.pem`, `*.key`, secrets? → MEDIUM if missing
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- [ ] No wildcard `permissions.allow` for Bash or Write? → HIGH if present
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- [ ] No `dangerouslySkipPermissions` or similar flags? → CRITICAL if present
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### Phase 7: Exposed Secrets in Config
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```bash
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# Check for secrets in .claude/ directory
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grep -rn "sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]\{20,\}\|sk-ant-[a-zA-Z0-9]\{20,\}\|ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]\{36\}\|AKIA[A-Z0-9]\{16\}" \
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.claude/ ~/.claude/ 2>/dev/null
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# Check for private keys
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grep -rn "BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY" .claude/ ~/.claude/ 2>/dev/null
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```
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- [ ] API keys or tokens in config files? → CRITICAL
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- [ ] Private keys in config? → CRITICAL
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## Output Format
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```
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## 🛡️ Security Check Report
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**Date**: [timestamp]
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**Scope**: Claude Code configuration
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### Results Summary
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| Severity | Count | Status |
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|----------|-------|--------|
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| 🔴 CRITICAL | X | [PASS/FAIL] |
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| 🟠 HIGH | X | [PASS/FAIL] |
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| 🟡 MEDIUM | X | [PASS/FAIL] |
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| 🟢 LOW | X | [PASS/FAIL] |
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### 🔴 Critical Issues
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[List each critical finding with location and fix]
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### 🟠 High Issues
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[List each high finding with location and fix]
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### 🟡 Medium Issues
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[List each medium finding with location and fix]
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### ✅ Passed Checks
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[List what passed — important for confidence]
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### 🔧 Recommended Actions (Priority Order)
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1. [Most urgent fix with exact command]
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2. [Second priority]
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3. [...]
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### 📚 References
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- Full security guide: guide/security-hardening.md
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- Threat database: examples/commands/resources/threat-db.yaml
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- MCP scan: `npx mcp-scan` (Snyk)
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```
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If ALL checks pass, output:
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```
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## 🛡️ Security Check Report — ALL CLEAR ✅
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**Date**: [timestamp]
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No known threats detected in your Claude Code configuration.
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**Recommendations for continued security:**
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- Re-run `/security-check` after installing new skills or MCP servers
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- Run `/security-audit` for a comprehensive project + config audit
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- Keep Claude Code updated (current security fixes in v2.1.34+)
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```
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$ARGUMENTS
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