Major audit correcting misleading documentation about Claude Code behavior: ### Fixed - `--add-dir`: permissions (not context loading) - `excludePatterns` → `permissions.deny` (never existed) - `.claudeignore` removed (not an official feature) - "selective loading" myth → lazy loading reality - Invented CLI flags (`--think`, `--headless`, `--learn`) → prompt keywords - `@` file reference: "loads automatically" → "reads on-demand" ### Added - Session Search Tool (`cs`) - zero-dep bash script for finding sessions - Security section: Known limitations of permissions.deny 15 files modified, 516 insertions, 200 deletions Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
281 lines
9.3 KiB
Markdown
281 lines
9.3 KiB
Markdown
# Data Privacy & Retention Guide
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> **Critical**: Everything you share with Claude Code is sent to Anthropic servers. This guide explains what data leaves your machine and how to protect sensitive information.
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## TL;DR - Retention Summary
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| Configuration | Retention Period | Training | How to Enable |
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|---------------|------------------|----------|---------------|
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| **Default** | 5 years | Yes | (default state) |
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| **Opt-out** | 30 days | No | [claude.ai/settings](https://claude.ai/settings/data-privacy-controls) |
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| **Enterprise (ZDR)** | 0 days | No | Enterprise contract |
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**Immediate action**: [Disable training data usage](https://claude.ai/settings/data-privacy-controls) to reduce retention from 5 years to 30 days.
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---
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## 1. Understanding the Data Flow
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### What Leaves Your Machine
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When you use Claude Code, the following data is sent to Anthropic:
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```
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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
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│ YOUR LOCAL MACHINE │
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├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
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│ • Prompts you type │
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│ • Files Claude reads (including .env if not excluded!) │
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│ • MCP server results (SQL queries, API responses) │
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│ • Bash command outputs │
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│ • Error messages and stack traces │
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└───────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
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│
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▼ HTTPS
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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
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│ ANTHROPIC API │
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├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
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│ • Processes your request │
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│ • Stores conversation based on retention policy │
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│ • May use data for model training (if not opted out) │
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└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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```
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### What This Means in Practice
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| Scenario | Data Sent to Anthropic |
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|----------|------------------------|
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| You ask Claude to read `src/app.ts` | Full file contents |
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| You run `git status` via Claude | Command output |
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| MCP executes `SELECT * FROM users` | Query results with user data |
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| Claude reads `.env` file | API keys, passwords, secrets |
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| Error occurs in your code | Full stack trace with paths |
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---
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## 2. Anthropic Retention Policies
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### Tier 1: Default (Training Enabled)
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- **Retention**: 5 years
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- **Usage**: Model improvement, training data
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- **Applies to**: Free, Pro, Max plans without opt-out
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### Tier 2: Training Disabled (Opt-Out)
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- **Retention**: 30 days
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- **Usage**: Safety monitoring, abuse prevention only
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- **How to enable**:
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1. Go to https://claude.ai/settings/data-privacy-controls
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2. Disable "Allow model training on your conversations"
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3. Changes apply immediately
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### Tier 3: Enterprise API (Zero Data Retention)
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- **Retention**: 0 days (real-time processing only)
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- **Usage**: None - data not stored
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- **Requires**: Enterprise contract with Anthropic
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- **Use cases**: HIPAA, GDPR, PCI-DSS compliance, government contracts
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---
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## 3. Known Risks
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### Risk 1: Automatic File Reading
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Claude Code reads files to understand context. By default, this includes:
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- `.env` and `.env.local` files (API keys, passwords)
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- `credentials.json`, `secrets.yaml` (service accounts)
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- SSH keys if in workspace scope
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- Database connection strings
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**Mitigation**: Configure `excludePatterns` (see Section 4).
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### Risk 2: MCP Database Access
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When you configure database MCP servers (Neon, Supabase, PlanetScale):
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```
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Your Query: "Show me recent orders"
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↓
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MCP Executes: SELECT * FROM orders LIMIT 100
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↓
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Results Sent: 100 rows with customer names, emails, addresses
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↓
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Stored at Anthropic: According to your retention tier
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```
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**Mitigation**: Never connect production databases. Use dev/staging with anonymized data.
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### Risk 3: Shell Command Output
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Bash commands and their output are included in context:
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```bash
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# This output goes to Anthropic:
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$ env | grep API
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OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-abc123...
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STRIPE_SECRET_KEY=sk_live_...
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```
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**Mitigation**: Use hooks to filter sensitive command outputs.
