tududi/backend/modules/tasks/attachments.js
Chris c2e9a1aa21
feat: Add OIDC/SSO authentication support (#1008)
* feat: add OIDC/SSO database schema and models (Phase 1)

Add database foundation for OpenID Connect authentication:

Database Migrations:
- Create oidc_identities table (links users to OIDC accounts)
- Create oidc_state_nonces table (OAuth state/nonce for CSRF protection)
- Create auth_audit_log table (security event logging)
- Make password_digest nullable in users table (allow OIDC-only users)

Models:
- OIDCIdentity: Links users to external OIDC providers
- OIDCStateNonce: Temporary OAuth state management
- AuthAuditLog: Authentication event audit trail

Changes:
- Updated User model to allow null password_digest
- Added model associations in models/index.js
- All migrations tested and verified

Related to #977

* feat: add OIDC core services (Phase 2)

- Install openid-client@^6.2.0 for OIDC protocol support
- Implement providerConfig.js for loading providers from .env
  - Support single provider or numbered providers (OIDC_PROVIDER_1_*, etc.)
  - Auto-provision and admin email domain configuration
  - Provider caching for performance
- Implement stateManager.js for OAuth state/nonce management
  - CSRF protection with 10-minute TTL
  - One-time use state consumption
  - Automatic cleanup of expired states
- Implement auditService.js for authentication event logging
  - Track login success/failure, logout, OIDC linking/unlinking
  - Store IP address, user agent, and metadata
  - Support for event queries and retention cleanup
- Add comprehensive unit tests (60 tests, all passing)
  - providerConfig: 36 tests for env parsing and validation
  - stateManager: 12 tests for state lifecycle and security
  - auditService: 12 tests for event logging and queries

Phase 2 completes the backend core services needed for OIDC authentication.

* feat: implement OIDC authentication flow (Phase 3)

Core OIDC Flow (service.js):
- Provider discovery with issuer caching
- Authorization URL generation with state/nonce
- OAuth callback handling and token exchange
- ID token validation using openid-client
- Token refresh functionality

JIT User Provisioning (provisioningService.js):
- Auto-create users from OIDC claims
- Link existing email accounts to OIDC identities
- Admin role assignment based on email domain rules
- Automatic username generation from email
- Transaction-safe identity creation

Identity Management (oidcIdentityService.js):
- List user's linked OIDC identities
- Link additional providers to existing accounts
- Unlink identities with safety checks
- Prevent unlinking last auth method
- Update identity claims on login

HTTP Layer (controller.js + routes.js):
- GET /api/oidc/providers - List configured providers
- GET /api/oidc/auth/:slug - Initiate OIDC flow
- GET /api/oidc/callback/:slug - Handle OAuth callback
- POST /api/oidc/link/:slug - Link provider to current user
- DELETE /api/oidc/unlink/:id - Unlink identity
- GET /api/oidc/identities - Get user's identities

Integration:
- Register OIDC routes in Express app (public + authenticated)
- Update auth service to reject password login for OIDC-only users
- Audit logging for all OIDC operations
- Session creation on successful authentication

Security:
- State/nonce CSRF protection
- One-time use state consumption
- Transaction-safe user provisioning
- Foreign key constraints enforced

* feat: implement OIDC frontend login flow (Phase 4)

- Created OIDCProviderButtons component for SSO login options
- Created OIDCCallback component for OAuth callback handling
- Updated Login page to fetch and display OIDC providers
- Added /auth/callback/:provider route to App.tsx
- Added i18n translations for OIDC UI elements
- Downgraded openid-client to v5.7.0 (CommonJS compatibility)
- Fixed linting issues in backend OIDC modules

Phase 4 completes the frontend login flow for OIDC/SSO authentication.
Users can now see configured SSO providers on the login page.

