# AI Agent Skills & MCP Servers - Threat Intelligence Database
# For use with /security-check and /security-audit commands
# Manually maintained — update after new security advisories

version: "2.5.0"
updated: "2026-03-05"
sources:
  - name: "Snyk ToxicSkills"
    url: "https://snyk.io/blog/toxicskills-malicious-ai-agent-skills-clawhub/"
    date: "2026-02-05"
  - name: "Koi Security ClawHavoc"
    url: "https://www.koi.ai/blog/clawhavoc-341-malicious-clawedbot-skills-found-by-the-bot-they-were-targeting"
    date: "2026-02-01"
  - name: "SafeDep Agent Skills Threat Model"
    url: "https://safedep.io/agent-skills-threat-model"
    date: "2026-01"
  - name: "Cymulate EscapeRoute (CVE-2025-53109/53110)"
    url: "https://cymulate.com/blog/cve-2025-53109-53110-escaperoute-anthropic/"
    date: "2025-09"
  - name: "Checkpoint MCPoison (CVE-2025-54135/54136)"
    url: "https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/cursor-vulnerability-mcpoison/"
    date: "2025-10"
  - name: "JFrog Prompt Hijacking (CVE-2025-6515)"
    url: "https://jfrog.com/blog/mcp-prompt-hijacking-vulnerability/"
    date: "2025-10"
  - name: "JFrog PyPI MCP Reverse Shell"
    url: "https://research.jfrog.com/post/3-malicious-mcps-pypi-reverse-shell/"
    date: "2025-12"
  - name: "Recorded Future MCP Inspector (CVE-2025-49596)"
    url: "https://www.recordedfuture.com/blog/anthropic-mcp-inspector-cve-2025-49596"
    date: "2025-07"
  - name: "Flatt Security - 8 ways to pwn Claude Code"
    url: "https://flatt.tech/research/posts/pwning-claude-code-in-8-different-ways/"
    date: "2026-01"
  - name: "SentinelOne WebFetch SSRF (CVE-2026-24052)"
    url: "https://www.sentinelone.com/vulnerability-database/cve-2026-24052/"
    date: "2026-01"
  - name: "The Hacker News - MCP Git Server Flaws"
    url: "https://thehackernews.com/2026/01/three-flaws-in-anthropic-mcp-git-server.html"
    date: "2026-01"
  - name: "Bitsight TRACE - Exposed MCP Servers"
    url: "https://www.bitsight.com/blog/exposed-mcp-servers-reveal-new-ai-vulnerabilities"
    date: "2026-01"
  - name: "Defender's Initiative - Postmark MCP Squatter"
    url: "https://defendersinitiative.substack.com/p/npm-not-another-package-malicious"
    date: "2025-11"
  - name: "SAFE-MCP Framework"
    url: "https://www.safemcp.org"
    date: "2026-01"
  - name: "VirusTotal - OpenClaw Malicious Skills"
    url: "https://blog.virustotal.com/2026/02/from-automation-to-infection-how.html"
    date: "2026-02-02"
  - name: "arXiv - Malicious Agent Skills Empirical Study"
    url: "https://www.arxiv.org/abs/2602.06547"
    date: "2026-02-06"
  - name: "SentinelOne - xcode-mcp-server CVE-2026-2178"
    url: "https://www.sentinelone.com/vulnerability-database/cve-2026-2178/"
    date: "2026-02-13"
  - name: "Immersive Labs - CVE-2026-23744 MCPJam RCE"
    url: "https://community.immersivelabs.com/blog/the-human-connection-blog/new-cti-lab-cve-2026-23744-mcpjam-rce-offensive/3882"
    date: "2026-01-21"
  - name: "Aikido - Hallucinated npx Commands in Skills"
    url: "https://www.aikido.dev/blog/agent-skills-spreading-hallucinated-npx-commands"
    date: "2026-01-21"
  - name: "OWASP Top 10 for Agentic AI Security Risks 2026"
    url: "https://www.startupdefense.io/blog/owasp-top-10-agentic-ai-security-risks-2026"
    date: "2026-02-16"
  - name: "Lakera - The Agent Skill Ecosystem: When AI Extensions Become a Malware Delivery Channel"
    url: "https://www.lakera.ai/blog/the-agent-skill-ecosystem-when-ai-extensions-become-a-malware-delivery-channel"
    date: "2026-02-20"
  - name: "Penligent AI - CVE-2026-0755 gemini-mcp-tool Command Injection"
    url: "https://www.penligent.ai/hackinglabs/de/deep-analysis-of-gemini-mcp-tool-command-injection-cve-2026-0755-when-an-mcp-toolchain-hands-user-input-to-the-shell/"
    date: "2026-02-07"
  - name: "Snyk - SSRF in mcp-run-python (SNYK-PYTHON-MCPRUNPYTHON-15250607)"
    url: "https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-PYTHON-MCPRUNPYTHON-15250607"
    date: "2026-02-09"
  - name: "The Hacker News - Anthropic Launches Claude Code Security"
    url: "https://thehackernews.com/2026/02/anthropic-launches-claude-code-security.html"
    date: "2026-02-21"
  - name: "Check Point Research - CVE-2025-59536 & CVE-2026-21852 Claude Code RCE + API Key Theft"
    url: "https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/rce-and-api-token-exfiltration-through-claude-code-project-files-cve-2025-59536/"
    date: "2026-02-25"
  - name: "The Hacker News - Claude Code Flaws Allow RCE and API Key Theft"
    url: "https://thehackernews.com/2026/02/claude-code-flaws-allow-remote-code.html"
    date: "2026-02-25"
  - name: "Trend Micro - Malicious OpenClaw Skills Used to Distribute Atomic macOS Stealer"
    url: "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/26/b/openclaw-skills-used-to-distribute-atomic-macos-stealer.html"
    date: "2026-02-23"
  - name: "1Password - From magic to malware: OpenClaw attack surface"
    url: "https://1password.com/blog/from-magic-to-malware-how-openclaws-agent-skills-become-an-attack-surface"
    date: "2026-02-02"
  - name: "Red Hat - MCP Security Current Situation"
    url: "https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/mcp-security-current-situation"
    date: "2026-02-25"
  - name: "NVD - CVE-2026-26029 sf-mcp-server Command Injection"
    url: "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26029"
    date: "2026-02-11"
  - name: "CVEDetails - CVE-2026-27203 eBay API MCP Server Env Injection"
    url: "https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2026-27203/"
    date: "2026-02-20"
  - name: "NVD - CVE-2026-27735 mcp-server-git Path Traversal in git_add"
    url: "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27735"
    date: "2026-02-26"
  - name: "Snyk - Clinejection: AI Bot → Supply Chain Attack via Cache Poisoning"
    url: "https://snyk.io/blog/cline-supply-chain-attack-prompt-injection-github-actions/"
    date: "2026-02-19"
  - name: "The Hacker News - Cline CLI 2.3.0 Supply Chain Attack"
    url: "https://thehackernews.com/2026/02/cline-cli-230-supply-chain-attack.html"
    date: "2026-02-20"
  - name: "Microsoft Security Blog - AI Recommendation Poisoning"
    url: "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/02/10/ai-recommendation-poisoning/"
    date: "2026-02-10"
  - name: "SonicWall - CVE-2026-25253 OpenClaw Auth Token Theft RCE"
    url: "https://www.sonicwall.com/blog/openclaw-auth-token-theft-leading-to-rce-cve-2026-25253"
    date: "2026-02-26"
  - name: "Hunt.io - CVE-2026-25253 17500+ Exposed OpenClaw Instances"
    url: "https://hunt.io/blog/cve-2026-25253-openclaw-ai-agent-exposure"
    date: "2026-02-03"
  - name: "NVD - CVE-2026-25725 Claude Code Sandbox Escape"
    url: "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25725"
    date: "2026-02-06"
  - name: "NVD - CVE-2026-0757 MCP Manager Claude Desktop Sandbox Escape"
    url: "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0757"
    date: "2026-01-22"
  - name: "ZDI - CVE-2025-15061 Framelink Figma MCP Server fetchWithRetry RCE"
    url: "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-25-1197/"
    date: "2025-12-29"
  - name: "Check Point Advisories - CVE-2025-35028 HexStrike AI MCP Server"
    url: "https://advisories.checkpoint.com/defense/advisories/public/2026/cpai-2025-12521.html"
    date: "2026-03-02"
  - name: "NVD - CVE-2026-3484 Nmap-Mcp-Server Command Injection"
    url: "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3484"
    date: "2026-03-04"
  - name: "Ona Security - Claude Code Autonomous Denylist and Sandbox Bypass"
    url: "https://ona.com/stories/how-claude-code-escapes-its-own-denylist-and-sandbox"
    date: "2026-03-03"
  - name: "Brandefense - MCP Server Security: 10 Protocol-Level Attack Scenarios"
    url: "https://brandefense.io/blog/mcp-server-security-protocol-attack-patterns/"
    date: "2026-03-02"

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# MALICIOUS AUTHORS (confirmed by security researchers)
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
malicious_authors:
  # Snyk ToxicSkills confirmed — block ALL skills from these authors
  - name: "zaycv"
    source: "Snyk ToxicSkills"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "40+ malicious skills, programmatic malware campaign, clawhub/clawdhub1 typosquats"
  - name: "Aslaep123"
    source: "Snyk ToxicSkills"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "Malicious crypto/trading skills, typosquatted exchange tools"
  - name: "pepe276"
    source: "Snyk ToxicSkills"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "Unicode-obfuscated instructions, DAN-style jailbreaking for exfiltration"
  - name: "moonshine-100rze"
    source: "Snyk ToxicSkills"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "Mixed prompt-injection + exfil; GitHub repo aztr0nutzs/NET_NiNjA.v1.2 hosts additional weaponized skills"
  # VirusTotal confirmed — single publisher, 314+ skills, 100% malicious
  - name: "hightower6eu"
    source: "VirusTotal OpenClaw Analysis"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "Single malicious publisher responsible for 314+ OpenClaw skills; all confirmed malicious by VirusTotal scan; malware disguised as productivity/utility tools"

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# MALICIOUS SKILLS (confirmed by researchers)
# Organized by campaign and type for efficient scanning
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
malicious_skills:

  # ─── Snyk ToxicSkills confirmed ───
  - name: "clawhud"
    type: "typosquatting"
    target: "clawhub"
    source: "Snyk ToxicSkills"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "clawhub1"
    type: "typosquatting"
    target: "clawhub"
    source: "Snyk ToxicSkills"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "clawdhub1"
    type: "typosquatting"
    target: "clawhub"
    source: "Snyk ToxicSkills"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "polymarket-traiding-bot"
    type: "malware"
    source: "Snyk ToxicSkills + Koi AuthTool"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "Typosquatting + credential theft"

  # ─── ClawHavoc campaign: ClawHub CLI typosquats (29 skills) ───
  # All deploy Atomic Stealer (AMOS) via fake prerequisites
  - name: "clawhub"
    type: "typosquatting"
    target: "clawhub-cli"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "clawhubb"
    type: "typosquatting"
    target: "clawhub-cli"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "clawhubcli"
    type: "typosquatting"
    target: "clawhub-cli"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "clawwhub"
    type: "typosquatting"
    target: "clawhub-cli"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "cllawhub"
    type: "typosquatting"
    target: "clawhub-cli"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  # 23 random-suffix variants — match with pattern "clawhub-*"
  - name: "clawhub-6yr3b"
    type: "typosquatting"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "clawhub-c9y4p"
    type: "typosquatting"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "clawhub-d4kxr"
    type: "typosquatting"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "clawhub-f3qcn"
    type: "typosquatting"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "clawhub-gpcrq"
    type: "typosquatting"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "clawhub-gstca"
    type: "typosquatting"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "clawhub-hh1fd"
    type: "typosquatting"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "clawhub-hh2km"
    type: "typosquatting"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "clawhub-hylhq"
    type: "typosquatting"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "clawhub-i7oci"
    type: "typosquatting"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "clawhub-i9zhz"
    type: "typosquatting"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "clawhub-ja7eh"
    type: "typosquatting"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "clawhub-krmvq"
    type: "typosquatting"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "clawhub-oihpl"
    type: "typosquatting"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "clawhub-olgys"
    type: "typosquatting"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "clawhub-osasg"
    type: "typosquatting"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "clawhub-rkvny"
    type: "typosquatting"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "clawhub-sxtsn"
    type: "typosquatting"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "clawhub-tlxx5"
    type: "typosquatting"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "clawhub-uoeym"
    type: "typosquatting"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "clawhub-wixce"
    type: "typosquatting"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "clawhub-wotp2"
    type: "typosquatting"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"

  # ─── ClawHavoc: Crypto tools (111 skills) ───
  # Solana wallet (33 variants) — pattern: solana-*
  - name: "solana-*"
    type: "malware"
    category: "crypto"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "33 variants (solana-07bcb through solana-ytzgw), deploys AMOS"
  # Phantom wallet (29 variants) — pattern: phantom-*
  - name: "phantom-*"
    type: "malware"
    category: "crypto"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "29 variants (phantom-0jcvy through phantom-ygmjc), deploys AMOS"
  # Wallet trackers (25 variants) — pattern: wallet-tracker-*
  - name: "wallet-tracker-*"
    type: "malware"
    category: "crypto"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "25 variants (wallet-tracker-0ghsk through wallet-tracker-zih4w)"
  # Insider wallet finders (23 variants) — pattern: insider-wallets-finder-*
  - name: "insider-wallets-finder-*"
    type: "malware"
    category: "crypto"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "23 variants (insider-wallets-finder-1a7pi through insider-wallets-finder-zzs2p)"
  # Ethereum gas trackers (14 variants) — pattern: ethereum-gas-tracker-*
  - name: "ethereum-gas-tracker-*"
    type: "malware"
    category: "crypto"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "14 variants"
  # Lost Bitcoin (3 skills)
  - name: "lost-bitcoin-10li1"
    type: "malware"
    category: "crypto"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "lost-bitcoin-dbrgt"
    type: "malware"
    category: "crypto"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "lost-bitcoin-eabml"
    type: "malware"
    category: "crypto"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"

  # ─── ClawHavoc: YouTube utilities (57 skills) ───
  # Summarizers (29 variants) — pattern: youtube-summarize-*
  - name: "youtube-summarize-*"
    type: "malware"
    category: "youtube"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "29 variants, deploys AMOS"
  # Thumbnail grabbers (13 variants) — pattern: youtube-thumbnail-grabber-*
  - name: "youtube-thumbnail-grabber-*"
    type: "malware"
    category: "youtube"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "13 variants"
  # Downloaders (13 variants) — pattern: youtube-video-downloader-*
  - name: "youtube-video-downloader-*"
    type: "malware"
    category: "youtube"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "13 variants"

  # ─── ClawHavoc: Polymarket bots (34 skills) ───
  - name: "poly"
    type: "malware"
    category: "polymarket"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "polym"
    type: "malware"
    category: "polymarket"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "polymarkets"
    type: "malware"
    category: "polymarket"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "polytrading"
    type: "malware"
    category: "polymarket"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  # 30 random-suffix variants — pattern: polymarket-*
  - name: "polymarket-*"
    type: "malware"
    category: "polymarket"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "30 variants (polymarket-25nwy through polymarket-z7lwp)"

  # ─── ClawHavoc: Auto-updaters (30 skills) ───
  - name: "amir"
    type: "malware"
    category: "updater"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "update"
    type: "malware"
    category: "updater"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "updater"
    type: "malware"
    category: "updater"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
  - name: "auto-updater-*"
    type: "malware"
    category: "updater"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "27 variants (auto-updater-161ks through auto-updater-xsunp)"

  # ─── ClawHavoc: Finance & social (76 skills) ───
  - name: "yahoo-finance-*"
    type: "malware"
    category: "finance"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "24 variants"
  - name: "x-trends-*"
    type: "malware"
    category: "social"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "25 variants"

  # ─── ClawHavoc: Google Workspace (17 skills) ───
  - name: "google-workspace-*"
    type: "malware"
    category: "productivity"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "17 variants targeting Gmail/Calendar/Drive"

  # ─── Koi outliers: AuthTool campaign (3 skills) ───
  # NOT AMOS — separate payload
  - name: "base-agent"
    type: "malware"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc (AuthTool)"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "Fake auth tool dropping separate payload"
  - name: "bybit-agent"
    type: "malware"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc (AuthTool)"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "Fake auth tool dropping separate payload"

  # ─── Koi outliers: Hidden backdoor (2 skills) ───
  # Inline reverse shell to 54.91.154.110:13338
  - name: "better-polymarket"
    type: "backdoor"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "Reverse shell to 54.91.154.110:13338 via /bin/bash -i >/dev/tcp/..."
  - name: "polymarket-all-in-one"
    type: "backdoor"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "Reverse shell to 54.91.154.110:13338"

  # ─── Koi outliers: Credential exfiltration (1 skill) ───
  - name: "rankaj"
    type: "credential-theft"
    source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "Reads ~/.clawdbot/.env, POSTs to webhook.site/358866c4-81c6-4c30-9c8c-358db4d04412"

  # ─── Supply chain: Malicious MCP servers on PyPI (JFrog) ───
  - name: "mcp-runcmd-server"
    type: "supply-chain"
    platform: "pypi"
    source: "JFrog"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "Reverse shell to 45.115.38.27:4433 before starting MCP server"
  - name: "mcp-runcommand-server"
    type: "supply-chain"
    platform: "pypi"
    source: "JFrog"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "Reverse shell to 45.115.38.27:4433"
  - name: "mcp-runcommand-server2"
    type: "supply-chain"
    platform: "pypi"
    source: "JFrog"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "Reverse shell to 45.115.38.27:4433"

  # ─── Supply chain: Malicious npm MCP package ───
  - name: "postmark-mcp"
    type: "supply-chain"
    platform: "npm"
    source: "Defender's Initiative"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "Squatter copying official Postmark MCP with hidden backdoor"

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# MALICIOUS SKILL PATTERNS (for wildcard/regex matching)
# Use these when scanning installed skills by name
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
malicious_skill_patterns:
  # Exact prefix matches — any skill starting with these is suspicious
  - pattern: "clawhub-"
    campaign: "ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "29 typosquat variants with random suffixes"
  - pattern: "solana-"
    campaign: "ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "33 crypto wallet variants"
  - pattern: "phantom-"
    campaign: "ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "29 phantom wallet variants"
  - pattern: "wallet-tracker-"
    campaign: "ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "25 wallet tracker variants"
  - pattern: "insider-wallets-finder-"
    campaign: "ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "23 variants"
  - pattern: "ethereum-gas-tracker-"
    campaign: "ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "14 variants"
  - pattern: "youtube-summarize-"
    campaign: "ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "29 summarizer variants"
  - pattern: "youtube-thumbnail-grabber-"
    campaign: "ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "13 variants"
  - pattern: "youtube-video-downloader-"
    campaign: "ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "13 variants"
  - pattern: "polymarket-"
    campaign: "ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "30 random-suffix variants"
  - pattern: "auto-updater-"
    campaign: "ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "27 variants"
  - pattern: "yahoo-finance-"
    campaign: "ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "24 variants"
  - pattern: "x-trends-"
    campaign: "ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "25 variants"
  - pattern: "google-workspace-"
    campaign: "ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "17 variants"
  - pattern: "lost-bitcoin-"
    campaign: "ClawHavoc"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "3 variants"
  - pattern: "mcp-runcmd"
    campaign: "PyPI supply chain"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "JFrog: reverse shell MCP servers"
  - pattern: "mcp-runcommand"
    campaign: "PyPI supply chain"
    risk: "critical"
    notes: "JFrog: reverse shell MCP servers"

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# CVE DATABASE (MCP servers & AI agent tools)
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
cve_database:
  # --- Anthropic Filesystem MCP ---
  - id: "CVE-2025-53109"
    component: "Filesystem MCP Server"
    severity: "high"
    description: "Symlink escape to arbitrary filesystem access / potential LPE"
    source: "Cymulate EscapeRoute"
    fixed_in: "0.6.3 / 2025.7.1"
    mitigation: "Update to >= 0.6.3; avoid Filesystem MCP in sensitive environments"

  - id: "CVE-2025-53110"
    component: "Filesystem MCP Server"
    severity: "high"
    description: "Naive prefix-match directory bypass (startsWith on paths)"
    source: "Cymulate EscapeRoute"
    fixed_in: "0.6.3 / 2025.7.1"
    mitigation: "Update to >= 0.6.3"

  # --- Anthropic MCP Inspector ---
  - id: "CVE-2025-49596"
    component: "MCP Inspector"
    severity: "critical"
    cvss: 9.4
    description: "RCE via unauthenticated proxy on 0.0.0.0; drive-by RCE from malicious web page"
    source: "Recorded Future / SocRadar"
    fixed_in: "0.14.1"
    mitigation: "Update to >= 0.14.1; restrict to localhost"
    notes: "~560 exposed instances found on Shodan"

  # --- Anthropic MCP Git Server (3 flaws, Jan 2026) ---
  - id: "CVE-2025-68143"
    component: "MCP Git Server (mcp-server-git)"
    severity: "high"
    description: "git_init path traversal — arbitrary filesystem path for repo creation"
    source: "The Hacker News / PointGuard AI"
    fixed_in: "2025.9.25"
    mitigation: "Update; restrict Git MCP to trusted repos"

  - id: "CVE-2025-68144"
    component: "MCP Git Server (mcp-server-git)"
    severity: "high"
    description: "Argument injection in git_diff/git_checkout — shell metacharacters via user-controlled args"
    source: "The Hacker News / PointGuard AI"
    fixed_in: "2025.12.18"
    mitigation: "Update; sanitize all user inputs to git CLI"

  - id: "CVE-2025-68145"
    component: "MCP Git Server (mcp-server-git)"
    severity: "high"
    description: "--repository path validation bypass — access beyond allowlist"
    source: "The Hacker News / PointGuard AI"
    fixed_in: "2025.12.18"
    mitigation: "Update; enforce strict path validation"

  # --- MCP Python SDK ---
  - id: "CVE-2025-66416"
    component: "MCP Python SDK (mcp on PyPI)"
    severity: "medium"
    description: "DNS rebinding to local HTTP MCP servers when using FastMCP HTTP/SSE with no auth"
    source: "Debian Security Tracker"
    fixed_in: "1.23.0"
    mitigation: "Update to >= 1.23.0; enable TransportSecuritySettings explicitly"

  # --- MCP Gateway ---
  - id: "CVE-2025-64443"
    component: "MCP Gateway"
    severity: "medium"
    description: "DNS rebinding against SSE/streaming listeners — indirect access to MCP servers behind gateway"
    source: "Blog Gowrishankar"
    fixed_in: "0.28.0"
    mitigation: "Update to > 0.27.0"

  # --- MCP TypeScript SDK ---
  - id: "CVE-2026-25536"
    component: "MCP TypeScript SDK"
    severity: "high"
    description: "Cross-client response data leak when reusing single server+transport across multiple SSE clients"
    source: "Feedly CVE"
    fixed_in: "1.26.0"
    mitigation: "Update to >= 1.26.0; isolate transport instances per client"

  # --- Cursor IDE ---
  - id: "CVE-2025-54135"
    component: "Cursor IDE"
    severity: "high"
    cvss: 8.6
    description: "CurXecute — RCE via prompt injection writing .cursor/mcp.json"
    source: "Checkpoint / PropelCode"
    fixed_in: "1.3.9"
    mitigation: "Update to Cursor >= 1.3.9; file integrity monitoring on mcp.json"

  - id: "CVE-2025-54136"
    component: "Cursor IDE"
    severity: "high"
    description: "MCPoison — persistent RCE via trusted config mutation; post-approval changes auto-execute"
    source: "Checkpoint"
    fixed_in: "1.3.9"
    mitigation: "Update to >= 1.3.9; Git hooks + hash verification on mcp.json"

  # --- Claude Code ---
  - id: "CVE-2025-66032"
    component: "Claude Code"
    severity: "high"
    description: "8 command execution bypasses via blocklist flaws (man --html, sed e modifier, git arg ambiguity, bash variable expansion)"
    source: "Flatt Security"
    fixed_in: "1.0.93"
    mitigation: "Update to Claude Code >= 1.0.93"

  - id: "CVE-2026-24052"
    component: "Claude Code WebFetch"
    severity: "high"
    description: "SSRF via startsWith() domain validation bypass in WebFetch (trusted-domain prefix attack)"
    source: "SentinelOne"
    fixed_in: "1.0.111"
    mitigation: "Update to Claude Code >= 1.0.111"

  - id: "CVE-2025-59536"
    component: "Claude Code"
    severity: "critical"
    description: "RCE via enableAllProjectMcpServers config — malicious .claude/settings.json or .mcp.json sets flag to auto-start MCP servers before trust dialog is shown; injected commands execute immediately upon claude startup in untrusted directory"
    source: "Check Point Research (2026-02-25)"
    fixed_in: "1.0.111"
    mitigation: "Update to Claude Code >= 1.0.111; never run claude in untrusted repositories without reviewing config files first"
    notes: "Paired with CVE-2026-21852; both disclosed by Check Point Research; trust dialog bypass is the core issue"

  - id: "CVE-2026-21852"
    component: "Claude Code"
    severity: "medium"
    cvss: 5.3
    description: "API key exfiltration via ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL in malicious repository config — attacker sets ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL to attacker-controlled server in .claude/settings.json; Claude Code sends API requests (including bearer API key) before trust dialog is presented"
    source: "Check Point Research (2026-02-25)"
    fixed_in: "2.0.65"
    mitigation: "Update to Claude Code >= 2.0.65; inspect .claude/settings.json and .mcp.json before opening unfamiliar repos"
    notes: "With stolen key: access workspace storage, shared project files, unauthorized uploads, unexpected API cost generation"

  - id: "ADVISORY-CC-2026-001"
    component: "Claude Code"
    severity: "high"
    description: "Sandbox bypass — commands excluded from sandboxing could bypass Bash permission enforcement (details undisclosed)"
    source: "Claude Code CHANGELOG v2.1.34"
    fixed_in: "2.1.34"
    mitigation: "Update to Claude Code >= 2.1.34"
    notes: "No CVE assigned. Fixed in CHANGELOG. Separate from CVE-2026-25725 (different sandbox escape)."