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### Risk 4: Documented Community Incidents
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| Incident | Source |
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|----------|--------|
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| Claude reads `.env` by default | r/ClaudeAI, GitHub issues |
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| DROP TABLE attempts on poorly configured MCP | r/ClaudeAI |
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| Credentials exposed via environment variables | GitHub issues |
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| Prompt injection via malicious MCP servers | r/programming |
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---
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## 4. Protective Measures
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### Immediate Actions
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#### 4.1 Opt-Out of Training
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1. Visit https://claude.ai/settings/data-privacy-controls
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2. Toggle OFF "Allow model training"
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3. Retention reduces from 5 years to 30 days
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#### 4.2 Configure File Exclusions
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In `.claude/settings.json`, use `permissions.deny` to block access to sensitive files:
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```json
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{
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"permissions": {
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"deny": [
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"Read(./.env*)",
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"Edit(./.env*)",
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"Write(./.env*)",
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"Bash(cat .env*)",
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"Bash(head .env*)",
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"Read(./secrets/**)",
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"Read(./**/credentials*)",
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"Read(./**/*.pem)",
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"Read(./**/*.key)",
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"Read(./**/service-account*.json)"
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]
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}
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}
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```
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> **Note**: The old `excludePatterns` and `ignorePatterns` settings were deprecated in October 2025. Use `permissions.deny` instead.
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> **Warning**: `permissions.deny` has [known limitations](./security-hardening.md#known-limitations-of-permissionsdeny). For defense-in-depth, combine with security hooks and external secrets management.
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#### 4.3 Use Security Hooks
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Create `.claude/hooks/PreToolUse.sh`:
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```bash
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#!/bin/bash
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INPUT=$(cat)
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TOOL_NAME=$(echo "$INPUT" | jq -r '.tool.name')
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if [[ "$TOOL_NAME" == "Read" ]]; then
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FILE_PATH=$(echo "$INPUT" | jq -r '.tool.input.file_path')
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# Block reading sensitive files
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if [[ "$FILE_PATH" =~ \.env|credentials|secrets|\.pem|\.key ]]; then
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echo "BLOCKED: Attempted to read sensitive file: $FILE_PATH" >&2
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exit 2 # Block the operation
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fi
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fi
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```
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### MCP Best Practices
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| Rule | Rationale |
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|------|-----------|
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| **Never connect production databases** | All query results sent to Anthropic |
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| **Use read-only database users** | Prevents DROP/DELETE/UPDATE accidents |
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| **Anonymize development data** | Reduces PII exposure risk |
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| **Create minimal test datasets** | Less data = less risk |
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| **Audit MCP server sources** | Third-party MCPs may have vulnerabilities |
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### For Teams
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| Environment | Recommendation |
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|-------------|----------------|
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| **Development** | Opt-out + exclusions + anonymized data |
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| **Staging** | Consider Enterprise API if handling real data |
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| **Production** | NEVER connect Claude Code directly |
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---
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## 5. Comparison with Other Tools
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| Feature | Claude Code + MCP | Cursor | GitHub Copilot |
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|---------|-------------------|--------|----------------|
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| Data scope sent | Full SQL results, files | Code snippets | Code snippets |
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| Production DB access | Yes (via MCP) | Limited | Not designed for |
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| Default retention | 5 years | Variable | 30 days |
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| Training by default | Yes | Opt-in | Opt-in |
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**Key difference**: MCP creates a unique attack surface because MCP servers are separate processes with independent network/filesystem access.
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---
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## 6. Enterprise Considerations
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### When to Use Enterprise API (ZDR)
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- Handling PII (names, emails, addresses)
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- Regulated industries (HIPAA, GDPR, PCI-DSS)
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- Client data processing
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- Government contracts
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- Financial services
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### Evaluation Checklist
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- [ ] Data classification policy exists for your organization
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- [ ] API tier matches data sensitivity requirements
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- [ ] Team trained on privacy controls
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- [ ] Incident response plan for potential data exposure
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- [ ] Legal/compliance review completed
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---
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## 7. Quick Reference
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### Links
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| Resource | URL |
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|----------|-----|
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| Privacy settings | https://claude.ai/settings/data-privacy-controls |
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| Anthropic usage policy | https://www.anthropic.com/policies |
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| Enterprise information | https://www.anthropic.com/enterprise |
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| Terms of service | https://www.anthropic.com/legal/consumer-terms |
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### Commands
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```bash
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# Check current Claude config
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claude /config
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# Verify exclusions are loaded
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claude /status
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# Run privacy audit
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./examples/scripts/audit-scan.sh
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```
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### Quick Checklist
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- [ ] Training opt-out enabled at claude.ai/settings
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- [ ] `.env*` files blocked via `permissions.deny` in settings.json
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- [ ] No production database connections via MCP
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- [ ] Security hooks installed for sensitive file access
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- [ ] Team aware of data flow to Anthropic
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---
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## Changelog
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- 2026-01: Initial version - documenting retention policies and protective measures
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