Issue daemon auth tokens (mdt_) on pairing session claim, bound to workspace_id + daemon_id with 1-year expiry. Add DaemonAuth middleware that validates these tokens and falls back to JWT/PAT for backward compatibility. Apply middleware to all daemon routes except pairing endpoints.
112 lines
3.5 KiB
Go
112 lines
3.5 KiB
Go
package middleware
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import (
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"context"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/auth"
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db "github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/db/generated"
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)
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// Daemon context keys.
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type daemonContextKey int
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const (
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ctxKeyDaemonWorkspaceID daemonContextKey = iota
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ctxKeyDaemonID
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)
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// DaemonWorkspaceIDFromContext returns the workspace ID set by DaemonAuth middleware.
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func DaemonWorkspaceIDFromContext(ctx context.Context) string {
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id, _ := ctx.Value(ctxKeyDaemonWorkspaceID).(string)
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return id
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}
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// DaemonIDFromContext returns the daemon ID set by DaemonAuth middleware.
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func DaemonIDFromContext(ctx context.Context) string {
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id, _ := ctx.Value(ctxKeyDaemonID).(string)
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return id
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}
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// DaemonAuth validates daemon auth tokens (mdt_ prefix) or falls back to
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// JWT/PAT validation for backward compatibility with daemons that
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// authenticate via user tokens.
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func DaemonAuth(queries *db.Queries) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
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if authHeader == "" {
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slog.Debug("daemon_auth: missing authorization header", "path", r.URL.Path)
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writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "missing authorization header")
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return
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}
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tokenString := strings.TrimPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ")
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if tokenString == authHeader {
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slog.Debug("daemon_auth: invalid format", "path", r.URL.Path)
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writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid authorization format")
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return
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}
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// Daemon token: "mdt_" prefix.
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if strings.HasPrefix(tokenString, "mdt_") {
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hash := auth.HashToken(tokenString)
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dt, err := queries.GetDaemonTokenByHash(r.Context(), hash)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Warn("daemon_auth: invalid daemon token", "path", r.URL.Path, "error", err)
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writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid daemon token")
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return
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}
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ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), ctxKeyDaemonWorkspaceID, uuidToString(dt.WorkspaceID))
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ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ctxKeyDaemonID, dt.DaemonID)
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
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return
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}
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// Fallback: PAT tokens ("mul_" prefix).
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if strings.HasPrefix(tokenString, "mul_") {
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hash := auth.HashToken(tokenString)
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pat, err := queries.GetPersonalAccessTokenByHash(r.Context(), hash)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Warn("daemon_auth: invalid PAT", "path", r.URL.Path, "error", err)
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writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid token")
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return
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}
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r.Header.Set("X-User-ID", uuidToString(pat.UserID))
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go queries.UpdatePersonalAccessTokenLastUsed(context.Background(), pat.ID)
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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// Fallback: JWT tokens.
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token, err := jwt.Parse(tokenString, func(token *jwt.Token) (any, error) {
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if _, ok := token.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodHMAC); !ok {
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return nil, jwt.ErrSignatureInvalid
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}
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return auth.JWTSecret(), nil
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})
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if err != nil || !token.Valid {
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slog.Warn("daemon_auth: invalid token", "path", r.URL.Path, "error", err)
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writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid token")
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return
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}
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claims, ok := token.Claims.(jwt.MapClaims)
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if !ok {
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writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid claims")
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return
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}
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sub, ok := claims["sub"].(string)
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if !ok || strings.TrimSpace(sub) == "" {
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writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid claims")
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return
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}
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r.Header.Set("X-User-ID", sub)
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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}
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