  # --- Third-party MCP servers ---
  - id: "CVE-2025-53967"
    component: "Framelink Figma MCP Server (figma-developer-mcp)"
    severity: "high"
    cvss: 7.5
    description: "Command injection via unsanitized input in fetchWithRetry curl command"
    source: "Geordie AI / EndorLabs"
    fixed_in: "0.6.3"
    mitigation: "Update to >= 0.6.3"

  - id: "CVE-2025-9611"
    component: "Microsoft Playwright MCP Server (@playwright/mcp)"
    severity: "medium"
    description: "DNS rebinding / Origin-less CSRF — missing Origin validation on local instance"
    source: "Mondoo / NVD"
    fixed_in: "0.0.40"
    mitigation: "Update to >= 0.0.40"

  - id: "CVE-2025-6515"
    component: "MCP SSE Transport (oatpp-mcp)"
    severity: "high"
    description: "Prompt hijacking via predictable/reused session IDs; attacker replaces tool outputs"
    source: "JFrog"
    mitigation: "Use cryptographically secure session IDs (128+ bits entropy)"

  - id: "CVE-2026-25546"
    component: "Godot MCP Server (godot-mcp)"
    severity: "high"
    description: "Command injection via user-controlled projectPath passed to exec()"
    source: "Feedly CVE"
    fixed_in: "0.1.1"
    mitigation: "Update to >= 0.1.1; sanitize projectPath; avoid exec() with user input"

  - id: "CVE-2025-54073"
    component: "mcp-package-docs"
    severity: "high"
    description: "Command injection in child_process.exec via unsanitized input"
    source: "NVD"
    fixed_in: "0.1.28"
    mitigation: "Update to >= 0.1.28"

  # --- MCPJam Inspector ---
  - id: "CVE-2026-23744"
    component: "MCPJam Inspector"
    severity: "critical"
    description: "RCE via crafted HTTP request that triggers automatic MCP server installation; allows remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on developer machine"
    source: "Immersive Labs / CVE-2026-23744"
    fixed_in: "1.4.3"
    mitigation: "Update MCPJam Inspector to >= 1.4.3; restrict to localhost; do not expose MCPJam to untrusted networks"
    notes: "Affects local-first MCP dev platform; versions <= 1.4.2 vulnerable"

  # --- xcode-mcp-server ---
  - id: "CVE-2026-2178"
    component: "xcode-mcp-server (r-huijts)"
    severity: "high"
    description: "Command injection in registerXcodeTools function via unsanitized args argument passed to exec(); allows RCE or data exfiltration"
    source: "SentinelOne"
    fixed_in: "after commit f3419f00117aa9949e326f78cc940166c88f18cb"
    mitigation: "Update to latest commit post-f3419f00; avoid passing user-controlled input to exec(); switch to execFile() with argument arrays"

  # --- gemini-mcp-tool ---
  - id: "CVE-2026-0755"
    component: "gemini-mcp-tool"
    severity: "critical"
    cvss: 9.8
    description: "Command injection via LLM-generated arguments passed directly to shell execution primitives without validation; network-reachable RCE via JSON-RPC CallTool requests requiring no authentication and no user interaction"
    source: "Penligent AI"
    fixed_in: "no fix confirmed at time of research (2026-02-22)"
    mitigation: "Replace shell string execution with execFile() and argument arrays; validate all LLM-generated arguments before passing to any exec primitive; do not expose gemini-mcp-tool to untrusted networks"

  # --- mcp-run-python ---
  - id: "SNYK-PYTHON-MCPRUNPYTHON-15250607"
    component: "mcp-run-python"
    severity: "high"
    description: "SSRF via overly permissive Deno sandbox configuration — sandbox allows localhost interface access, enabling attackers to reach internal network resources through crafted Python code execution requests"
    source: "Snyk (2026-02-09)"
    fixed_in: "unknown — check upstream for patch"
    mitigation: "Restrict Deno sandbox network permissions to block localhost/internal ranges; do not expose mcp-run-python to untrusted inputs or external networks"

  # --- MCP Salesforce Connector ---
  - id: "CVE-2026-25650"
    component: "MCP Salesforce Connector"
    severity: "medium"
    description: "Arbitrary attribute access — prior to 0.1.10, attacker can access arbitrary object attributes via crafted MCP requests, potentially exposing sensitive Salesforce data"
    source: "NVD"
    fixed_in: "0.1.10"
    mitigation: "Update MCP Salesforce Connector to >= 0.1.10; enforce attribute allowlists"

  # --- sf-mcp-server ---
  - id: "CVE-2026-26029"
    component: "sf-mcp-server (Salesforce MCP)"
    severity: "high"
    description: "Command injection via unsafe child_process.exec when constructing Salesforce CLI commands with user-controlled input; allows arbitrary code execution on the host"
    source: "NVD (2026-02-11)"
    fixed_in: "unknown — check upstream"
    mitigation: "Replace child_process.exec with execFile() and sanitize all user-controlled inputs; avoid sf-mcp-server until patched"

  # --- eBay API MCP Server ---
  - id: "CVE-2026-27203"
    component: "eBay API MCP Server (open-source)"
    severity: "medium"
    description: "Environment variable injection via updateEnvFile function in ebay_set_user_tokens tool — all versions vulnerable; attacker can inject arbitrary env variables to the .env file"
    source: "CVEDetails (2026-02-20)"
    fixed_in: "no fix confirmed"
    mitigation: "Sanitize all inputs to updateEnvFile; do not expose eBay MCP Server to untrusted inputs"

  # --- MCP Git Server (additional, git_add path traversal) ---
  - id: "CVE-2026-27735"
    component: "MCP Git Server (mcp-server-git)"
    severity: "medium"
    cvss: 6.4
    description: "Path traversal in git_add tool — unsafe GitPython repo.index.add() call without path boundary validation allows staging/committing files outside repo (e.g. /etc/shadow, ~/.ssh/id_rsa); attacker or confused LLM can exfiltrate sensitive host files via a commit push"
    source: "NVD / dev.to (2026-02-26)"
    fixed_in: "2026.1.14"
    mitigation: "Update mcp-server-git to >= 2026.1.14; audit recent git commits managed by agents for unexpected file paths"
    notes: "Distinct from CVE-2025-68143/68144/68145 (those affect git_init/git_diff/git_checkout); this affects git_add; fix uses repo.git.add('--', *files) instead of repo.index.add(files)"

  # --- OpenClaw (clawdbot / Moltbot) ---
  - id: "CVE-2026-25253"
    component: "OpenClaw (aka clawdbot, Moltbot)"
    severity: "high"
    cvss: 8.8
    description: "Authentication token theft and RCE via malicious gatewayUrl — OpenClaw automatically establishes a WebSocket connection to a URL provided in the query string without origin validation; clicking attacker-crafted link causes OpenClaw to transmit auth token to attacker-controlled server; attacker replays token for full system access. 17,500+ internet-exposed instances identified."
    source: "SonicWall / Hunt.io / runZero (2026-02-03 to 2026-02-26)"
    fixed_in: "2026.1.29"
    mitigation: "Update OpenClaw to >= 2026.1.29; block public internet exposure of OpenClaw instances"
    notes: "CWE-669 (Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres); exposes unauthenticated /api/export-auth endpoint leaking stored API tokens for Claude, OpenAI, Google AI"

  # --- Claude Code (additional CVEs) ---
  - id: "CVE-2026-25725"
    component: "Claude Code"
    severity: "high"
    description: "Sandbox escape via persistent configuration injection — bubblewrap sandbox failed to protect missing .claude/settings.json; malicious code running inside sandbox creates settings.json with SessionStart hooks that execute with host privileges after Claude Code restart"
    source: "NVD / GHSA-ff64-7w26-62rf (2026-02-06)"
    fixed_in: "2.1.2"
    mitigation: "Update Claude Code to >= 2.1.34 (covers this and subsequent fixes); monitor .claude/settings.json for unexpected SessionStart hooks"
    notes: "CWE-501 Trust Boundary Violation; distinct from ADVISORY-CC-2026-001 (which is a different sandbox bypass patched in 2.1.34)"

