release: v3.20.6 - agentskills.io integration + 4 resource evaluations

- agentskills.io open standard: frontmatter table, skills-ref CLI, portability section
- Agent Skills supply chain risks (security-hardening.md §1.2)
- anthropics/skills (60K+★) added to complementary resources
- 16 new reference.yaml entries
- Resource evaluations: agentskills.io (4/5), Skill Doctor (2/5), dclaude (new), paddo (new)
- Sandbox isolation + README updates

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Florian BRUNIAUX 2026-02-01 16:49:33 +01:00
parent 23e0ac476d
commit bc86c8ed7f
14 changed files with 625 additions and 26 deletions

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@ -118,7 +118,17 @@ Before adding any MCP server, complete this checklist:
- Use read-only database credentials
- Minimize environment variables exposed
### 1.2 Known Limitations of permissions.deny
### 1.2 Agent Skills Supply Chain Risks
Third-party Agent Skills (installed via `npx add-skill` or plugin marketplaces) introduce supply chain risks similar to npm packages. Research by [SafeDep](https://safedep.io/agent-skills-threat-model) identified vulnerabilities in **8-14% of publicly available skills**, including prompt injection, data exfiltration, and privilege escalation.
**Mitigations**:
- **Review SKILL.md before installing** — Check `allowed-tools` for unexpected access (especially `Bash`)
- **Validate with skills-ref**`skills-ref validate ./skill-dir` checks spec compliance ([agentskills.io](https://agentskills.io))
- **Pin skill versions** — Use specific commit hashes when installing from GitHub
- **Audit scripts/** — Executable scripts bundled with skills are the highest-risk component
### 1.3 Known Limitations of permissions.deny
The `permissions.deny` setting in `.claude/settings.json` is the official method to block Claude from accessing sensitive files. However, security researchers have documented architectural limitations.
@ -176,7 +186,7 @@ Because `permissions.deny` alone cannot guarantee complete protection:
> **Bottom line**: `permissions.deny` is necessary but not sufficient. Treat it as one layer in a defense-in-depth strategy, not a complete solution.
### 1.3 Repository Pre-Scan
### 1.4 Repository Pre-Scan
Before opening untrusted repositories, scan for injection vectors: