release: v3.27.6 - Sonnet 4.6 default + 200K vs 1M context guide

- Pricing table: Sonnet 4.6 now default (Feb 2026)
- New section: 200K vs 1M context decision guide (MRCR bench, cost table, use cases)
- threat-db.yaml v2.1.0: CVE-2026-23744, Slopsquatting T009, OWASP Agentic AI Top 10

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Florian BRUNIAUX 2026-02-18 09:33:55 +01:00
parent 4b15bdb137
commit c3da456d3a
8 changed files with 173 additions and 21 deletions

View file

@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
# For use with /security-check and /security-audit commands
# Manually maintained — update after new security advisories
version: "2.0.0"
updated: "2026-02-11"
version: "2.1.0"
updated: "2026-02-17"
sources:
- name: "Snyk ToxicSkills"
url: "https://snyk.io/blog/toxicskills-malicious-ai-agent-skills-clawhub/"
@ -47,6 +47,24 @@ sources:
- name: "SAFE-MCP Framework"
url: "https://www.safemcp.org"
date: "2026-01"
- name: "VirusTotal - OpenClaw Malicious Skills"
url: "https://blog.virustotal.com/2026/02/from-automation-to-infection-how.html"
date: "2026-02-02"
- name: "arXiv - Malicious Agent Skills Empirical Study"
url: "https://www.arxiv.org/abs/2602.06547"
date: "2026-02-06"
- name: "SentinelOne - xcode-mcp-server CVE-2026-2178"
url: "https://www.sentinelone.com/vulnerability-database/cve-2026-2178/"
date: "2026-02-13"
- name: "Immersive Labs - CVE-2026-23744 MCPJam RCE"
url: "https://community.immersivelabs.com/blog/the-human-connection-blog/new-cti-lab-cve-2026-23744-mcpjam-rce-offensive/3882"
date: "2026-01-21"
- name: "Aikido - Hallucinated npx Commands in Skills"
url: "https://www.aikido.dev/blog/agent-skills-spreading-hallucinated-npx-commands"
date: "2026-01-21"
- name: "OWASP Top 10 for Agentic AI Security Risks 2026"
url: "https://www.startupdefense.io/blog/owasp-top-10-agentic-ai-security-risks-2026"
date: "2026-02-16"
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# MALICIOUS AUTHORS (confirmed by security researchers)
@ -69,6 +87,11 @@ malicious_authors:
source: "Snyk ToxicSkills"
risk: "critical"
notes: "Mixed prompt-injection + exfil; GitHub repo aztr0nutzs/NET_NiNjA.v1.2 hosts additional weaponized skills"
# VirusTotal confirmed — single publisher, 314+ skills, 100% malicious
- name: "hightower6eu"
source: "VirusTotal OpenClaw Analysis"
risk: "critical"
notes: "Single malicious publisher responsible for 314+ OpenClaw skills; all confirmed malicious by VirusTotal scan; malware disguised as productivity/utility tools"
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# MALICIOUS SKILLS (confirmed by researchers)
@ -670,6 +693,34 @@ cve_database:
fixed_in: "0.1.28"
mitigation: "Update to >= 0.1.28"
# --- MCPJam Inspector ---
- id: "CVE-2026-23744"
component: "MCPJam Inspector"
severity: "critical"
description: "RCE via crafted HTTP request that triggers automatic MCP server installation; allows remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on developer machine"
source: "Immersive Labs / CVE-2026-23744"
fixed_in: "1.4.3"
mitigation: "Update MCPJam Inspector to >= 1.4.3; restrict to localhost; do not expose MCPJam to untrusted networks"
notes: "Affects local-first MCP dev platform; versions <= 1.4.2 vulnerable"
# --- xcode-mcp-server ---
- id: "CVE-2026-2178"
component: "xcode-mcp-server (r-huijts)"
severity: "high"
description: "Command injection in registerXcodeTools function via unsanitized args argument passed to exec(); allows RCE or data exfiltration"
source: "SentinelOne"
fixed_in: "after commit f3419f00117aa9949e326f78cc940166c88f18cb"
mitigation: "Update to latest commit post-f3419f00; avoid passing user-controlled input to exec(); switch to execFile() with argument arrays"
# --- MCP Salesforce Connector ---
- id: "CVE-2026-25650"
component: "MCP Salesforce Connector"
severity: "medium"
description: "Arbitrary attribute access — prior to 0.1.10, attacker can access arbitrary object attributes via crafted MCP requests, potentially exposing sensitive Salesforce data"
source: "NVD"
fixed_in: "0.1.10"
mitigation: "Update MCP Salesforce Connector to >= 0.1.10; enforce attribute allowlists"
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# MINIMUM SAFE VERSIONS (quick reference for scanning)
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
@ -684,6 +735,8 @@ minimum_safe_versions:
"mcp-package-docs": "0.1.28"
"cursor": "1.3.9"
"claude-code": "2.1.34"
"mcpjam-inspector": "1.4.3"
"mcp-salesforce-connector": "0.1.10"
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# IOCs (Indicators of Compromise)
@ -1055,6 +1108,15 @@ attack_techniques:
campaigns: ["ClawHavoc", "ToxicSkills"]
mitigation: "Block agent access to .env, .aws, .ssh directories; use pre-execution hooks"
- id: "T009"
name: "Slopsquatting / Hallucinated Package Injection"
description: "Malicious skills spread hallucinated or fabricated package names (e.g. via npx commands) that resolve to attacker-controlled packages on npm/PyPI when executed"
examples:
- "Skills with setup instructions referencing nonexistent npm packages that typosquat legitimate tools"
- "AI-generated skill content propagating hallucinated npx commands that install malicious packages"
source: "Aikido Security (2026-01-21)"
mitigation: "Verify every package reference in SKILL.md before executing setup instructions; use package lockfiles; pin all dependencies to known-good checksums"
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# SCANNING TOOLS
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
@ -1138,6 +1200,36 @@ scanning_tools:
limitations:
- "ClawHub/OpenClaw specific"
- name: "Mcpwn"
vendor: "community"
type: "cli"
url: "https://hackers-arise.com/artificial-intelligence-in-cybersecurity-part-9-how-to-test-mcp-servers-for-security-vulnerabilities/"
capabilities:
- "Dedicated MCP vulnerability scanner"
- "Detects RCE via command injection in MCP servers"
- "Path traversal weakness detection"
- "Prompt injection risk identification"
- "Quick scan mode focused on RCE surface"
- "Supports custom Python and Node.js MCP servers"
limitations:
- "Newer/community tool — smaller detection database than mcp-scan"
- "Less coverage of skills.sh / ClawHub skill scanning"
- name: "Mend SAST MCP"
vendor: "Mend.io"
type: "mcp-server"
url: "https://appsecsanta.com/mend-sast"
capabilities:
- "Commercial SAST with MCP server integration"
- "Real-time static analysis on AI-generated code via IDE"
- "Software composition analysis (SCA) for dependencies"
- "Integrates with Cursor, VS Code, Claude Code, Windsurf"
- "mend-code-security-assistant tool: SAST scans"
- "mend-dependencies-assistant tool: SCA checks"
limitations:
- "Commercial product — requires Mend.io subscription"
- "Code scanning focus — does not scan SKILL.md or MCP configs directly"
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# DEFENSIVE FRAMEWORKS & BLOCKLISTS
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
@ -1170,3 +1262,8 @@ defensive_resources:
exposed_servers: 1000
no_auth: true
risk_examples: ["Kubernetes clusters", "CRM access", "WhatsApp messaging", "arbitrary shell"]
- name: "OWASP Top 10 for Agentic AI Security Risks 2026"
url: "https://www.startupdefense.io/blog/owasp-top-10-agentic-ai-security-risks-2026"
type: "framework"
description: "Community-maintained OWASP-style Top 10 listing for agentic AI systems; covers Agent Goal Hijacking (#1), Supply Chain compromise, Tool Poisoning, Prompt Injection, Memory Poisoning, and more. Updated 2026-02-16."