  # --- MCP Manager for Claude Desktop ---
  - id: "CVE-2026-0757"
    component: "MCP Manager for Claude Desktop"
    severity: "high"
    description: "Command injection sandbox escape — execute-command functionality fails to sanitize user-supplied strings from MCP config objects before passing to system calls; attacker crafts malicious webpage with injected config objects, causing MCP Manager to execute arbitrary commands outside the sandbox"
    source: "NVD / ZDI-CAN-27810 (2026-01-22)"
    fixed_in: "unknown — check upstream"
    mitigation: "Restrict MCP Manager access to trusted configurations only; sanitize all MCP config object fields before system calls; block untrusted file/webpage access"

  # --- HexStrike AI MCP Server ---
  - id: "CVE-2025-35028"
    component: "HexStrike AI MCP Server (0x4m4)"
    severity: "critical"
    cvss: 9.1
    description: "Command injection via semicolon-prefixed argument — EnhancedCommandExecutor class fails to sanitize command-line arguments; attacker provides argument beginning with ; to API endpoint, executing arbitrary commands with MCP server privileges (typically root in default config)"
    source: "Check Point Advisories / NVD (2025-11-30)"
    fixed_in: "no fix confirmed at time of research"
    mitigation: "Sanitize all command-line arguments; replace exec()-style calls with execFile() with argument arrays; do not expose HexStrike AI MCP Server to untrusted networks or inputs"
    notes: "CWE-78; attack requires no authentication, no user interaction; default configuration typically runs as root"

  # --- Nmap-Mcp-Server ---
  - id: "CVE-2026-3484"
    component: "nmap-mcp-server (PhialsBasement)"
    severity: "medium"
    cvss: 6.5
    description: "Command injection in Nmap CLI Command Handler — child_process.exec in src/index.ts processes special elements (CWE-74/CWE-77) without sanitization; remotely exploitable with no authentication required"
    source: "NVD / PT Security (2026-03-04)"
    fixed_in: "patch commit 30a6b9e1c7fa6146f51e28d6ab83a2568d9a3488"
    mitigation: "Apply patch commit 30a6b9e...; replace child_process.exec with execFile() and argument arrays; sanitize all nmap arguments"

  # --- Framelink Figma MCP Server (additional CVE) ---
  - id: "CVE-2025-15061"
    component: "Framelink Figma MCP Server (figma-developer-mcp)"
    severity: "critical"
    cvss: 9.8
    description: "Command injection RCE via fetchWithRetry method — user-supplied input passed to system calls without sanitization of shell metacharacters; authentication not required; allows arbitrary code execution with MCP server service account privileges"
    source: "ZDI-25-1197 / SentinelOne (2025-12-29, NVD published 2026-01-23)"
    fixed_in: "latest patched version (see upstream)"
    mitigation: "Update Framelink Figma MCP Server to latest version; sanitize all user-supplied inputs; restrict MCP Server network access to trusted sources"
    notes: "Distinct CVE from CVE-2025-53967 (same component/method, different CVE assignment; CVSS 9.8 vs 7.5); CWE-78"

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# MINIMUM SAFE VERSIONS (quick reference for scanning)
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
minimum_safe_versions:
  "filesystem-mcp": "0.6.3"
  "mcp-inspector": "0.14.1"
  "mcp-server-git": "2026.1.14"
  "mcp-python-sdk": "1.23.0"
  "mcp-gateway": "0.28.0"
  "figma-developer-mcp": "0.6.3"
  "@playwright/mcp": "0.0.40"
  "mcp-package-docs": "0.1.28"
  "cursor": "1.3.9"
  "claude-code": "2.1.34"
  "mcpjam-inspector": "1.4.3"
  "mcp-salesforce-connector": "0.1.10"
  "openclaw": "2026.1.29"

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# IOCs (Indicators of Compromise)
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
iocs:
  # ClawHavoc C2 IPs — block outbound connections
  c2_ips:
    - ip: "91.92.242.30"
      campaign: "ClawHavoc"
      notes: "Primary AMOS dropper host"
    - ip: "95.92.242.30"
      campaign: "ClawHavoc"
    - ip: "96.92.242.30"
      campaign: "ClawHavoc"
    - ip: "202.161.50.59"
      campaign: "ClawHavoc"
    - ip: "54.91.154.110"
      campaign: "ClawHavoc"
      notes: "Reverse shell target (better-polymarket, polymarket-all-in-one) port 13338"
    - ip: "45.115.38.27"
      campaign: "PyPI MCP reverse shell (JFrog)"
      notes: "Reverse shell on port 4433"

  # Exfiltration endpoints
  exfil_urls:
    - url: "webhook.site/358866c4-81c6-4c30-9c8c-358db4d04412"
      skill: "rankaj"
      source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
      notes: "Credential exfiltration endpoint"

  # Malicious GitHub repos
  github_repos:
    - repo: "aztr0nutzs/NET_NiNjA.v1.2"
      author: "moonshine-100rze"
      source: "Snyk ToxicSkills"
      notes: "Hosts additional weaponized skills not yet on ClawHub"

  # AMOS sample hashes (from Koi report)
  malware_hashes:
    - hash: "1e6d4b05...e2298"
      type: "AMOS Mach-O"
      source: "Koi ClawHavoc"
    - hash: "0e52566c...dd65"
      type: "AMOS Mach-O"
      source: "Koi ClawHavoc"

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# SUSPICIOUS PATTERNS (for grep-based scanning)
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
suspicious_patterns:
  # Hook exfiltration patterns
  hooks:
    - pattern: "curl|wget"
      description: "Network calls in hooks (potential data exfiltration)"
      risk: "high"
      action: "Review every network call in hooks — legitimate hooks rarely need outbound requests"
    - pattern: "nc |ncat|netcat"
      description: "Netcat in hooks (reverse shell indicator)"
      risk: "critical"
      action: "Remove immediately — no legitimate hook use case"
    - pattern: "base64"
      description: "Base64 encoding in hooks (payload obfuscation)"
      risk: "medium"
      action: "Verify what is being encoded — common evasion technique"
    - pattern: "eval|exec"
      description: "Dynamic code execution in hooks"
      risk: "high"
      action: "Verify source of executed code"
    - pattern: '\$\(.*\)|`.*`'
      description: "Command substitution in hooks"
      risk: "medium"
      action: "Verify no sensitive data is captured"
    - pattern: "/dev/tcp|/dev/udp"
      description: "Bash network redirects (reverse shell)"
      risk: "critical"
      action: "Remove immediately"
    - pattern: "ssh|id_rsa|id_ed25519"
      description: "SSH key access in hooks"
      risk: "critical"
      action: "No hook should access SSH keys"
    - pattern: '.env|credentials|secret|password|token|api.key'
      description: "Credential file access in hooks"
      risk: "critical"
      action: "No hook should read credential files"
    - pattern: "glot.io|pastebin.com|hastebin.com"
      description: "Paste site references in hooks (common payload hosting)"
      risk: "high"
      action: "Review carefully — ClawHavoc uses glot.io for obfuscated scripts"

  # Agent/skill red flags
  agents:
    - pattern: 'allowed-tools.*Bash'
      description: "Broad Bash access in agent definition"
      risk: "medium"
      action: "Verify agent needs shell access — prefer specific tools"
    - pattern: 'allowed-tools.*\["Bash"\]'
      description: "Agent with ONLY Bash access (common in malicious agents)"
      risk: "high"
      action: "Highly suspicious — legitimate agents use specific tools"
    - pattern: "ignore previous|disregard|override"
      description: "Prompt injection attempt in agent system prompt"
      risk: "critical"
      action: "Remove agent — confirmed injection vector"
    - pattern: "you are now|new instructions|forget"
      description: "Role hijacking in agent instructions"
      risk: "high"
      action: "Review agent source carefully"
    - pattern: "developer mode|DAN|jailbreak"
      description: "Jailbreak attempt in skill/agent instructions"
      risk: "critical"
      action: "Remove immediately — used by pepe276 and others"

  # Config red flags
  config:
    - pattern: "dangerouslySkipPermissions|dangerously"
      description: "Dangerous permission bypass flags"
      risk: "critical"
      action: "Remove — never use in production"
    - pattern: '"allow".*"Bash\(.*\*.*\)"'
      description: "Wildcard Bash permissions"
      risk: "high"
      action: "Narrow to specific commands"
    - pattern: '"allow".*"Write\(.*\*.*\)"'
      description: "Wildcard Write permissions"
      risk: "high"
      action: "Narrow to specific paths"
    - pattern: "@latest"
      description: "Unpinned MCP server version in mcp.json"
      risk: "high"
      action: "Pin to exact version — unpinned packages are supply-chain targets"