* feat: implement OIDC account linking UI (Phase 5)

Add Connected Accounts section to Profile Security tab allowing users to:
- View linked OIDC provider accounts
- Link new SSO providers to their account
- Unlink OIDC identities with validation
- Prevent unlinking last authentication method

Backend changes:
- Add has_password virtual field to User model
- Include has_password in profile API response
- Track whether user has password set for validation

Frontend changes:
- Create oidcService for OIDC API operations
- Create ConnectedAccounts component with link/unlink flows
- Add confirmation dialog before unlinking accounts
- Validate that users cannot unlink their last auth method
- Show warning if user has no password set
- Integrate Connected Accounts into SecurityTab

User experience:
- View all linked SSO provider accounts with email and link date
- Link additional providers via "Link Provider" buttons
- Unlink with two-step confirmation to prevent accidents
- Clear error messages when unlinking would leave no auth method
- Warning message suggesting password setup for OIDC-only users

Fixes #977

* feat: complete OIDC documentation and UI improvements (Phase 6)

This commit completes Phase 6 of the OIDC/SSO implementation with comprehensive
documentation, bug fixes, and UI reorganization.

Documentation:
- Add comprehensive user guide at docs/10-oidc-sso.md with:
  - Setup guides for 6 major providers (Google, Okta, Keycloak, Authentik, PocketID, Azure AD)
  - Configuration examples for single and multiple providers
  - User features documentation (login, account linking, management)
  - Advanced topics (auto-provisioning, admin role assignment, hybrid auth)
  - Comprehensive troubleshooting section
  - Security considerations and best practices
- Update README.md with OIDC/SSO section and quick setup examples

Internationalization:
- Add i18n support to OIDCProviderButtons component
- Add translation keys for all OIDC UI text
- Update English translations with "sign_in_with" key

Bug Fixes:
- Fix oidcService.ts to correctly unwrap API responses
  - Backend returns {providers: [...]} and {identities: [...]}
  - Frontend was expecting plain arrays, causing "map is not a function" error
- Fix initiateOIDCLink to properly handle POST response

UI Improvements:
- Move OIDC/SSO to dedicated tab in profile settings
  - Create new OIDCTab component with green LinkIcon
  - Remove ConnectedAccounts from SecurityTab
  - Add OIDC tab between Security and API Keys tabs
  - Update ProfileSettings with new tab configuration
- Security tab now focuses solely on password management

Testing:
- All linting passes
- All tests pass (82 suites, 1223 tests)

Related to #977

* feat: add OIDC/SSO translations for all 24 languages

Add i18n support for OIDC/SSO features across all supported languages:
- "Sign in with {{provider}}" button text
- "OIDC/SSO" tab label in profile settings
- OIDC authentication flow messages

Translations added for: Arabic, Bulgarian, Danish, German, Greek, Spanish,
Finnish, French, Indonesian, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Dutch, Norwegian,
Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Russian, Slovenian, Swedish, Turkish,
Ukrainian, Vietnamese, and Chinese.

* fix: resolve 13 CodeQL security alerts

This commit addresses critical security vulnerabilities identified by CodeQL scanning:

**Security Configuration (2 fixes)**
- Fix insecure Helmet configuration - enable CSP and HSTS in production
- Fix clear text cookie transmission - enable secure cookies in production

**Path Injection (3 fixes)**
- Add path validation in users/controller.js to prevent arbitrary file deletion
- Add path validation in users/service.js for avatar operations
- Add path sanitization in attachment-utils.js deleteFileFromDisk function

**Cross-Site Scripting (1 fix)**
- Fix XSS vulnerability in GeneralTab.tsx avatar URL handling
- Add URL sanitization to prevent javascript: protocol attacks

**URL Security (2 fixes)**
- Fix double escaping in url/service.js HTML entity decoding
- Fix incomplete URL sanitization for YouTube domain validation

**Denial of Service (1 fix)**
- Add loop bound protection in inboxProcessingService.js (10k char limit)

**Rate Limiting (3 fixes)**
- Add rate limiting to auth routes (register, verify-email)
- Add rate limiting to task attachment upload/delete endpoints
- Add rate limiting to user avatar upload/delete endpoints

**GitHub Actions Security (1 fix)**
- Add explicit read-only permissions to CI workflow

Note: CSRF middleware (#10) requires frontend changes and is tracked separately.

Relates to PR #1008

* fix: allow test files in path validation for tests

* fix: format long condition in attachment-utils for Prettier compliance

Break the path validation condition across multiple lines to meet Prettier formatting requirements and fix CI linting failure.

* fix: resolve CodeQL security alerts

- Add rate limiting to OIDC authentication routes using authLimiter and authenticatedApiLimiter
- Implement CSRF protection middleware using csrf-sync (skips for API tokens and test environment)
- Add CSRF token endpoint at /api/csrf-token
- Fix incomplete URL scheme validation in GeneralTab to block all dangerous schemes (javascript:, data:, vbscript:, file:)

This addresses 5 high-severity CodeQL security vulnerabilities:
- Missing rate limiting on OIDC auth routes
- Missing CSRF middleware protection
- Incomplete URL sanitization in avatar handling

All 1223 tests passing.

* fix: implement CSRF protection with lusca for CodeQL compliance

Add CSRF protection using lusca.csrf (CodeQL's recommended library) to
protect session-based authentication while supporting hybrid auth patterns.

Implementation:
- Pre-check middleware marks exempt requests (test env, Bearer tokens)
- Lusca CSRF middleware applied with exemption flag check
- Session-based requests require valid x-csrf-token header
- Bearer token requests exempt (don't use cookies)
- Test environment exempt for test execution

This addresses CodeQL security alert js/missing-token-validation while
maintaining support for both cookie-based and token-based authentication.

Related: #977 (OIDC/SSO authentication feature)
2026-04-13 12:17:35 +03:00

302 lines
9.6 KiB
JavaScript

const express = require('express');
const multer = require('multer');
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const { getConfig } = require('../../config/config');
const config = getConfig();
const { TaskAttachment, Task } = require('../../models');
const { uid } = require('../../utils/uid');
const { logError } = require('../../services/logService');
const {
validateFileType,
deleteFileFromDisk,
getFileUrl,
} = require('../../utils/attachment-utils');
const { getAuthenticatedUserId } = require('../../utils/request-utils');
const permissionsService = require('../../services/permissionsService');
const { createResourceLimiter } = require('../../middleware/rateLimiter');
const router = express.Router();
// Ensure authenticated
router.use((req, res, next) => {
const userId = getAuthenticatedUserId(req);
if (!userId) {
return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Authentication required' });
}
req.authUserId = userId;
next();
});
// Configure multer for file uploads
const storage = multer.diskStorage({
destination: function (req, file, cb) {
const uploadDir = path.join(config.uploadPath, 'tasks');
if (!fs.existsSync(uploadDir)) {
fs.mkdirSync(uploadDir, { recursive: true });
}
cb(null, uploadDir);
},
filename: function (req, file, cb) {
const uniqueSuffix = Date.now() + '-' + Math.round(Math.random() * 1e9);
cb(null, 'task-' + uniqueSuffix + path.extname(file.originalname));
},
});
const upload = multer({
storage: storage,
limits: {
fileSize: 10 * 1024 * 1024, // 10MB limit
},
fileFilter: function (req, file, cb) {
if (validateFileType(file.mimetype)) {
return cb(null, true);
} else {
cb(new Error('File type not allowed'));
}
},
});
// Upload attachment to task
router.post(
'/upload/task-attachment',
createResourceLimiter,
upload.single('file'),
async (req, res) => {
try {
const { taskUid } = req.body;
const userId = req.authUserId;
if (!taskUid) {
// Clean up uploaded file
if (req.file) {
await deleteFileFromDisk(req.file.path);
}
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Task UID is required' });
}
// Find task
const task = await Task.findOne({ where: { uid: taskUid } });
if (!task) {
// Clean up uploaded file
if (req.file) {
await deleteFileFromDisk(req.file.path);
}
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Task not found' });
}
// Check if user has write access to the task (includes shared projects)
const access = await permissionsService.getAccess(
userId,
'task',
taskUid
);
const LEVELS = { none: 0, ro: 1, rw: 2, admin: 3 };
if (LEVELS[access] < LEVELS.rw) {
// Clean up uploaded file
if (req.file) {
await deleteFileFromDisk(req.file.path);
}
return res
.status(403)
.json({ error: 'Not authorized to upload to this task' });
}
// Check attachment count limit (20 max)
const attachmentCount = await TaskAttachment.count({
where: { task_id: task.id },
});
if (attachmentCount >= 20) {
// Clean up uploaded file
if (req.file) {
await deleteFileFromDisk(req.file.path);
}
return res.status(400).json({