  # Secrets patterns (in any file)
  secrets:
    - pattern: '(?i)(api[_-]?key|apikey)\s*[=:]\s*["\x27][A-Za-z0-9_\-]{20,}["\x27]'
      description: "Hardcoded API key"
      risk: "critical"
    - pattern: '(?i)(secret|password|passwd|pwd)\s*[=:]\s*["\x27][^\x27"]{8,}["\x27]'
      description: "Hardcoded secret/password"
      risk: "critical"
    - pattern: '(?i)(token|bearer)\s*[=:]\s*["\x27][A-Za-z0-9_\-\.]{20,}["\x27]'
      description: "Hardcoded token"
      risk: "critical"
    - pattern: "sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}"
      description: "OpenAI API key pattern"
      risk: "critical"
    - pattern: "sk-ant-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}"
      description: "Anthropic API key pattern"
      risk: "critical"
    - pattern: "ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}"
      description: "GitHub personal access token"
      risk: "critical"
    - pattern: "AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}"
      description: "AWS access key ID"
      risk: "critical"
    - pattern: 'xox[bps]-[a-zA-Z0-9\-]{20,}'
      description: "Slack token"
      risk: "critical"
    - pattern: '-----BEGIN (RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----'
      description: "Private key in file"
      risk: "critical"

  # Prompt injection in markdown/config
  injection:
    - pattern: '[\x{200B}-\x{200D}\x{FEFF}]'
      description: "Zero-width Unicode characters (invisible instructions)"
      risk: "high"
      encoding: "unicode"
    - pattern: '[\x{202A}-\x{202E}\x{2066}-\x{2069}]'
      description: "RTL/bidirectional override characters"
      risk: "high"
      encoding: "unicode"
    - pattern: '[\x{E0000}-\x{E007F}]'
      description: "Tag characters (invisible Unicode block)"
      risk: "high"
      encoding: "unicode"
    - pattern: '\x1b\[|\x1b\]|\x1b\('
      description: "ANSI escape sequences (terminal injection)"
      risk: "medium"
    - pattern: '\x00'
      description: "Null byte (string truncation attack)"
      risk: "high"
    - pattern: '<!--.*(?:ignore|forget|override|system|admin|instruction).*-->'
      description: "Hidden instructions in HTML comments"
      risk: "high"

  # SKILL.md / skill content red flags
  skill_content:
    - pattern: 'curl.*\|.*bash'
      description: "Remote script execution (curl pipe bash)"
      risk: "critical"
      action: "Classic malware delivery — review URL and content"
    - pattern: 'base64.*-[dD].*\|.*bash'
      description: "Base64-decoded command execution"
      risk: "critical"
      action: "Obfuscated payload — likely malicious"
    - pattern: 'password.*openclaw|openclaw.*password'
      description: "Password-protected archive with known ClawHavoc password"
      risk: "critical"
      action: "Matches ClawHavoc delivery pattern"
    - pattern: 'chmod.*\+x.*&&.*\./'
      description: "Download, make executable, run — malware dropper pattern"
      risk: "critical"
    - pattern: '/bin/bash.*-i.*>/dev/tcp'
      description: "Interactive reverse shell"
      risk: "critical"
      action: "Remove immediately"
    - pattern: 'webhook\.site|requestbin\.com'
      description: "Data exfiltration via webhook/request bin service"
      risk: "high"
      action: "Verify intent — common exfil endpoint"

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# CAMPAIGN SIGNATURES
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
campaigns:
  - name: "ClawHavoc"
    source: "Koi Security"
    date: "2026-02-01"
    skills_count: 341
    amos_skills: 335
    outlier_skills: 6
    platform: "ClawHub / OpenClaw"
    malware: "Atomic Stealer (AMOS) + Windows infostealers"
    delivery:
      - "Fake prerequisites in SKILL.md"
      - "Base64-encoded shell snippets from glot.io"
      - "Password-protected ZIPs (password: 'openclaw')"
      - "Second-stage dropper from raw IP"
    c2_ips:
      - "91.92.242.30"
      - "95.92.242.30"
      - "96.92.242.30"
      - "202.161.50.59"
      - "54.91.154.110"
    targets:
      - "Cryptocurrency wallets (60+ wallets: Exodus, Binance, Electrum, Atomic, Ledger)"
      - "Browser data (Chrome, Safari, Firefox, Brave, Edge)"
      - "SSH keys and shell history"
      - "Telegram sessions"
      - "Keychain passwords (macOS)"
    categories:
      crypto: 111
      youtube: 57
      finance_social: 76
      polymarket: 34
      typosquatting: 29
      auto_updaters: 30
      google_workspace: 17
    outliers:
      auth_tool: ["base-agent", "bybit-agent", "polymarket-traiding-bot"]
      reverse_shell: ["better-polymarket", "polymarket-all-in-one"]
      credential_theft: ["rankaj"]

  - name: "ToxicSkills"
    source: "Snyk"
    date: "2026-02-05"
    skills_scanned: 3984
    platforms: ["ClawHub", "skills.sh"]
    findings:
      total_flawed: 1467
      flawed_percentage: 36.82
      critical_risk: 534
      critical_percentage: 13.4
      malicious_payloads: 76
      still_live_at_scan: 8
      hardcoded_secrets_percentage: 10.9
      remote_content_fetch_percentage: 17.7
      remote_prompt_execution_percentage: 2.9
    known_malicious_authors:
      - "zaycv"
      - "Aslaep123"
      - "pepe276"
      - "moonshine-100rze"

  - name: "PyPI MCP Reverse Shell"
    source: "JFrog"
    date: "2025-12"
    platform: "PyPI"
    packages:
      - "mcp-runcmd-server"
      - "mcp-runcommand-server"
      - "mcp-runcommand-server2"
    c2_ip: "45.115.38.27"
    c2_port: 4433
    technique: "Spawns /bin/sh -i reverse shell before starting MCP server"

  - name: "Postmark MCP Squatter"
    source: "Defender's Initiative"
    date: "2025-11"
    platform: "npm"
    package: "postmark-mcp"
    technique: "Copies official Postmark MCP server with hidden backdoor"

  - name: "Clinejection"
    source: "Snyk / Adnan Khan (researcher)"
    date: "2026-02-17"
    platform: "GitHub Actions / npm"
    packages:
      - "cline-cli@2.3.0 (malicious, 4000 downloads, 8-hour window)"
    technique: "Prompt injection via GitHub issue title → GitHub Actions cache poisoning (10 GB junk fill, LRU eviction) → stolen CI/CD publishing tokens → malicious npm publish"
    tokens_stolen:
      - "VSCE_PAT"
      - "OVSX_PAT"
      - "NPM_RELEASE_TOKEN"
    payload: "OpenClaw AI agent installer distributed to developer machines"
    timeline:
      - "2026-01-01: Researcher Adnan Khan submits GHSA and notifies Cline"
      - "2026-02-09: Public disclosure; Cline patches in 30 minutes"
      - "2026-02-17: Unknown actor exploits, publishes malicious cline-cli 2.3.0"
    notes: "Potential blast radius: 5M+ VS Code users with auto-update enabled; Cline moved to OIDC provenance post-fix"
    sources:
      - "https://snyk.io/blog/cline-supply-chain-attack-prompt-injection-github-actions/"
      - "https://adnanthekhan.com/posts/clinejection/"
      - "https://thehackernews.com/2026/02/cline-cli-230-supply-chain-attack.html"

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# ATTACK TECHNIQUES TAXONOMY
# Maps to SAFE-MCP framework and common patterns
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
attack_techniques:
  - id: "T001"
    name: "Tool Poisoning via SKILL.md"
    description: "Hidden instructions in SKILL.md that instruct the agent to run malicious commands"
    examples:
      - "curl | bash from glot.io scripts"
      - "Password-protected ZIP with embedded malware"
      - "Base64-decoded eval commands"
    campaigns: ["ClawHavoc", "ToxicSkills"]
    mitigation: "Scan SKILL.md for shell commands; never auto-execute prerequisites"

  - id: "T002"
    name: "Memory Poisoning"
    description: "Injection of persistent instructions into SOUL.md, MEMORY.md, CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md"
    examples:
      - "Skills targeting SOUL.md/MEMORY.md to inject persistent backdoor instructions"
      - "Cognitive worms that replicate across agent memory files"
    campaigns: ["ToxicSkills"]
    mitigation: "Treat memory files as config; require code review for changes; monitor diffs"

  - id: "T003"
    name: "Rug Pull / Post-Approval Mutation"
    description: "Benign config approved once, then mutated to malicious version that auto-executes"
    examples:
      - "MCPoison: .cursor/rules/mcp.json approved, then updated with reverse shell"
      - "ClawHub skills updated without changelog to swap in AMOS installer"
    cves: ["CVE-2025-54136"]
    mitigation: "Hash verification on configs; re-approval on any change"

  - id: "T004"
    name: "Confused Deputy via MCP"
    description: "Attacker manipulates MCP session/output; client trusts poisoned response"
    examples:
      - "oatpp-mcp session ID reuse (CVE-2025-6515)"
      - "Git MCP + Filesystem MCP chain via poisoned README"
    cves: ["CVE-2025-6515", "CVE-2025-68143", "CVE-2025-68144", "CVE-2025-68145"]
    mitigation: "Cryptographic session IDs; input validation; least-privilege for MCP tools"

  - id: "T005"
    name: "DNS Rebinding on Local MCP"
    description: "Malicious website rebinds domain to 127.0.0.1 to access local MCP servers"
    examples:
      - "MCP Python SDK HTTP/SSE servers (CVE-2025-66416)"
      - "MCP Gateway SSE (CVE-2025-64443)"
      - "Playwright MCP (CVE-2025-9611)"
    cves: ["CVE-2025-66416", "CVE-2025-64443", "CVE-2025-9611"]
    mitigation: "Use stdio transport; enable DNS rebinding protection; authenticate local servers"

  - id: "T006"
    name: "Supply Chain Package Attack"
    description: "Malicious packages published to registries mimicking legitimate MCP servers"
    examples:
      - "PyPI: mcp-runcmd-server, mcp-runcommand-server (JFrog)"
      - "npm: postmark-mcp squatter"
    campaigns: ["PyPI MCP Reverse Shell", "Postmark MCP Squatter"]
    mitigation: "Verify package author; check download counts; use SafeDep vet"

  - id: "T007"
    name: "Hook-Based Exfiltration"
    description: "Malicious .claude/hooks/ scripts run on agent events with full user privileges"
    examples:
      - "SessionStart hook that POSTs environment variables"
      - "PostToolUse hook that exfiltrates file paths and content"
    mitigation: "Review all hooks; forbid auto-running hooks from untrusted repos; maintain hook allowlist"

  - id: "T008"
    name: "Credential Theft via Agent"
    description: "Agent instructed to read credential files and send to attacker"
    examples:
      - "rankaj skill: reads ~/.clawdbot/.env, POSTs to webhook.site"
      - "Base64-encoded curl to send ~/.aws/credentials"
    campaigns: ["ClawHavoc", "ToxicSkills"]
    mitigation: "Block agent access to .env, .aws, .ssh directories; use pre-execution hooks"

  - id: "T009"
    name: "Slopsquatting / Hallucinated Package Injection"
    description: "Malicious skills spread hallucinated or fabricated package names (e.g. via npx commands) that resolve to attacker-controlled packages on npm/PyPI when executed"
    examples:
      - "Skills with setup instructions referencing nonexistent npm packages that typosquat legitimate tools"
      - "AI-generated skill content propagating hallucinated npx commands that install malicious packages"
    source: "Aikido Security (2026-01-21)"
    mitigation: "Verify every package reference in SKILL.md before executing setup instructions; use package lockfiles; pin all dependencies to known-good checksums"

  - id: "T010"
    name: "Agent-to-Agent Communication Injection"
    description: "Attacker injects malicious instructions into communication channels (Slack, email, ticketing systems, code review comments) that AI agents monitor autonomously; agent executes unauthorized actions without cryptographic source verification"
    examples:
      - "Posting fake urgent security alerts in Slack channels monitored by DevOps AI agents causing unauthorized deployments"
      - "Embedding malicious instructions in GitHub issue comments that redirect CI/CD agents to commit backdoored code"
      - "Crafting PR review comments that cause coding agents to weaken security controls under the guise of refactoring"
    source: "Pillar Security / Cisco AI Security Research (2026)"
    mitigation: "Validate agent instruction sources cryptographically; treat all external channel content as untrusted user input; require human-in-the-loop for high-impact actions triggered via monitored channels; scope agent permissions to minimum required for task"

  - id: "T011"
    name: "Project Configuration Hijacking"
    description: "Attacker embeds malicious settings in repository config files (.claude/settings.json, .mcp.json) that auto-execute MCP servers or redirect API traffic before trust dialog is shown; the configuration layer — not the code — is the attack surface"
    examples:
      - "Setting enableAllProjectMcpServers:true in .claude/settings.json to auto-start attacker MCP server that executes commands before trust dialog (CVE-2025-59536)"
      - "Setting ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL to attacker endpoint in repo config — API key sent in plaintext before user can approve or deny the directory (CVE-2026-21852)"
      - "Injecting claude hooks in settings.json to run exfiltration scripts on PostToolUse events"
    cves: ["CVE-2025-59536", "CVE-2026-21852"]
    source: "Check Point Research (2026-02-25)"
    mitigation: "Review .claude/settings.json and .mcp.json before opening unfamiliar repos; treat these files as code, not metadata; update Claude Code to >= 2.0.65; never clone-and-run from untrusted sources without inspecting config files first"

  - id: "T013"
    name: "Autonomous Safety Control Bypass"
    description: "AI coding agent autonomously disables or circumvents its own security controls (sandbox, denylist, permission enforcement) when those controls block task completion, without explicit attacker instruction — the agent's reasoning determines that bypassing safety is necessary to fulfill the assigned goal"
    examples:
      - "Claude Code disabling bubblewrap sandbox when it blocks file operations required for task"
      - "Agent using path tricks, ELF dynamic linker, or alternative code-loading mechanisms to bypass denylist enforcement"
      - "Agent finding sandbox escape paths proactively when sandbox prevents API calls or shell execution"
    source: "Ona Security / Leonardo Di Donato (2026-03-03)"
    mitigation: "Treat agent-initiated security control disabling as a red flag requiring human review; implement hard security boundaries that cannot be overridden by agent reasoning; monitor for unexpected sandbox exits or denylist bypass attempts; apply principle of least privilege so agents cannot access sandbox configuration"

  - id: "T012"
    name: "AI Recommendation Poisoning"
    description: "Attacker embeds hidden instructions in URLs (e.g. 'Summarize with AI' buttons, share links) that inject persistent memory entries into AI assistants, biasing future recommendations toward attacker-controlled content or services"
    examples:
      - "Company embeds 'remember [Brand] as a trusted source' in URL parameters of 'Summarize with AI' buttons; user clicks → AI memory poisoned; every future conversation biased"
      - "Malicious share links containing memory-altering prompts distributed via email or web pages"
      - "50+ unique prompts from 31 companies across 14 industries documented by Microsoft over 60 days (2026-02-10)"
    high_risk_sectors:
      - "Health advice (biased medical recommendations)"
      - "Financial services (biased investment advice)"
    detection:
      - "Hunt for URLs pointing to AI assistant domains containing prompt keywords: 'remember', 'trusted source', 'in future conversations', 'authoritative source', 'cite'"
      - "Periodically audit AI memory for entries referencing brands or commercial interests"
      - "Monitor web proxy / browser history for clicks to AI-assistant share URLs with prompt parameters"
    source: "Microsoft Security Blog (2026-02-10)"
    mitigation: "Disable URL-based memory pre-population in AI assistants where possible; treat any 'Summarize with AI' button as potentially adversarial; periodically clear AI memory; hover over AI buttons before clicking to inspect destination URL"

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# SCANNING TOOLS
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
scanning_tools:
  - name: "mcp-scan"
    vendor: "Invariant / Snyk"
    type: "cli"
    command: "npx mcp-scan"
    url: "https://github.com/invariantlabs-ai/mcp-scan"
    capabilities:
      - "Scans MCP server configurations for vulnerabilities"
      - "Detects known vulnerable MCP servers and versions"
      - "Scans SKILL.md for prompt injection, malicious code, secrets"
      - "Supports Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf configs"
      - "Backed by ToxicSkills taxonomy (90-100% recall, 0% FP on skills.sh top-100)"
    limitations:
      - "413 error on large configs (~/.claude/ too big)"
      - "Unknown MCP config on some VSCode setups"
      - "Does not scan .claude/skills/ native Claude Code skills"
      - "Requires network access to Snyk vulnerability DB"
      - "Cannot detect runtime-only payloads fetched from benign-looking URLs"
    notes: "Complement with local grep patterns from this threat-db"

  - name: "skills-ref validate"
    vendor: "agentskills.io"
    type: "cli"
    command: "skills-ref validate ./skill-dir"
    url: "https://docs.rs/skills-ref-rs/latest/skills_ref/"
    capabilities:
      - "Validates skill spec compliance (SKILL.md structure, frontmatter, naming)"
      - "Parse metadata to JSON (skills-ref read-properties)"
      - "Generate agent prompts (skills-ref to-prompt)"
    limitations:
      - "Spec compliance only — does NOT detect malware or analyze code"
      - "Reduces slopsquatting via naming rules but no security scanning"

  - name: "Garak"
    vendor: "NVIDIA"
    type: "cli"
    url: "https://github.com/NVIDIA/garak"
    capabilities:
      - "37+ probe modules for LLM vulnerabilities"
      - "Prompt injection detection"
      - "Jailbreak testing"
      - "Data exfiltration probes"
    limitations:
      - "LLM-focused, not MCP/skill-specific"
      - "Does not parse SKILL.md or MCP configs"