error: 'Maximum 20 attachments allowed per task',
});
}
if (!req.file) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'No file uploaded' });
}
// Create attachment record
const attachment = await TaskAttachment.create({
uid: uid(),
task_id: task.id,
user_id: userId,
original_filename: req.file.originalname,
stored_filename: req.file.filename,
file_size: req.file.size,
mime_type: req.file.mimetype,
file_path: `tasks/${req.file.filename}`,
});
// Return attachment with file URL
const attachmentData = {
...attachment.toJSON(),
file_url: getFileUrl(req.file.filename),
};
res.status(201).json(attachmentData);
} catch (error) {
logError('Error uploading attachment:', error);
// Clean up uploaded file on error
if (req.file) {
await deleteFileFromDisk(req.file.path);
}
res.status(500).json({
error: 'Failed to upload attachment',
details: error.message,
});
}
}
);
// Get all attachments for a task
router.get('/tasks/:taskUid/attachments', async (req, res) => {
try {
const { taskUid } = req.params;
const userId = req.authUserId;
// Find task
const task = await Task.findOne({ where: { uid: taskUid } });
if (!task) {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Task not found' });
}
// Check if user has read access to the task (includes shared projects)
const access = await permissionsService.getAccess(
userId,
'task',
taskUid
);
const LEVELS = { none: 0, ro: 1, rw: 2, admin: 3 };
if (LEVELS[access] < LEVELS.ro) {
return res
.status(403)
.json({ error: 'Not authorized to view this task' });
}
// Get attachments
const attachments = await TaskAttachment.findAll({
where: { task_id: task.id },
order: [['created_at', 'ASC']],
});
// Add file URLs
const attachmentsWithUrls = attachments.map((att) => ({
...att.toJSON(),
file_url: getFileUrl(att.stored_filename),
}));
res.json(attachmentsWithUrls);
} catch (error) {
logError('Error fetching attachments:', error);
res.status(500).json({
error: 'Failed to fetch attachments',
details: error.message,
});
}
});
// Delete an attachment
router.delete(
'/tasks/:taskUid/attachments/:attachmentUid',
createResourceLimiter,
async (req, res) => {
try {
const { taskUid, attachmentUid } = req.params;
const userId = req.authUserId;
// Find task
const task = await Task.findOne({ where: { uid: taskUid } });
if (!task) {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Task not found' });
}
// Check if user has write access to the task (includes shared projects)
const access = await permissionsService.getAccess(
userId,
'task',
taskUid
);
const LEVELS = { none: 0, ro: 1, rw: 2, admin: 3 };
if (LEVELS[access] < LEVELS.rw) {
return res
.status(403)
.json({ error: 'Not authorized to modify this task' });
}
// Find attachment
const attachment = await TaskAttachment.findOne({
where: { uid: attachmentUid, task_id: task.id },
});
if (!attachment) {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Attachment not found' });
}
// Delete file from disk
const filePath = path.join(config.uploadPath, attachment.file_path);
await deleteFileFromDisk(filePath);
// Delete database record
await attachment.destroy();
res.json({ message: 'Attachment deleted successfully' });
} catch (error) {
logError('Error deleting attachment:', error);
res.status(500).json({
error: 'Failed to delete attachment',
details: error.message,
});
}
}
);
// Download an attachment
router.get('/attachments/:attachmentUid/download', async (req, res) => {
try {
const { attachmentUid } = req.params;
const userId = req.authUserId;
// Find attachment
const attachment = await TaskAttachment.findOne({
where: { uid: attachmentUid },
include: [{ model: Task, required: true }],
});
if (!attachment) {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Attachment not found' });
}
// Check if user has read access to the task (includes shared projects)
const access = await permissionsService.getAccess(
userId,
'task',
attachment.Task.uid
);
const LEVELS = { none: 0, ro: 1, rw: 2, admin: 3 };
if (LEVELS[access] < LEVELS.ro) {
return res
.status(403)
.json({ error: 'Not authorized to download this file' });
}
// Send file
const filePath = path.join(config.uploadPath, attachment.file_path);
res.download(filePath, attachment.original_filename);
} catch (error) {
logError('Error downloading attachment:', error);
res.status(500).json({
error: 'Failed to download attachment',
details: error.message,
});
}
});
module.exports = router;