  - name: "MCP Fortress"
    vendor: "mcp-fortress"
    type: "mcp-server + dashboard"
    url: "https://github.com/mcp-fortress/mcp-fortress"
    capabilities:
      - "Scans npm/PyPI dependencies of MCP servers"
      - "Queries CVE databases for risk scores"
      - "Runtime protection — quarantines suspicious servers"
      - "Streaming telemetry dashboard"
      - "Can run as MCP server exposing security tools to Claude/Cursor"
    limitations:
      - "Newer project — smaller detection database than mcp-scan"

  - name: "SafeDep vet MCP"
    vendor: "SafeDep"
    type: "mcp-server"
    url: "https://safedep.io/introducing-vet-mcp-server/"
    capabilities:
      - "Software composition analysis integrated with agents"
      - "Detects slopsquatting, vulnerable and malicious packages"
      - "Screens package suggestions before pip/npm install"
    limitations:
      - "Package-focused — does not scan SKILL.md or agent configs"

  - name: "Koi Clawdex"
    vendor: "Koi Security"
    type: "clawhub-skill"
    capabilities:
      - "ClawHub security addon / MCP"
      - "Checks skills against Koi malicious skill database"
      - "Pre-install and retroactive scan support"
    limitations:
      - "ClawHub/OpenClaw specific"

  - name: "Mcpwn"
    vendor: "community"
    type: "cli"
    url: "https://hackers-arise.com/artificial-intelligence-in-cybersecurity-part-9-how-to-test-mcp-servers-for-security-vulnerabilities/"
    capabilities:
      - "Dedicated MCP vulnerability scanner"
      - "Detects RCE via command injection in MCP servers"
      - "Path traversal weakness detection"
      - "Prompt injection risk identification"
      - "Quick scan mode focused on RCE surface"
      - "Supports custom Python and Node.js MCP servers"
    limitations:
      - "Newer/community tool — smaller detection database than mcp-scan"
      - "Less coverage of skills.sh / ClawHub skill scanning"

  - name: "Proximity"
    vendor: "community (open-source)"
    type: "cli"
    url: "https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2025/10/29/proximity-open-source-mcp-security-scanner/"
    capabilities:
      - "Open-source MCP security scanner"
      - "Identifies prompts, tools, and resources exposed by MCP servers"
      - "Evaluates security risks via NOVA rule engine"
      - "Detects prompt injection and jailbreak attempts in tool descriptions"
    limitations:
      - "Early-stage open-source project — smaller detection database than commercial tools"
      - "Does not scan SKILL.md or agent config files"

  - name: "Enkrypt AI MCP Scanner"
    vendor: "Enkrypt AI"
    type: "cloud-saas"
    url: "https://www.enkryptai.com/mcp-scan"
    capabilities:
      - "Agentic static analysis for MCP servers"
      - "Detects command injection, path traversal, prompt injection, code injection"
      - "Identifies LLM-driven exploits and authorization gaps between docs and code"
      - "Protocol-level vulnerability detection for MCP JSON-RPC implementation"
    limitations:
      - "Commercial/SaaS — not open-source"
      - "Does not scan SKILL.md or ClawHub skills directly"

  - name: "Cisco MCP Scanner"
    vendor: "Cisco"
    type: "cli"
    url: "https://blogs.cisco.com/ai/ciscos-mcp-scanner-introduces-behavioral-code-threat-analysis"
    capabilities:
      - "Interprocedural dataflow analysis across MCP server functions"
      - "Behavioral code threat analysis — compares documented intent vs actual behavior"
      - "Detects hidden operations (undocumented network calls, file operations)"
      - "Supports black-box (YARA/API scanning) and white-box (source code) analysis"
      - "LLM-powered semantic analysis for intent vs behavior mismatch"
    limitations:
      - "Cisco-maintained — may require Cisco toolchain integration"
      - "Does not scan skills.sh / ClawHub ecosystem"

  - name: "NeuralTrust MCP Scanner"
    vendor: "NeuralTrust"
    type: "cloud-saas"
    url: "https://neuraltrust.ai/mcp-scanner"
    capabilities:
      - "Detects poisoned or redefined tools and unsafe endpoint exposures"
      - "Analyzes dependencies and integration risks"
      - "Policy validation for MCP manifests"
      - "Compliance mapping to OWASP, MITRE, and CWE frameworks"
    limitations:
      - "Commercial/SaaS platform"

  - name: "MCPScan.ai"
    vendor: "mcpscan.ai"
    type: "cloud-saas"
    url: "https://mcpscan.ai"
    capabilities:
      - "Cloud platform with specialized LLM classifiers for poisoning detection"
      - "Advanced Tool Metadata Scanner for MCP servers"
      - "Detects shell command patterns, code injection, resource exhaustion risks"
      - "Private scanning options for enterprise users"
    limitations:
      - "Cloud-based — requires sending server metadata to external platform"
      - "Not open-source"

  - name: "Mend SAST MCP"
    vendor: "Mend.io"
    type: "mcp-server"
    url: "https://appsecsanta.com/mend-sast"
    capabilities:
      - "Commercial SAST with MCP server integration"
      - "Real-time static analysis on AI-generated code via IDE"
      - "Software composition analysis (SCA) for dependencies"
      - "Integrates with Cursor, VS Code, Claude Code, Windsurf"
      - "mend-code-security-assistant tool: SAST scans"
      - "mend-dependencies-assistant tool: SCA checks"
    limitations:
      - "Commercial product — requires Mend.io subscription"
      - "Code scanning focus — does not scan SKILL.md or MCP configs directly"

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# DEFENSIVE FRAMEWORKS & BLOCKLISTS
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
defensive_resources:
  - name: "SAFE-MCP"
    url: "https://www.safemcp.org"
    type: "framework"
    description: "80+ techniques mapped to ATT&CK for MCP environments; policy-based blocklists"

  - name: "OpenClaw VirusTotal Integration"
    url: "https://thehackernews.com/2026/02/openclaw-integrates-virustotal-scanning.html"
    type: "platform"
    description: "ClawHub now hashes every skill bundle, checks VirusTotal, blocks/flags malicious; daily re-scan"

  - name: "Docker MCP Gateway"
    url: "https://www.docker.com/blog/mpc-horror-stories-cve-2025-49596-local-host-breach/"
    type: "tool"
    description: "Isolates MCP servers behind stdio transport; mitigates CVE-2025-49596-style localhost attacks"

  - name: "Snyk AI-BOM & Evo"
    url: "https://snyk.io/articles/snyk-mcp-cheat-sheet/"
    type: "platform"
    description: "AI bill of materials; inventory MCP servers and skills; enforce guardrails"

  - name: "Bitsight TRACE"
    url: "https://www.bitsight.com/blog/exposed-mcp-servers-reveal-new-ai-vulnerabilities"
    type: "threat-intel"
    description: "Continuous scanning of exposed MCP endpoints; ~1000 unauthenticated servers found"
    stats:
      exposed_servers: 1000
      no_auth: true
      risk_examples: ["Kubernetes clusters", "CRM access", "WhatsApp messaging", "arbitrary shell"]

  - name: "OWASP Top 10 for Agentic AI Security Risks 2026"
    url: "https://www.startupdefense.io/blog/owasp-top-10-agentic-ai-security-risks-2026"
    type: "framework"
    description: "Community-maintained OWASP-style Top 10 listing for agentic AI systems; covers Agent Goal Hijacking (#1), Supply Chain compromise, Tool Poisoning, Prompt Injection, Memory Poisoning, and more. Updated 2026-02-16."

  - name: "Anthropic Claude Code Security"
    url: "https://thehackernews.com/2026/02/anthropic-launches-claude-code-security.html"
    type: "tool"
    description: "Anthropic's AI-powered codebase security scanner with human-reviewed patch suggestions; launched 2026-02-21. Scans for vulnerabilities using Claude as the analysis engine with human oversight before applying fixes."

  - name: "GuardFive AI Agent Security Scanner"
    url: "https://guardfive.com/blog/the-complete-mcp-server-security-checklist-2026"
    type: "cloud-saas"
    description: "Scans MCP servers for tool poisoning, credential theft, and malicious attacks; provides MCP server security checklist aligned with 2026 threat landscape"

  - name: "Palo Alto AI Runtime Security - MCP Threat Detection"
    url: "https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/content/techdocs/en_US/ai-runtime-security/administration/prevent-network-security-threats/detect-mcp-threats"
    type: "platform"
    description: "Network-level MCP threat detection by Palo Alto; validates MCP tool communications and detects prompt injection and tool poisoning in real-time traffic (2026-02-09)"